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ABSTRACT 
Income inequality is prevalent in both developed and developing countries.  In all of 
these countries there are workers who are highly paid while others are given very 
low wages. The disgruntled low-paid workers in these countries usually force their 
governments to intervene in the labour market and introduce the redistributive 
policies like the minimum wage policy. Governments usually accede to these 
demands of low-paid workers because they do not want to invite political troubles. 
That led to an increase in the number of countries using minimum wage policy as 
redistributive mechanism in the late 20th century and the beginning of the 21st 
century. 
Minimum wage policy is, however, a very controversial issue. Supporters of 
minimum wages regard the policy as ideal because it provides social protection to 
un-unionised and low-paid workers with little or no bargaining power. The opponents 
of the policy on the other hand argue that wages in the labour market should be 
determined by the forces of demand and supply. It is argued that wages that are 
artificially determined lead to the rationing of jobs and displacement of the very same 
low-paid workers that the policy is intended to protect, as employers are forced to 
replace unskilled workers with skilled workers and machines. 
South Africa’s agricultural sector workers were among some of the least paid 
workers in the country. Employers were able to exploit these workers because they 
were not protected by any labour legislation that workers in other sectors were 
afforded. Farm workers were only protected by common law. It was only in the 1990s 
that labour legislations like Basic Conditions of Employment Act, Labour Relations 
Act, Employment Equity Act, Extension of Security Act and Tenure Act and Skills 
Development Act were extended to the agricultural sector in an attempt to protect the 
working conditions of vulnerable workers. These acts as well failed to improve the 
working conditions of the agricultural sector workers and that prompted the Minister 
of Labour to instruct the Director-General of Labour to conduct the necessary 
investigations to see if it could be necessary to introduce minimum standard of 
employment in the sector, including minimum wages. That led to the adoption of 
Sectoral Determination 8 of 2003 which introduced sectoral minimum wage in the 
sector. The sectoral minimum wage which came into effect in 2003 was increased 
v 
 
annually by the rate of inflation plus one per cent. It was only in 2013, after the 
Western Cape farm workers went on strike for higher wages, that the minimum wage 
was raised by 52 per cent. As argued by the opponents of minimum wages, job 
losses occurred among unskilled workers.  
The implementation of minimum wage policy in the agricultural sector was 
problematic, as the policy was not properly complied with due to several compliance 
concerns. Apart from there being insufficient inspectors to monitor and investigate 
cases of non-compliance, inspectors were under-trained and under-equipped. Fines 
imposed on offenders were too small, which further encouraged disregard for the 
policy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Most countries use minimum wage legislation as a tool for reducing income 
inequality between the rich and the poor, and to reduce poverty among the low-paid 
workers. They try to achieve these goals by raising the wages of the working poor 
towards or above poverty line (Devereux 2005: 1). There is, however, no general 
agreement regarding the role played by minimum wages as a tool for reducing 
income inequality and poverty among the working poor.  
 
The monopsony case argues that employers of vulnerable workers usually set their 
wage levels much lower than the market rate and this pushes the low-paid workers 
into poverty. The supporters of the policy believe that the authorities should protect 
the low-paid workers by introducing minimum wages. They believe that forcing the 
monopsonist to pay a minimum wage would not only lead to an increase in wages of 
the working poor, but that it would also lead to an increase in employment in those 
sectors where minimum wages are introduced (Edward & Gilman 1999: 21). The 
employment levels in such sectors will continue to rise as long as the minimum wage 
is still below the equilibrium wage rate. Employment will only begin to drop if 
minimum wages could be set at the levels which are above the equilibrium wage rate 
(Jones 1997: 25). 
The standard competitive model, on the other hand, argues that minimum wage 
policy hurts the very same low-paid workers whom it is intended to help. They hold 
that minimum wages make employers lay off the least skilled, least experienced and 
least educated workers. Employers are forced to lay off these workers because the 
economic value of their work is lower than the value of their work (Stigler 1946: 358). 
This makes employers employ qualified and skilled workers who are more productive 
and reject workers with lower productivity (Schuldt et al. 2012: 265). Employers 
again replace the less productive workers with capital intensive methods of 
production (Saayman & Middelberg 2014: 344). 
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In developing countries where there is usually perfect mobility of workers between 
the formal and informal sectors, workers who lose their jobs in the formal sector tend 
to search for employment in the informal sector where wages are not affected by 
minimum wage policy. This only helps to depress wages in the sector even further 
and the situation of the people employed in the sector becomes even worse (Jones 
1997: 22).  
Opponents of minimum wages argue that even workers who retain their jobs do not 
all benefit from the minimum wage policy either, because most employers do not 
comply with the policy. Most employers are encouraged to cheat because they 
realise that the chances of being detected are very low, as enforcement is poor. This 
is most relevant in developing countries where the inspectors are unable to conduct 
regular inspections due to resource constraints (Jones 1997).  
 
1.1 Background information 
Unlike most African countries, South Africa experienced a smooth transition from 
apartheid to the new democratic government in 1994. For the past 23 years the 
country had undergone considerable political, social and economic changes. The 
new democratic government, however, continued to experience a number of 
daunting challenges like high levels of poverty and crime. Over 51 per cent of South 
Africans were living below the poverty line in 2016. Poverty was mainly caused by 
high levels of unemployment and low wages. The official unemployment rate for 
South Africa is currently standing at 27.7 per cent (Menon 2017). The expanded 
unemployment rate is even higher at 36.6 per cent (Daily Maverick 2017).  
 
The challenging aspect of poverty is that it is not only confined to unemployed 
people. There are also a large number of people who are living in poverty despite the 
fact that they are working. The main cause of poverty among these people is low 
pay. About 6.7 million South African workers earned wages, which were below the 
working poverty line of R4 317 per month while 4.6 million earned below R2 500 per 
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month in 2016. This made South African society to be one of the highly unequal 
societies in the world. The high level of inequality is made more evident by the Gini 
coeffient, which the World Bank estimated to be between 0.66 and 0.70 in 2016 
(National Treasury 2016). 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
South Africa’s agricultural sector workers were among the workers whose lives were 
seriously disadvantaged by the low pay they had received. These workers were 
poorly paid both before and after the democratic government came to power in 1994. 
In 1986, for instance, the average income for farm workers was R104 per month, 
benefit in-kind included. In 1992, it was R225,25 per month (Weideman 2004: 335). 
About 77 per cent of South Africa’s agricultural sector workers were paid only R322 
per month in 2001 (Department of Labour 2010: 35). The trend has continued 
because currently the sectoral minimum wage in this sector is  
R2 778,83 per month, which is still much lower than the working poor poverty line of 
R4 317 per month (Free State Agriculture 2017). 
 
The low wage levels made it difficult for farm workers to meet their basic needs and 
those of their dependants. Farm workers could not even afford nutritious food for 
their children. This made most children of farm workers to be stunted and 
underweight (Visser & Ferrer 2015).  
 
The low pay and poor treatment which farm workers received from their employers 
was partly due to the fact that most of these workers were not trade union members. 
Their rights as workers were also not protected by labour laws. Instead, their rights 
were only protected by common law. It was only in the 1990s that government 
introduced some laws in the sector with the intention of improving the working and 
living conditions of the farm workers. Legislation like the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act, the Agricultural Labour Act, the Labour Relations Act, the 
Employment Equity Act, the Skills Development Act and the Extension of Security 
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and Tenure Act were either introduced or extended to the agricultural sector to 
protect the vulnerable workers (Grub 2005). 
 
Government’s intervention did not do much to rescue the working poor from poverty 
and the state of poverty worsened in the sector instead. The worsening state of 
poverty among the agricultural sector workers made the Minister of Labour to give 
directives to the Director-General of the Department of Labour to conduct 
investigations to determine if it would be possible to introduce minimum standards of 
employment in the sector, including minimum wages. This led to the introduction of 
sectoral minimum wage in the sector, which came into effect in 2003 (Bhorat et al. 
2014). The minimum wage, which in the beginning was about 17 per cent, was to be 
increased annually by the inflation rate plus one percent (Department of Labour 
2003). The sectoral minimum wage was again increased by 52 per cent in 2013 after 
the Western Cape farm workers went on strike for higher pay in 2012 (Business Day 
Live 2013).   
It is, however, not certain to how the sectoral minimum wages have affected 
employment of both skilled and unskilled workers in the agricultural sector. It is not 
clear if minimum wages in the sector led to an increase in both wages and 
employment of low-paid workers as predicted by the monopsony model or whether it 
led to a replacement of these vulnerable workers by skilled workers and machines as 
predicted by the standard competitive model.  
 
This study is intended to investigate the employment effect of minimum wages on 
agricultural sector workers. It is intended to determine whether minimum wages led 
to an increase in employment of unskilled workers as predicted by the supporters of 
the wage policy or whether it has made employers in the sector to replace unskilled 
workers with skilled workers and machines as predicted by the standard competitive 
model.  
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1.3 Aims of the study  
Given the lack of clear understanding of what actually happens to employment after 
the introduction or raising of minimum wages, which are used in most countries (both 
developed and developing) as a tool to support decent work goals and to strengthen 
the social protection floor and reduce poverty among the working poor, the aim of 
this study is to provide an overview of the theory and implications of minimum wages 
globally and in South Africa’s agricultural sector.  
The sub-objectives are as follows: 
 To examine the theory of minimum wages;  
 To look at the implications of minimum wages globally; 
 To see if minimum wage policy made employers of the farming sector prefer 
skilled workers and machines over unskilled workers as predicted by the 
standard competitive model; and 
 To find out if the minimum wage policy has been implemented and enforced 
properly in South Africa’s farming sector.  
 
1.4 Research questions 
The crucial questions that should be answered are as follows: 
 Why were minimum wages introduced in the agricultural sector and what effect 
did they have on employment? 
 What effect did they have on the use of skilled labour and machines in the 
agricultural sector? 
 What effect did minimum wages have on employment globally? 
 Were minimum wages properly implemented and enforced in South Africa’s 
agricultural sector? 
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1.5 Delineation 
The research will focus on the working poor and skilled workers in the agricultural 
sector of South Africa from 2002. This is the period before the introduction of 
sectoral minimum wage in the agricultural sector and 2005, which is the period after 
minimum wage has been introduced. It will also focus on 2012, a year before the 
minimum wage was raised by 52 per cent and 2015, the period after minimum wage 
was raised by a high percentage.  
The purpose is to look at what happened before the introduction or the increase of 
the minimum wages in terms of employment of the low-paid workers in the sector. 
With regard to the employment of skilled workers, the research will focus on 2012, 
the period before the minimum wage was raised by 52 per cent and 2015, the period 
after the minimum wage was increased by a high percentage.  
The study will also focus on how minimum wages were enforced in the sector after 
the introduction in 2003 and after the increase of 2013. It will also look at how 
mechanisation was influenced by the minimum wage policies from 2002 to 2014. 
 
1.6  Research methodology 
The research methodology used in the study is descriptive in nature. Only secondary 
data was used in the research. Secondary data analysis takes place when 
researchers use data, which has already been produced by others (Matthews & 
Ross 2010: 285). McCaston (2005: 1) describes the process as the analysis of data 
that has been gathered by someone else; for example, researchers, institutions, 
other NGOs et cetera, for purposes different from the one currently considered.  
 
Sources of secondary data are official statistics, scholarly journals, literature review 
articles, trade union journals and reference books (McCaston 2005: 2). The main 
advantage of secondary data is that it enables a researcher to tap into extensive 
data sets, often drawn from large representative samples that are well beyond the 
resources of an individual researcher (Robson 1993: 360).  
 
7 
 
Secondary data analysis also has disadvantages. The following are some of the 
disadvantages of secondary data analysis relevant to this study: 
 It is not always consistent with the needs of the researcher;  
 A researcher using secondary data has no control over the quality of data since 
he/she did not collect it (Matthews & Ross 2010: 287); 
 A person reviewing secondary data could easily be overwhelmed by the volume 
of the available data. She/he should therefore be careful in selecting data 
relevant to his/her study; 
 It is usually difficult to determine the quality of some of the available secondary 
data; 
 Sources may conflict with one another; and 
 The goals and purposes of the original researcher may potentially bias the 
study of the current researcher (McCaston 2005: 10). 
Data used in this study came mainly from Statistics South Africa’s reports such as 
the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). In 2008, 
the Labour Force Survey was replaced by Quarterly Labour Force Survey, which 
was conducted four times per year. Both the LFS and QLFS were designed to 
measure labour market activities. They provided information on a variety of issues 
relating to the labour market like the level and pattern of unemployment as well as 
the industrial and occupational structure of the economy. The design of the 
questionnaire used in this study was in line with the requirements set by international 
bodies like the International Labour Organisation (Statistics South Africa 2005: i). 
 
Data used in the research was also sourced from scholarly journals and other 
literature review articles. Scholarly journals are journals which generally contain 
reports of original research written by experts in the field. Articles in scholarly 
journals usually undergo a peer review where experts in the field review the content 
of the article for accuracy, originality and relevance (McCaston 2005: 2). 
The search for data was done both manually and electronically. Electronic searches 
were done on the Unisa electronic database, which focuses on economics such as 
Epscohost, Emerald, Proquest, SAep et cetera. Data was also sourced from Google 
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Scholar and websites such as PLAAS, Statistics South Africa and University of the 
Witwatersrand. Searches for LFS and QLFS releases were done on Statistics South 
Africa’s website. Most material on farm workers in South Africa was found on the 
PLAAS website. Scholarly journals were downloaded from the University of South 
Africa electronic database. 
  
Bibliographies of scholarly journals were also searched for more relevant journal 
articles on the topic. Relevant articles found were downloaded from the Unisa 
database and other websites. Journal articles, which the researcher could not find on 
his own, were requested from the subject librarian of the Unisa Library. 
 
1.7  Significance of the study 
The study will clarify if indeed minimum wages make employers replace unskilled 
workers, whose services have become more expensive as a result of the policy, with 
skilled workers and machines as predicted by the opponents of the wage policy. It 
will also reveal if the policy has increased the employment of the working poor as 
predicted by the supporters of the policy. The results of the study will guide policy 
makers on the merits of minimum wage policy in the agricultural sector.  
 
The investigation will also indicate if employers of agricultural sector workers have 
complied with the minimum wage policy or not. It will analyse which factors forced 
employers to comply with the policy. In cases where employers have not complied, 
the authorities will know the reasons why the employers have not complied, reasons 
for this will be advanced. Proper understanding of the reasons why employers have 
not complied with the policy will enable the authorities to know which steps to take to 
enforce compliance. 
 
The research will also enable policy-makers to understand the relevance of minimum 
wage policy and how it should be implemented. It will enable them to understand the 
extent to which minimum wages should be raised in the farming sector in particular 
9 
 
and in the country in general. Through this study policy-makers will be guided as to 
when minimum wages may be raised by higher percentages and when it will be 
disastrous to do so. 
 
1.8  Overview of chapters 
The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction where the 
two opposing theories concerning minimum wages are presented. The introduction is 
followed by background information in which the poverty situation of farm workers is 
presented in detail. The reasons which make farm workers to continue to live in 
poverty and government’s intervention strategy are also highlighted in the chapter. 
This is followed by the problem statement to be investigated in the study. Research 
objectives, which stipulate what needs to be achieved in the study, are also stated in 
the chapter. This is followed by the research questions, delineation of the study, the 
research methodology and significance of the study.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical debate between the supporters of minimum 
wages and those who are against labour market intervention. The chapter starts with 
an overview of how wages are formed in a competitive labour market. This is then 
followed by a brief description of the origin of minimum wages. The discussion about 
government’s intervention in the labour market follows subsequent to this. Then the 
argument of the supporters of labour market intervention and the counterarguments 
raised by the opponents of minimum wages are discussed. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a global perspective of minimum wages. The chapter looks at the 
implementation of minimum wages in both developed and developing countries. The 
aim of this chapter is to determine the extent to which the working poor in countries 
that have applied minimum wages benefit from the policy. It will also focus on 
whether minimum wages assisted in reducing income inequality and alleviating 
poverty in countries where they have been implemented. Brief background 
information of countries which have implemented minimum wages is given in section 
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two of this chapter. Information is arranged according to economic sectors, namely 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In section three, the role of minimum wage 
policy, as a tool for helping the vulnerable workers, is analysed. The analysis is 
intended to determine if minimum wages have succeeded in reducing income 
inequality and poverty in those countries.  
  
Chapter 4 deals with sectoral minimum wages in South Africa’s agricultural sector. 
The chapter starts by looking at the poverty levels in South Africa in general and 
then in the agricultural sector in particular. The first part of the chapter deals with the 
main causes of poverty in South Africa. It is then followed by the description of South 
Africa’s agricultural sector, the characteristics of agricultural sector workers, the 
social and economic conditions, government’s intervention and the criteria used to 
determine minimum wages in the sector. The research methodology is discussed 
thereafter and this is followed by an analysis of the minimum wage theory and its 
relevance to South Africa’s agricultural sector. The analysis of how minimum wage 
policy has been implemented in the agricultural sector follows thereafter. 
 
Chapter 5 contains the findings, recommendations and the conclusion of the study. 
The chapter opens with the introduction, which gives an overview of the state of 
poverty in South Africa’s agricultural sector. This is followed by a summary of 
findings on employment and enforcement both globally and in South Africa’s 
agricultural sector. A summary of contributions, suggestions for further research and 
recommendations conclude the chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MINIMUM WAGE DEBATE 
2.1 Introduction 
Redistributive policies are those policies that are intended to improve the living 
conditions of the disadvantaged members of the society. Minimum wage policy is 
one of those policies that is aimed at improving the living conditions of the working 
poor (Boadway & Cuff 2001: 554). Devereux (2005: 899) adds that mandated 
minimum wages are labour market interventions, which are implemented to reduce 
income inequality. It has a welfare objective of reducing poverty among the poorest 
and the most vulnerable workers by raising their wages towards the poverty line or 
the average wage existing in that particular sector. 
 
The disgruntled workers, who are dissatisfied by the wages that have been decided 
by the market forces of demand and supply, put pressure on the government to 
protect them from being exploited by their employers. They put pressure on the 
government to introduce minimum wages that would make it possible for them to 
meet their most basic needs. Governments usually accede to these demands 
because they do not want to invite political troubles (Gillis et al. 1996: 240). 
 
The introduction of minimum wages for the low-paid workers is an attractive policy 
option from a poverty reduction point of view. Supporters of minimum wage argue 
that it reaches the poor segment of the economically active population and that it 
does not cost government anything since the cost is borne entirely by the private 
sector. They see it as a transformative policy in that it provides social protection to 
those workers who are ununionised, exploited and have little bargaining power with 
regard to their employers.  
 
The sectors in which wages are lowest usually have poor working conditions, 
negligible benefits and low job security. This means on top of the meagre wages that 
these workers receive, they also receive poor treatment. Fair wages in such sectors 
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provide partial compensation for the absence of job-related social protection, which 
better paid employers enjoy (Devereux 2005: 200). 
The minimum wage, however, is a very controversial issue. Those who are against it 
argue that labour market interventions, if effectively enforced, improve the wages 
and working conditions of the workers who remain employed. They maintain that 
raising wages artificially leads to the rationing of jobs and displacement of the low-
paid workers, that the minimum wage is intended to help, especially when it is 
pegged at a level that is higher than the market-clearing wage. The higher the new 
minimum wage rate, the greater the negative effect it will have on employment. The 
minimum wage rate of US$10.00 per hour, for example, will have more negative 
employment effects than it would have when it was US$6.50 per hour (Brown & 
Johnson 2006: 7). 
 
The workers who lose their jobs become worse off because they will no longer earn 
even the meagre wages they used to receive while they were still employed. The 
welfare gains of those who manage to retain their jobs are offset by the significant 
welfare losses of those who lose their jobs when the minimum wages are introduced 
or raised. This means, instead of bringing relief to the poor, minimum wage 
legislation makes their situation even worse (Gillis et al. 1996: 240).  
 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical debate of those who support minimum wages 
and those who are against labour market intervention. The chapter starts by 
providing an overview of how wages are determined in a competitive labour market. 
This is followed by a brief description of the origin of minimum wage. The discussion 
about the intervention of the government in the labour market follows subsequent to 
this. The argument of those who support labour market intervention will be discussed 
immediately after the government’s intervention. The counterarguments raised by 
the opponents of minimum wages will then be discussed and this will be followed by 
the conclusion. 
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2.2 Wage determination in the labour market 
The neoclassical economists argue that the labour market is just like any other 
market in that the employers and the employees come together in a voluntary 
contract through inducements that they offer one another. Both the employers and 
the employees believe that their situations will be improved by the relationship; 
otherwise they would not bother to join in. In the labour market, the workers take up 
employment, which is most attractive to them at that particular time, given the 
available alternatives. The terms like wages and other working conditions that the 
workers receive will depend on the interplay of demand and supply (Murphey 1996: 
80). 
 
If the workers are unwilling to work at a particular wage rate, the employers respond 
by offering a higher wage rate to persuade them to supply their labour. The employer 
can also choose to use capital instead of labour or go out of business if he feels that 
both inputs are unaffordable (Moore et al. 2009: 23). 
The basic competitive model is based on the following assumptions: 
 The labour market has many identical firms; 
 Workers in this market are homogenous; 
 Workers are paid more to persuade them to supply more labour; 
 The value of the last unit of labour or the marginal product of labour declines 
as labour increases; and 
 Labour is the only input used in the production process. 
 
These assumptions lead to a positively sloping supply curve and a negatively sloping 
demand curve, which illustrate an inverse relationship between the wage rate and 
the number of workers employed in the market. Although the market supply curve 
has a positively sloping curve, individual firms are faced with horizontally sloping 
supply curves. These horizontally sloping supply curves indicate that each firm is 
small enough that it can employ workers without affecting the equilibrium wage 
(Zavodney 1998: 19). 
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The labour market demand curve is the horizontal sum of the marginal revenue 
product, which are the demand curves of individual firms. The marginal revenue 
product to which is also referred as the marginal benefit is obtainable by multiplying 
the marginal physical product of labour by the price of the product (Lipsey 1975: 
348).  
 
To determine if it will be profitable for the firm operating under the conditions of 
perfect competition to employ additional units of labour, a worker is remunerated in 
accordance with his productivity. This indicates that, under competition, every worker 
is paid in accordance with the value of his marginal product (Stigler 1946: 358). 
 
The marginal revenue product of a worker is compared with his wage rate, which is 
also referred to as the marginal cost. Wages in excess of marginal revenue product 
lead to losses for the firm and this will eventually force the employer out of business 
(Schuldt et al. 2012: 260). If the marginal revenue product is greater than the 
marginal cost, which is also referred to as the wage rate, it is profitable for the firm to 
employ additional units of labour. The employment of additional workers will continue 
up to the point where the last unit of labour employed adds as much to the firm as it 
does to cost. This means labour, just like any other productive factor, is paid its 
marginal physical product (Lipsey 1975: 350). 
 
Wages, which are above the marginal revenue product, prevent employment which 
would otherwise happen if wages were equal to or less than the marginal revenue 
product (Bronfenbrenner 1950: 299). Stigler (1946: 358) adds that the number of 
jobs in the business is not fixed by the level of business; it varies with the cost of 
labour inputs. If the cost of labour input is higher, the business will employ fewer 
workers but if the cost is lower, the firm will manage to employ more workers. 
 
The explanation above will be clearly illustrated by the following practical example. 
Let us assume that there is a firm, which is producing and making the total revenue 
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product of R1 000 and employs 100 workers. If this firm employs an extra worker 
and the total revenue product of the firm increases from R1 000 to R1 005, it means 
the firm’s marginal revenue is only R5, 00. This is the revenue contributed by the last 
worker employed by the firm.  
 
Because the contribution made to the firm by the last worker employed is R5, 00, it 
will be profitable for the firm to pay this worker a wage which is lower than R5, 00. 
Let us say the firm will give this additional worker R3, 00. In this case, the firm gains 
R2, 00 from the extra worker while the worker gains R3, 00. Both the firm and the 
employee make money. However, if the firm could pay this extra worker the wage 
rate, which is above R5,00, say R7,00 per hour, the firm will lose R2,00 for every 
hour the employee works. To avoid this loss, the company simply does not employ 
the extra worker (Schuldt et al. 2012: 260).  
 
Together, the labour market supply and labour market demand curves determine the 
market clearing wage (Zavodney 1998: 19). The labour supply curve gives the total 
number of hours that the workers are willing to work at a given wage rate. A 
positively sloping labour supply curve indicates that workers will be prepared to work 
fewer hours at a lower wage and that they will be prepared to work more hours at a 
higher wage rate. The labour market demand curve, on the other hand, represents 
the total number of hours that employers are willing and able to employ at a given 
wage rate. At a higher wage rate employers are willing and able to employ fewer 
workers, and at a lower rate they are willing and able to employ more workers. 
Equilibrium occurs at the point where demand for and supply of labour are equal. It is 
at this point where the wage rate and the quantity of labour demanded are 
determined (Borjas 2005: 164).  
The explanation above can be illustrated by Figure 2.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1 The equilibrium condition in a competitive labour market 
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Source: Dehejia et al. 2008: 485. 
 
Equilibrium is determined by the interaction of demand for labour represented, which 
is represented by D and supply of labour, which is represented by symbol S in Figure 
2.1 above. The equilibrium level of employment is Ne while the equilibrium wage rate 
is We.  
 
If the wage rate could be increased from We to Wf, more people would be prepared 
to offer their labour than what the firms are willing and able to hire. This leads to 
inefficiency because some employers are not willing to pay Wf which is higher than 
the equilibrium wage. As a result, some workers will lose their jobs if the wage rate is 
at Wf (Dehejia et al. 2008: 485). Coons (1996: 17) adds that at an artificially high 
price, sellers supply more than what buyers are prepared to buy, thereby creating 
unnecessary surplus.  
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2.3 Government’s intervention in the labour market 
Supporters of minimum wages argue that a free market economic system 
encourages employers to exploit their vulnerable workers. These employers usually 
give their workers very little wages that condemn the recipients into a deeper state of 
poverty. They do this because their aim in business is to make as much profit as 
possible. They do not care about the well-being of the workers who are responsible 
for generating the profit. The prevalent exploitation makes it necessary for the poor 
workers to be protected by minimum wage legislation. The pressure groups force the 
government to intervene in the labour market and introduce or raise minimum wage 
as a way of protecting the poor workers from exploitation (Schuldt et al. 2012: 262). 
 
A government that resists this strongly backed demand raised by the well-organised 
pressure groups is inviting political trouble. This indicates that minimum wage 
legislation has been used as a political tool to buy votes (Schuldt et al. 2012: 262). 
Governments end up acceding to the demands of these pressure groups and 
introduce minimum wages for fear of political ramifications (Gillis et al. 1996: 240). 
 
Minimum wage is a labour market’s legislation, which has been created to protect 
the workers from being exploited by their employers. It can be described as a wage, 
which is high enough to enable the workers to afford the necessities of life like food, 
clothes, housing, education and recreation, taking into consideration the economic 
and cultural development of his or her country (ILO 1992: 11). Addison and 
Blackburn (1999: 393) support this view when they point out that the principal aim of 
the minimum wage is to improve the economic conditions of the low-paid workers. 
 
2.4 Origins of minimum wage legislation 
The minimum wage as a labour market institution is used in many countries of the 
world today. Countries like Australia and New Zealand were the first to pass 
minimum wage regulations in the 1890s. Among the larger nations, Britain and the 
United States of America were the first countries to introduce minimum wage 
legislation. The United States of America passed the Owen Keating Act in 1916. This 
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Act set the minimum wage limit of age 14 for work in the factories. It also established 
an eight-hour day and created a national 48-hour working week. In 1918, the 
Congress passed minimum wage legislation, which protected women and children in 
the District of Columbia (Congressional Digest 2003).   
 
In Britain, the Wages Councils were first introduced in 1909 to protect the wages of 
the working poor in the sweated trades. The system of the Wages Councils was 
responsible for setting minimum wage rates in different industries. By the early 
1990s there were 26 Wages Councils in Britain, which set minimum wages for 2.5 
million workers. Until 1983, Wages Councils set a range of minimum wages, which 
were differentiated by age, occupation and region. From 1986 a single rate was set 
and the minimum wages determined by the Wages Councils were done away with in 
August 1993 in the government’s Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Bill. 
That left Britain with neither a formal nor an informal system on minimum wages 
(Machin & Manning 1996: 668). The introduction of minimum wages in the United 
Kingdom sparked the waves of twentieth century wage regulations around the world 
(Deakin & Green 2009: 205). 
 
The founding members of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) realised early 
on that there was a need to improve the working conditions of the poorly paid 
workers by giving them an adequate living wage. The governing body instructed the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) to conduct an enquiry into existing systems 
of fixing minimum wages, especially in industries where employers or workers were 
either unorganised or insufficiently organised. This resulted in the adoption of the 
minimum wage fixing machinery conventions (ILO 1992: 2). A total of 116 member 
states in both developed and developing countries ratified one or both conventions of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on minimum wage fixing. Many more 
countries established minimum wage fixing procedures, even those that did not ratify 
the relevant conventions (Eyraud & Saget 2005: 1). 
 
Most African countries had been conducting minimum wages since the colonial 
period. Jones (1997) listed about 16 African countries that had minimum wage 
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legislation in 1975. Some of the African countries that had minimum wage legislation 
in 1975 are countries like Ghana, Gabon and Botswana. In most of these countries 
the real value of the minimum wage reached a peak in the early 1970s, but it started 
falling gradually since then (Devereux 2005: 904). 
 
2.5 The case for minimum wages 
There is a continuous debate about whether minimum wage legislation is helping to 
alleviate poverty among the low-paid workers or not. Proponents like Card and 
Krueger (1994) hold the view that positive effects are achievable from minimum 
wages with very little side-effects. These new economists point out that those who 
criticise minimum wages base their arguments on unrealistic assumptions of the 
perfect market like: 
 Labour markets are perfectly competitive;  
 Workers are homogenous; 
 Workers are perfectly mobile; and  
 Workers have complete knowledge about job opportunities that are available.  
They argue that relaxing any of these assumptions would yield more positive 
interpretations of the potential benefits of a minimum wage (Boadway & Cuff 2001: 
554). The proponents of minimum wage legislation base their arguments on the 
following models which are discussed below: 
  
2.5.1 The bargaining power theory and minimum wages 
The bargaining power model argues that an individual worker lacks bargaining power 
regarding wages. This theory focuses on the urgency and weakness an individual 
feels when searching for employment. It also focuses on the plight of someone, a job 
seeker, during the time when the economy is in recession. Since many people live 
from pay cheque to pay cheque, most job seekers are usually desperate to such an 
extent that they are more willing to accept much lower wages, which condemn them 
into deeper poverty. The employer is in need of a worker, but not necessarily this 
particular worker. The employer needs workers, but he does not necessarily need 
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this particular one. His need for an employee is not even that urgent. He could even 
carry on without this new employee. This puts the employer in a much stronger 
position than the job seeker. An employer like this one is in a much stronger position, 
which enables him to pay much lower wages to his employees. In such situations, 
governments should intervene and introduce minimum wages to protect these 
vulnerable workers. The thinking behind the minimum wage laws is that the 
employer should not be allowed to pay less than the specified minimum wages. It is 
only when employers are forced to pay the stipulated minimum wages that workers 
will be protected (Murphey 1996: 84). 
 
2.5.2 The monopsony model with complete and incomplete 
coverage 
a. The monopsony model with complete coverage 
Labour monopsony exists when there is only one purchaser of labour services 
(Levin-Waldman 2001: 24). In a monopsony with complete coverage, there is usually 
one firm or one industry that employs labour. This particular firm or industry has a 
monopsony power and this gives them the power to determine what the wage should 
be. Firms under monopsony do not just follow the wage rate that has been 
determined by the invisible hand of the market forces. They possess the market 
power, which enables them to set wages at the levels that are lower than the market 
rate (Edwards & Gilman 1999: 21). These firms usually set very low wages, which 
continue to make the low-paid workers worse off. The vulnerable workers are forced 
to accept the much lower wages offered by these firms because they are the only 
firms willing to employ low-paid workers. They do not have an option of offering their 
services elsewhere. For these workers employment by the monopsonist is an 
alternative to unemployment (Murphey 1996: 82). 
 
But unlike what happens in the competitive labour market, where it is believed that 
an increase in minimum wage usually leads to job losses, the increase in minimum 
wage under monopsony is believed to have a positive effect in terms of employment. 
The introduction of minimum wage legislation would bring workers nearer to the 
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market wage rate, which is good for the working poor. The only negative effect will 
be a cut in employer profits as opposed to a reduction in employment as it is 
predicted by the neoclassical economists (Edwards & Gilman 1999: 21). 
 
Card and Krueger (1995) added to this by pointing out that the filling of vacancies is 
costly to the firms. Some firms might even run with a stock of unfilled vacancies 
because it is costly to fill them. It might also be desirable to pay higher wages to 
attract new recruits who might otherwise be reluctant to join the labour market when 
the wages are too low. The minimum wage might make it possible for these 
vacancies to be filled because it makes those jobs more attractive to the job seekers 
(Edwards & Gilman 1999: 21).  
 
As the legal minimum wage is pushed even higher, the number of workers that the 
firm wishes to employ increases until the legal minimum reaches what the wage 
would have been under the competitive labour market. If the minimum wage could 
be pushed even higher than it could have been under the competitive labour market 
employment begins to decrease (Levin-Waldman 2001: 24). The monopsonist 
situation can be illustrated by Figure 2.2 below. 
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Figure 2.2: The employment effects of a wage floor in a monopsony 
model 
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Source: Jones 1997: 25. 
 
The monopsonists minimise costs by hiring workers up to the point where marginal 
cost of labour (MC) is equal to their demand for labour (D). This happens at point E1 
in Figure 2.2 above. When minimum wage is introduced, the monopsonist becomes 
a price-taker and he will now be forced to pay a wage rate of W1. A higher minimum 
wage of W1 leads to an increase in employment from E1 to E2 as more and more 
people are attracted into the labour market. However, if the minimum wage could be 
set at a point higher than W1, employment would be reduced to below the 
competitive level of E1 (Jones 1997: 3). 
 
b.  Incomplete coverage  
In a dualistic economy, the monopsony model is to some extent intricate. For 
simplicity reasons it will be assumed that only firms in the covered sector could enjoy 
monopsony power. It is easy to imagine a situation where employers in the covered 
sector could enjoy monopsony power while employers in the uncovered sector 
remain competitive. That situation could arise in cases where workers have invested 
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in skills that are not easily transferred across firms, for example, a small number of 
workers in a developing economy have been trained to be computer programmers in 
C++. They are motivated by the fact that the salaries of such programmers are 
higher, about five times higher than the average salary. These workers are, however, 
faced with one serious challenge. The challenge that these workers have is that 
there are few large companies that employ programmers and all of them are based 
in the capital city. If there is a surplus of these programmers, it is possible that the 
firms that employ the programmers might possess some monopsony power, which 
makes it possible for the employers to pay them (programmers) way below their 
marginal products. This is made possible by the fact that all the trained programmers 
prefer to work for the bigger companies as opposed to working for any other firm. 
These workers do not care much about the fact that their wages are below their 
marginal products because they are still earning much more than they would if they 
were employed by any of the smaller firms in the area (Jones 1997: 23). 
 
The situation is only feasible in a situation where there is a surplus of C++ 
programmers because if there were a shortage, any firm could poach its rival 
programmers by offering them higher wages than they are earning in their respective 
firms. In the situation where some firms have monopsony power the introduction of a 
minimum wage will raise employment in the non-competitive sector (Jones 1997: 5). 
This is because more people are prepared to offer their labour if remunerations are 
higher. The explanation above is further illustrated by Figure 2.3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
W1 
LdF 
MCF 
  LSF 
Ld1 
W0 
E1 E0 
W1
O1OF 
Figure 2.3 The effects of minimum wage legislation in a dualistic 
labour market with flexible wages and partial labour mobility 
(monopsony case) 
 
                                                                                   
                                                                                                 
 
 
 
       
         
                                                           
 
					  Source: Jones 1997: 23. 
 
Before the introduction of minimum wage legislation firms in the non-competitive 
sector have employed fewer workers. They employ workers up to the point where 
marginal cost of labour (MC) is equal to demand for labour (D). In the figure above, 
firms in the non-competitive sector have employed E0 and pay their workers Wo 
before the introduction of minimum wage legislation. With the introduction of 
minimum wage of W1 the number of workers employed in the non-competitive sector 
increases from OfE0 to OfE1. But if the minimum wage could be raised to a level 
which is higher than W1, employment would decrease to a level which is even below 
E0. This is an indication that the introduction of or an increase in minimum wage 
raises the level of employment, but only to a certain level (Jones 1997: 5). 
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Many economists regard the monopsony case as something that could not be 
applied in the real world. However, a number of research studies conducted in the 
recent past found that a higher minimum wage led to an increase in employment. 
Card and Krueger (1994), for example, examined the level of employment in the fast 
food restaurants before and after the minimum wage increase in New Jersey’s 
restaurants. They compared the level of employment in New Jersey’s restaurants 
with that of similar fast food restaurants in Pennsylvania where the minimum wage 
remained unchanged. They discovered that employment in New Jersey increased 
after the minimum wage increase when compared to that of Pennsylvania where 
minimum wage remained unchanged. This happened despite the fact that by the 
time the minimum wage was raised in New Jersey, the economy of that state had 
just entered a recession (Jones 1997: 4). 
 
The monopsony model differs from the competitive model in that it allows for a 
number of increases in the minimum wages, which result in increases as opposed to 
decreases in employment. However, both models agree that raising the legal 
minimum wage to a point that is above the competitive levels would lead to a 
reduction as opposed to an increase in the employment level (Brown & Johnson 
2006: 8). 
 
2.5.3 The classic paradigm of labour supply and demand and 
minimum wages 
Dehejia et al. (2008: 492) hold that minimum wages do not necessarily lead to 
unemployment. This is the case even under the classic labour supply and demand 
model. The logic behind the generally accepted belief that the introduction of 
minimum wage leads to an increase in unemployment comes from the theory of 
price floors. This model of demand and supply holds that as prices increase, 
consumers would be willing to consume less of the product of which the price had 
gone up. Suppliers, on the contrary, would be willing to supply more and in that way, 
there would be a mismatch between demand and supply (Dehejia et al. 2008: 488). 
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The classic paradigm of labour supply and demand need not imply that minimum 
wage laws lead to unemployment. This is because the labour supply curve differs 
from the supply curve of the commodity market. The labour supply curve may be 
sloping either upward or downward, depending on the balance of two effects, namely 
the substitution effect and the income effect (Dehejia et al. 2008: 488).  
 
The substitution effect holds that as wages increase, workers are willing to give up 
most of their leisure time for this higher wage. They are prepared to work more hours 
in order to earn more income. In other words, they are prepared to substitute leisure 
for work so that they can earn more. This effect causes the labour supply curve to be 
sloping upward (Dehejia et al. 2008: 488).  
 
The income effect holds that as wages increase, a worker who works a given 
number of hours receives a higher income. The worker whose income has gone up 
will choose to consume more leisure time and work fewer hours. The income effect 
therefore causes the labour supply curve to bend backwards. This shows that the 
labour supply curve can slope in either direction, depending on which of the two 
effects is dominant at a particular wage level. If the income effect is the one that is 
dominant, the introduction of a minimum wage will move the economy from a low to 
a high equilibrium wage. At the same time, an increase in the minimum wage may 
decrease rather than increase unemployment. This will be clearly illustrated in Figure 
2.4 below. 
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Figure 2.4 The potential equilibrium wages 
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Source: Dehejia et al. 2008: 488. 
 
Three potential market equilibrium wages are denoted by W1, W2 and W3 
respectively. The equilibrium with price W2 is unstable. This is because if wages 
were slightly higher, the excess demand would be expected to raise the wages to 
W3. On the other hand, if wages were slightly lower, the surplus supply of labour 
would be expected to decrease the wages. The introduction of a minimum wage 
could move the market to a higher equilibrium (Dehejia et al. 2008: 488).  
 
Let us assume that the equilibrium wage is W1. If the new law sets the minimum 
wage between W2 and W3, the only remaining market equilibrium will be W3. If 
employers comply with the new law and pay the new minimum wage, labour demand 
will be greater than labour supply. The excess demand for labour will push the 
wages up to W3. What is evident here is that there is no unemployment in that 
equilibrium (W3) after the introduction of the minimum wage legislation. According to 
this model, minimum wage legislation can actually lead to a decrease rather than an 
increase in unemployment (Dehejia et al. 2008: 488).   
Let us assume again that the minimum wage has been set between W1 and W2. At 
this level, there is high-level unemployment as supply of labour for labour is greater 
than demand. Most of the people would like to work at this price. The employers 
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cannot decrease wages to accommodate the unemployed workers, as doing that 
would be against the law. However, if the minimum wage could be increased to 
between W2 and W3, there would be an excess demand for labour and that would 
push the wage rate up to W3. At the new wage rate of W3 there would be no 
unemployment (Dehejia et al. 2008: 488). 
 
2.5.4 Efficiency wage model and the minimum wage 
If a firm pays its workers higher wages than its competitors the behaviour of the 
workers improves. These workers know that they are receiving higher wages than 
they would receive elsewhere. This motivates them to work harder in order to 
preserve their positions, as the cost associated with losing those jobs is higher. They 
will work hard and avoid shirking at all cost. Workers who are earning higher wages 
also have an incentive to improve their skills so that the value of their labour could 
match the higher wages that they receive. Workers who earn higher wages are able 
to maintain themselves well and this makes them to be physically healthy and 
strong. Healthy workers are full of energy and this makes them to be more 
productive than sick people (Devereux 2005: 903). 
 
The increase in productivity leads to an increase in the demand for labour. The 
reason for this is because an increase in labour productivity leads to an increase in 
the marginal product of labour. The employers will continue to employ more workers 
as long as the marginal revenue product of the last unit of labour employed is above 
or equal to the marginal cost of labour, which is also the wage rate. The demand 
curve for labour will shift outward and to the right as a result (Devereux 2005: 903).  
 
The introduction of minimum wage will produce the same results of increasing labour 
productivity, as the workers who are now earning higher wages will work harder and 
avoid shirking to protect their positions (Brown & Johnson 2006: 8). The higher 
minimum wage will also encourage the managers to provide on-the-job training and 
to use the employees more efficiently in an attempt to increase their productivity 
(Devereux 2005: 903). This means mandated minimum wage legislation also serves 
29 
 
as an investment in higher productivity and economic growth (Bell 1995).Employers 
also benefit because the cost of higher wages are offset by the savings in monitoring 
costs. This means the increase in the minimum wage has a positive inducement 
because it motivates the workers to do their work with great determination without 
being supervised (Levin-Waldman 2001: 25). 
 
This makes the proponents of legal minimum wage to argue that it leads to 
increased employment, as employers are more willing to employ productive workers. 
The employers will prefer to employ low skilled workers who are now more 
productive. The increase in the demand for labour will also lead to an increase in the 
wage rate and this is a positive step towards poverty alleviation (Brown & Johnson 
2006: 8).  
 
2.5.5 Minimum wages and aggregate demand 
The macroeconomic model argues that a higher minimum wage will offer low-wage 
workers more purchasing power, which will enable them to demand more goods and 
services. In other words, minimum wage will stimulate aggregate demand in the 
economy. The increased aggregate demand will motivate businesses to produce 
more goods and services because there is higher demand for their products. For 
them to produce more goods and services they will be forced to employ more people 
who are unemployed. The increase in the demand for labour will also lead to an 
increase in labour wages across the board. This means that the quantity of labour 
demanded is determined by the productivity of labour as opposed to the price of 
labour itself. The proponents of minimum wage believe that an increase in minimum 
wage will definitely lead to long-term benefits for the economy as a whole (Levin-
Waldman 2001: 18).  
 
It is also believed that higher minimum wage will lead to fewer labour strikes 
because there will not be good enough reason for workers to go on strike. Higher 
wages therefore have a stabilising effect and because the economy as a whole 
would have more money to spend there is a limit of how depressed wages can 
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become. The macroeconomic model assumes that policy is needed to ensure that 
workers are paid reasonably high wages. The fact that wages are determined by 
firms that possess market power makes it necessary for workers to have institutions 
like unions and statutory minimum wages to counteract the power of firms (Levin-
Waldman 2001: 18). 
 
Sectors that pay low wages are also characterised by poor working conditions, little 
benefits, no maternity leave, no holiday entitlement, redundancy pay, no pensions 
and lack of job security. The introduction or raising of legal minimum wage helps to 
compensate workers for their poor working conditions (Devereux 2005: 903). 
 
2.6 The case against minimum wages 
The opponents of minimum wage legislation argue that the legal minimum wage 
compounds instead of alleviates poverty among the low-paid workers whom the 
minimum wage is intended to help. They argue that minimum wage legislation will 
create disemployment amongst the working poor. Bardhan and Udry (1999) have 
pointed out that the problem becomes even worse if the rate is set above the market 
clearing equilibrium. Those who are against the minimum wage legislation base their 
argument on the following theories listed below: 
 
2.6.1 The standard competitive model with complete and 
incomplete coverage 
The neoclassical economists argue that economic systems are plagued by 
inefficiencies that stem from well-intentioned, inexpert interferences with the forces 
of demand and supply. Coons (1996: 17) argues that at an artificially high price, 
sellers supply more than what buyers are prepared to buy, thereby creating a 
surplus. One such interference is the introduction of legal minimum wage in the 
labour market. The idea of such a minimum wage is to alter the distribution of 
income at the lower end of the spectrum in the hope that poverty will be alleviated 
among the working poor.  
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The neoclassical economists argue that these interferences hurt those whom they 
are designed to help. They point out that minimum wage legislation leads to effects 
that are contrary to the objectives that the policy-makers intend to achieve (Sesinyi 
1998: 4). Rama (2001: 878) holds the view that the jobs that are most likely to be lost 
due to minimum wage increases are those of the working poor who are relatively the 
least skilled, least educated and least experienced. This is so because the economic 
value of their work or the value of the marginal product to the employer is much 
lower when compared to that of skilled, educated and experienced workers. This 
makes the employers to keep in employment the qualified individuals with higher 
productivity levels and reject the workers with lower productivity levels (Schuldt et al. 
2012: 265).  
 
Following the minimum wage increase from US$0,75 to US$1,00, the US 
Department of Labour tracked the unemployment effect it had on both non-white and 
white teenagers. They found that between 1954 and 1959, the unemployment rate 
for the non-white male teenagers, who were relatively less productive, had increased 
from 6 percent to 24 percent. The unemployment rate among white teenagers, on 
the other hand, had increased from 5 percent to 15 percent between 1954 and 1956 
(Schuldt et al. 2012: 265). 
 
Stigler (1946: 358) confirms this example when he points out that workers whose 
services are worth less than the minimum wage are laid off. The minimum wage 
therefore puts the unskilled, inexperienced and uneducated workers like the 
teenagers and the disabled in a great danger of being priced out of their jobs (Brown 
& Johnson 2006: 8).  
 
Minimum wages have had the undesirable result of reducing the demand for 
unskilled workers even in countries where coverage and compliance are high. The 
effect occurs because employers prefer to keep in employment skilled workers 
whose wages increase by smaller percentages by the minimum wages. This means 
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those whose wages increase by a bigger proportion will most likely lose their jobs 
(Jones 1997: 2). 
 
In an attempt to reduce the high labour cost the employers may change the way they 
compensate workers. They may increase the wage up to the required minimum, but 
cut back on non-wage benefits like medical benefits, vacation benefits, reduce leave 
days et cetera. These factors reduce the disemployment effect, but it also represents 
the real cost borne by the low-paid workers (Brown & Johnson 2006: 6). 
 
In developing countries, the negative effects of minimum wages are more than in 
developed countries where workers are usually protected from adverse demand 
shocks by things like unemployment insurance. In developing countries where 
workers do not have such benefits, those who are displaced from employment have 
only two options, namely: 
 To go and seek employment in the uncovered sector; or 
 Become unemployed and continue to search for employment in the covered 
sector. 
 
Most of the unskilled workers in developing countries have little or no savings to fall 
back on during the period in which they are unemployed. This means the poor 
workers who become unemployed cannot remain unemployed for a longer period of 
time. The displaced workers are most likely to take up jobs in the informal sector. 
This move will depress wages even further when the supply of labour in that sector 
increases without a corresponding increase in demand (Jones 1997: 2). 
 
To evaluate the full impact of minimum wages in developing countries, it is crucial to 
look at both the covered and the uncovered sectors of the economy. The reason 
being that in these countries there is a large number of people who are engaged in 
both formal and informal sector employment. In these countries, there is also a large 
number of people who are engaged in non-wage activities (Jones 1997: 3).  
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a. Minimum wages where there is complete coverage 
When assessing the effect of minimum wages in developing countries, both formal 
and informal sectors should be scrutinized because they both employ more workers. 
The effect of minimum wage legislation where there is complete coverage is 
illustrated in Figure 2.5 below. 
 
Figure 2.5 The employment effects of a minimum wages in a 
competitive labour market with complete coverage 
  
                                             
Wm                                                                                 
  
 
               
     0            Em                         Eo                                  Sm        Employment 
Source: Jones 1997: 23. 
This model assumes that there is a competitive labour market with homogenous 
workers. Employment levels are determined by the interaction between demand and 
supply. Before the introduction of the minimum wage, Eo workers are employed at a 
wage rate of Wo. In this labour market, all workers possess the same skills and effort 
levels, and this makes them perfect substitutes. With the introduction of the wage 
floor all employers pay the minimum wage, which means that there is a complete 
coverage. After the introduction of minimum wage the new wage becomes Wm, 
which is well above the competitive level. This makes employment levels to drop to 
Em. The proportional decline in employment (Em-Eo) is equal to the proportional 
increase in wage (Wm-Wo) multiplied by the elasticity of demand. From Figure 2.5 
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above, it is apparent that excess supply of labour results from an increase in 
minimum wage from Wo to Wm. 
 
The excess supply of labour, however, cannot be interpreted as the rise in 
unemployment. Unemployment refers to the number of people who are currently not 
employed, but are actively searching for work. Unless all of the unemployed people 
believe that they stand a chance of finding employment, some would stop searching. 
This means that the number of unemployed people will somehow be lower than the 
surplus of EmSm. However, what is certain is that the level of unemployment will rise 
after the introduction of minimum wage, which is above the equilibrium wage (Jones 
1997: 3). 
 
b. The minimum wage where there is incomplete coverage 
In the developing world, there is a large number of workers who earn their living 
through non-wage activities. These people earn their living through activities such as 
self-employment, informal sector work and domestic services. This makes it 
necessary to also apply a model in which coverage is incomplete when examining 
the effects of labour market intervention in developing countries. In this model, it is 
assumed that there is perfect mobility of labour across the formal and informal 
sectors, and all workers are identical and paid the same wage. The fact that there is 
no wage differential between the two sectors makes workers to be unconcerned 
about whether they are employed in the formal or informal sectors. This makes the 
level of employment to be the same between the formal and the informal sectors 
(Jones 1997: 4). 
 
Then the legal minimum wage, which is above the competitive level, is introduced in 
the formal sector only. This leads to the rationing of jobs in the formal sector. There 
is now an excess supply of labour as more and more people who want to work in the 
formal sector are unable to find employment in that sector. Most of those people who 
lose their jobs in the formal sector will search for employment in the informal sector 
where the wage rate has remained unchanged. This will depress the informal sector 
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wages even further, making people in the informal sector worse off (Jones 1997: 22). 
The explanation above is illustrated by Figure 2.6 below. 
Figure 2.6 The effects of wage floor in a dualistic labour market 
with incomplete coverage 
 
 
Source: Jones 1997: 22. 
 
The wages in both the formal and informal sectors are equal at W0. At the wage rate 
of Wo, Eo workers are employed in both the formal and informal sectors. Then the 
minimum wage, which is above the competitive level, is introduced in the formal 
sector only. Because of minimum wage, the wage rate in the formal sector increases 
to Wf. At this higher minimum wage some workers who want to work in the formal 
sector are unable to find employment. There is now an excess supply of labour of 
ScEc. These are the workers who are unable to find employment in the formal sector. 
If all of these workers could find employment in the informal sector, employment in 
that sector could increase from 01Eo to 01Ec. This will force the wage rate to 
decrease from Wo to W1. The introduction of legal minimum wage has led to a wage 
differential of (Wf - W1) and a decrease in formal sector employment from Eo to Ec. 
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On the contrary, a high minimum wage has led to an increase in the informal sector 
employment from O1Eo to O1Ec.  
 
The minimum wage effect is different in cases where there is no mobility of labour 
between the formal and the informal sectors. If the minimum wage is introduced in 
the situation where there is no mobility of labour between the formal and informal 
sectors, the imposition of a high minimum wage in the formal sector will lead to an 
increase in unemployment in that particular sector only. The workers who lose their 
jobs in the formal sector will not search for employment in the informal sector, as 
there is no mobility of labour between the two sectors. The supply of the informal 
sector workers will not change due to an increase in formal sector minimum wage. 
The level of employment in the informal sector will not change because of the rise in 
the formal sector minimum wage (Jones 1997: 4).  
 
The underlying factor both in the situations where there is complete and incomplete 
coverage is that an increase in minimum wage leads to excess supply of labour. If 
the workers who lose their jobs in the formal sector could search for employment in 
the informal sector, they would depress wages in the informal sector, thereby making 
life among the informal sector workers worse off (Brown & Johnson 2006: 4). 
 
2.6.2 The substitution model and the minimum wage 
Incorporating workers with different skill levels into the basic competitive model 
yields the prediction that minimum wage legislation will lower employment among 
low-skilled workers and possibly even among skilled workers. If the minimum wage 
is raised to a point above the equilibrium wage level of low-skilled workers, but below 
the wage level of skilled workers, the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers will change. 
Firms may reduce the employment of unskilled workers and leave the number of 
skilled workers unchanged (Zavodney 1998: 20). This is supported by Welch (1974: 
292) who points out that if those who earned less than the minimum wage were 
substitutes, the employers would replace them in favour of those whose relative 
costs have not increased or increased the least. 
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If firms substituted skilled workers for unskilled workers, the market wage for skilled 
workers would rise. Such a wage rise will also dampen the increase in the number of 
skilled workers employed. The total employment effect could not be positive in the 
substitution model because the wages of at least one or possibly both types of 
workers will increase and the increases in the wages will lead to a drop in 
employment (Zavodney 1998: 20). 
 
2.6.3 Minimum wages and on-the-job training  
Opponents of legal minimum wage argue that it raises barriers to people with little or 
no work experience in finding the initial employment that would provide experience 
and on-the-job training that would enable them to earn higher wages in future (Brown 
& Johnson 2006: 4). On-the-job training refers to the training which offers young 
workers basic skills, strengthens motivation and fosters attitudes that enable them to 
be more productive. On-the-job training enhances human capital development which 
leads to an increased earning (Hashimoto 1981: 24). 
 
These attributes are assets or capital because those who acquire them become 
more productive over time. These attributes resemble machines and other physical 
capital. Human capital, unlike physical capital, cannot be separated from a person 
who owns it. This makes human capital different from physical capital because, 
unlike the physical capital, human capital cannot be sold. 
 
Any worker, whether highly trained and experienced or not, owns some human 
capital. However, the more experienced and knowledgeable a person is, the more 
human capital that person possesses. These are the persons who are more 
productive and this enables them to earn higher incomes than those who are less 
knowledgeable and experienced. 
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Human capital is acquired through schooling and on-the-job training (OJT). However, 
most of the skills which make a person more productive are acquired through work 
experience (Hashimoto 1981: 14). A young person who enters the labour market at a 
particular time will not earn much because he does not as yet have more job 
experience and as a result he is not very productive. However, as he accumulates 
more experience and becomes more productive, his earnings rise as well. This 
means on-the-job training plays a pivotal role in increasing the earnings of young 
workers (Hashimoto 1981: 15). These workers’ earnings increase because their 
productivity has increased. A worker’s wage depends on how much he is worth. A 
worker who is more productive earns more than the worker who contributes less to 
the company (Schuldt et al. 2012: 260). 
 
Some jobs offer on-the-job training (OJT) through formal training programmes, but 
many jobs require little or no formal training programmes. The absence of on-the-job 
training, however, does not mean that a worker cannot acquire human capital on the 
job. A learning-by-experience process still takes place in these jobs through informal 
instruction, observations, experimentation et cetera. An inexperienced worker is 
allowed to observe the experienced workers operate complicated machines; he may 
even be allowed to operate those machines sometimes. In this way, the 
inexperienced worker is in the learning process. These opportunities are valuable 
because they enable the inexperienced worker to acquire valuable skills and 
knowledge to enable him to be productive. On-the-job training can therefore be 
viewed as a process of investment in human capital. 
 
Such investments entail costs that arise directly from the use of skilled manpower 
and the firm’s machines for the purpose of instruction as well as through the 
provision of work environments which are conducive to learning (Hashimoto 1981: 
15). The costs also arise from the fact that an inexperienced worker is allowed to 
waste raw materials, produce defective products and cause additional wear and tear 
to machines and equipment.  
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The worker attains his benefits in the form of increased earning power. The 
employer, on the other hand, attains his benefits through the increased productivity 
of the trained worker. This means both the worker and the employer benefit from on-
the-job training. The worker has every incentive to bear the high training cost 
because he can take his productive skills and experience elsewhere if he wants to. 
He pays the high training cost by allowing himself to be paid a lower wage. The 
explanation above is illustrated in Figure 2.7 below, which focuses on training as the 
sole factor responsible for growth of earnings. 
 
Figure 2.6 Relationship between training and earnings 
 
                                                              
                             
 
 
        0                          t*                t** 
                         Training years 
Source: Hashimoto 1981: 17. 
 
The horizontal line Y0 represents the earning schedule that the worker would receive 
when he has not received any training. The no training schedule indicates that the 
worker’s earnings do not change; it remains the same year after year. 
 
The schedule Y1 shows the earning profile when there is some on-the-job training in 
the early years of employment. Earnings in the early years of employment are lower 
than no training earnings. This means that the worker bears some of the training 
costs by accepting lower wages than he would be if no training were provided. 
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Earnings grow as learning accumulates (increases). Eventually it overtakes Y0 as 
on-the-job training (OJT) decreases and the worker continues to collect returns on 
the accumulated investment. The investment does not end at the overtaking time t*. 
It continues until time t**. Before t** the worker’s earning capacity is constantly 
growing as is indicated by the dotted Y1, reflecting the ever accumulating potentially 
recoupable returns to the previous investments (Hashimoto 1981: 18). 
 
An effective mandatory minimum wage reduces the amount of on-the-job training 
and prevents the growth of young workers’ earning capacity in the following three 
ways: 
 Mandatory minimum wage causes some workers to lose their jobs. This means 
that mandatory minimum wage leads to increased unemployment. The laid off 
workers will therefore lose an opportunity to on-the-job training; 
 The minimum wages also make those who remain employed to lose an 
opportunity of on-the-job training. Workers pay for their training in the sense that, 
by the time they still receive on-the-job training, they are prepared to accept the 
lower wages that they would otherwise not receive if they were not receiving 
training (Hashimoto 1981:18); and 
 Minimum wages render unskilled workers unemployable, as employers prefer 
skilled workers who are most productive (Schuldt et al. 2012: 265). 
To comply with the increased minimum wage, employers will raise money wages for 
those who receive less than the minimum wage but the increased minimum wage 
itself does little to improve productivity. Employers will respond to increased 
minimum wages by reducing the amounts of on-the-job training given to workers, 
thereby reducing their potential of earning higher wages in future. This condemns the 
low-paid workers to everlasting poverty (Hashimoto 1981: 22). 
 
2.6.4 The price effect model and the minimum wage 
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The basic competitive model with only one or two types of workers holds that prices 
are not affected by increases in minimum wages. In an attempt to counter the higher 
production cost firms respond by reducing the employment of less skilled workers. 
However, the decline in employment is most likely to cause total output to decrease, 
as fewer workers are now engaged in the production process. A decrease in output 
creates a situation where demand exceeds supply and this will cause prices to rise. 
An increase in prices of the products being produced makes the decline in 
employment less severe but it is unlikely that the increase in price will completely 
offset the decline in employment. 
 
The extent to which price will change depend on how elastic the demand and supply 
curves are. If the demand curve is inelastic or vertical, employment will not be 
severely affected by the rise in minimum wage. The employers in this case will 
manage to shift the higher minimum wage burden to the consumers by raising the 
prices of the products produced. This is made possible by the fact that a bigger 
change in price leads to a smaller than proportional change in quantity demanded 
(Zavodney 1998: 21). 
 
Two studies have found that restaurant prices tend to rise as minimum wage 
increases. The research on price effects of minimum wage increases focused on the 
restaurant industry because they mostly employ low-wage workers. Card and 
Krueger (1995) found that prices of restaurants foods increased after the minimum 
wage had increased. They also found that the number of people employed in those 
restaurants had gone up after the minimum wage increased. They discovered that 
prices had increased more quickly in cities where there was a high number of 
workers covered by the minimum wage. Aaronson (2001) also found that restaurant 
prices increased when the minimum wage increased. Both studies indicated that 
price increases were equal to the increase in labour cost brought about by the 
minimum wage increase. 
 
However, if the demand curve is elastic or near horizontal, more jobs are likely to be 
lost in response to the increase in minimum wage to the level above the equilibrium 
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wage rate. The price increases in this case cannot eliminate the negative effect of 
minimum wage on employment completely. The firms are not be able to shift the 
burden of higher minimum wage to the consumer because a small increase in the 
price of goods produced leads to a greater than proportional change in quantity 
demanded (Zavodney 1998: 21).  
 
There is evidence which shows that prices do not change in response to the 
increase in minimum wage. Katz and Krueger (1992), for example, did not find any 
evidence of relative price increases at the Texas fast food restaurants after the 
minimum wage was raised in that state. Card (1992) found that fast food prices rose 
at the same rate in California and in compared areas after the minimum wage had 
increased in that state. 
 
Even if prices increase when minimum wage increases, they cannot offset the 
disemployment effect, which results from such an increase. This is because demand 
in the restaurant industry is not perfectly inelastic. It then becomes difficult for the 
restaurant owners to shift the whole minimum wage increase burden to the 
consumers (Zavodney 1998: 21). 
 
If low-income people are primary purchasers of the goods produced by the minimum 
wage workers, the rise in prices will have a negative effect on the very same people 
whom the minimum wage is intended to help (Freeman 1996: 245). Those whose 
wages are not increased by the minimum wages, like the informal sector workers 
and those who happen to lose their jobs because of the minimum wage, are made 
worse off by the higher prices that they should now pay (Brown & Johnson 2006: 7). 
 
2.6.5 The endogeneity model and minimum wages 
The endogeneity model holds that the raising of minimum wage may depend on the 
expected employment effect it might have on low-paid workers. In most countries, 
minimum wages are determined by politicians who are most likely concerned about 
the potential negative effects it may have on their chances of being re-elected 
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(Zavodney 1998: 24). Schuldt et al. (2012: 265) confirm this when they point out that 
politicians use the desperation of the poverty stricken and poor to buy their votes.   
 
They may choose not to raise the minimum wage if they believe that the 
disemployment effect will be large or if it will greatly reduce businesses’ profits. This 
means when introducing or raising the minimum wage they make sure that it does 
not raise workers’ wages above the competitive level for fear that it will lead to job 
losses among the working poor whom it is meant to help. In most cases they choose 
to raise the minimum wage if the negative effects are expected to be minimal, 
especially when the economy is doing well and the average wages are increasing 
(Zavodney 1998: 24). 
 
This shows that the timing for introducing or raising the minimum wage depends on 
the prevailing economic conditions as opposed to the likely impact that it will have on 
poverty alleviation. When the governor of Connecticut, for example, approved the 
US$0, 88 increases in that state’s minimum wage in 1987 he observed that the 
economy was performing well and that the employers could afford it at that particular 
time (Zavodney 1998: 24). 
 
The commission that determines the minimum wages in California refused to 
increase the state’s minimum wage in 1993 because they realised that any increase 
would further damage the state’s economy, which was already not doing well at the 
time. The New Jersey state legislature and governor approved a US$0.90 minimum 
wage increase to be implemented in 1992, but before the new minimum wage could 
become effective, the economy went into a recession. The authorities had to put into 
effect only part of the scheduled increase for fear that the economic situation would 
become worse. This indicates that minimum wage increases are carried out only 
when economic conditions are favourable. If minimum wage increases are intended 
to happen only when they will have less economic effect, they cannot show the real 
impact that they have in the economy. Those who are against minimum wage argue 
that this is the main reason, which makes it difficult for researchers to find the actual 
negative employment effect of minimum wage increases (Zavodney 1998: 24). 
44 
 
 
2.6.6 The efficiency wage model: a response 
Opponents of minimum wage argue that the efficiency wage theory cannot explain 
cases where high wage rates are found in industries that are not even making above 
average profit. They maintain that the efficiency wage theory is able to re-describe 
aspects of labour market behaviour, but it is failing to explain it. A good example is 
this one of shirking and monitoring. They do not believe that high-wage rates can act 
as substitutes for the cost of supervision. Employees would avoid their duties if they 
could, even when they were earning higher wages. This means employers will still 
face the cost of supervision and monitoring even when they are paying higher wages 
to their employees (Zavodney 1998: 24). 
 
A variety of researchers reviewed by (Edward 1990) have found that workers do not 
shirk or disobey because they do not want to work. Instead, they shirk or disobey 
because they want to get round the inefficiencies generated by the rules that actually 
hamper productivity. This means they shirk and disobey so that they could be more 
productive. 
 
There is a variety of norms and values concerning the obligation to work, which 
encourage workers to participate willingly in the production process. Relations in the 
workplace are determined mainly by power and bargaining. The implication here is 
that the relationship between wages and motivation to work is more complex than 
what efficiency wage theories can actually explain (Edwards & Gilman 1999: 23). 
 
The opponents of minimum wage again do not agree with the assertion that 
increased income will lead to better health and to a greater individual efficiency. 
They argue that if nutrition has an important effect on efficiency and productivity, 
direct provision of meals to the workers will be a better solution than increasing 
wages (Harris 2001: 199). 
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2.6.7 Minimum wages and aggregate demand 
Contrary to common belief by the proponents of minimum wage that it raises 
aggregate demand, the opponents hold a totally different view. They maintain that an 
increased contribution to total demand by people who benefit from the increased 
minimum wage is offset by the reduction of demand by those who now pay higher 
prices for goods and services. They argue that even Dr John Maynard Keynes, who 
was one of the greatest economists of the twentieth century, did not agree that 
increase in wages leads to an increase in aggregate demand. On the contrary, he 
believed that wage increases would lead to a decrease in real demand. The 
opponents of minimum wage believe that the real increase in aggregate demand will 
be because of an increase in real wages. The increase in real wages is a benefit 
obtainable from the economy, which is expanding and growing more efficiently 
(Levin-Waldman 2001: 18). 
 
2.6.8 Minimum wages and the target group 
The main reason for minimum wages is to reduce poverty among the working poor. 
The opponents of minimum wage argue that it is an ineffective tool for dealing with 
poverty, especially when most of the minimum wage workers are distributed equally 
across the family income distribution. That is to say, while minimum wage workers 
could be earning low wages, other wage earners in the family could be earning much 
higher wages. Minimum wage workers may be teenagers living with parents, married 
women with working husbands, single women or single men without children in their 
households (Even & Macpherson 1996: 77). 
 
This means instead of helping the poor, minimum wage helps people from the 
middle and high income families and people with no children to support. This led 
Cain (1996: 54) to conclude that minimum wage increases are ineffective tools for 
raising a vulnerable worker from poverty because most beneficiaries are part-time 
workers, students or people holding down second jobs in order to supplement the 
incomes of their households’ earners. Those who actually live in absolute poverty 
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are not employed in those jobs even though those are the jobs for which they would 
qualify (Even & Macpherson 1996: 68). 
 
2.6.9 Additional theories 
The proponents of minimum wages argue that firms try to offset an increase in the 
higher wage cost brought about by the minimum wage by cutting other costs like 
fringe benefits and training. If firms could manage to offset the minimum wage 
increases by reducing other costs, they might not reduce employment. According to 
the opponents of minimum wages, this theory does not appear to be correct because 
low-wage employees receive relatively less in fringe benefits and training. Alpert 
(1986) found that restaurant workers received approximately twenty percent of the 
fringe benefits received by other workers elsewhere. He also found that the 
restaurants slightly reduced fringe benefits after the minimum wage had been raised 
in the 1970s. Katz and Krueger (1992) did not find any evidence that Texas fast food 
restaurants affected by minimum wage increases reduced fringe benefits after the 
raising of minimum wages. 
 
One other thing that makes it difficult for minimum wages to alleviate poverty is lack 
of compliance by the firms that employ minimum wage workers. Firms are most likely 
to evade minimum wage legislation if the possibilities of being detected are lower or 
if the costs of compliance are higher. In many developing countries, minimum wage 
laws are not effective because of poor enforcement by the authorities. Poor 
enforcement usually occurs because of poor administration and the inability of the 
authorities to conduct regular inspections on firms that employ minimum wage 
workers. Firms are also encouraged to cheat if the distortionary costs of minimum 
wage are higher. Such situations usually arise when the minimum wages are well 
above the market equilibrium (Jones 1997: 1). In the case of Trinidad and Tobago 
where minimum wage was introduced in 1998 it was found that 33 percent of the 
firms did not comply (Devereux 2005: 902). 
 
47 
 
The weakness of enforcement capabilities again became evident in Indonesia in 
1994 after minimum wage was increased in that country. The increase in minimum 
wage was very high and the period that was allowed to implement it was very short. 
Many firms did not comply with the higher minimum wage because they could not 
afford it or they were unwilling to comply. That led to the eruption of wildcat strikes 
from the minimum wage employees in that country (Rama 2001: 868).  
 
One other way of evading minimum wage legislation is if employers employ illegal 
aliens. The illegal immigrants are in no position to report the employers who do not 
comply with the law or policy. Raising the minimum wage will therefore lead to an 
increase in illegal immigrants, as the employers prefer them over the citizens of the 
country (Sesinyi 1998: 19). 
 
The opponents of minimum wage argue that the best way to alleviate poverty among 
the poor is to create conditions that will make it easier for them to be employed. It is 
only when they are employed that they will learn and acquire the necessary skills 
that will make their services most sought after by the employers. This will put them in 
a better position to earn higher wages that will enable them to overcome poverty. 
Those in authorities should not make it expensive for employers to give the low 
skilled person a job (Cain 1996: 53). 
  
2.7 Conclusion 
It is true that the working poor need to be pulled out of poverty, but there is just no 
agreement as to how this can be achieved. The policy-makers make use of legal 
minimum wage legislation as one of the strategies to alleviate poverty among the 
working poor. However, it is not certain as to whether minimum wage legislation 
does indeed alleviate poverty among the working poor whom the minimum wage 
legislation is intended to help. Proponents of minimum wage policy argue that it is 
the best poverty alleviation strategy because besides increasing the buying power of 
the low-paid workers it also leads to an increase in employment and productivity. 
The opponents, on the other hand, argue that it leads to job losses in the covered 
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sector, as employers substitute low-paid workers with skilled workers or capital. The 
displaced workers end up searching for jobs in the uncovered sector, thereby 
depressing wages in that sector even further as supply of labour becomes greater 
than demand.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE OF MINIMUM WAGES 
3.1 Introduction 
Minimum wages are a nearly universal policy instrument used by the majority of 
countries in all regions of the world.  It is only in the Middle and Eastern countries 
where minimum wages are not common (ILO 2009: 1). Its proponents see this policy 
as the relevant tool that could make a major contribution to social justice by 
improving the living conditions of the working poor (Belser & Rani 2012: 46). It has 
the potential to increase the number of workers with access to decent wages and 
reduce the pay gap between men and women in both developed and developing 
countries. The levels to which minimum wages are raised also determine the extent 
to which income inequality is reduced. It is believed that the higher minimum wage 
levels are more effective in reducing income inequality and alleviating poverty among 
the working poor than low minimum wages. Countries with higher minimum wages 
are therefore also countries with reduced income inequality (ILO 2009: 7) 
 
During the late 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries there have been clear 
indications of a more vigorous use of minimum wage policies in both developed and 
developing countries. Minimum wage levels have been increased in both 
industrialised and less industrialised countries. In an average country, for instance, 
the monthly minimum wage expressed in purchasing power parity (ppp) has 
increased from US$178 to US$235. This is contrary to earlier periods where the real 
value of minimum wages tended to increase more slowly or even declined.  
 
Another indication of the renewed importance of minimum wage legislation was a 
sudden increase in the number of states that ratified the Minimum Wage-Fixing 
Convention No. 131 of 1970. At the moment, a total of 119 member states have 
ratified either Convention No. 131 of 1970 or the earlier Minimum Wage-Fixing 
Machinery Convention No. 26 of 1928 (ILO 2009: 2). 
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The renewed importance of minimum wages is associated with various economic 
and social developments, namely: 
 The relatively high economic growth in the last decade that happened in 
many countries was accompanied by an increase in the number of people 
classified as vulnerable workers, especially those in part-time, temporary or 
casual employment, and other more low paying jobs. In such instances 
minimum wage policy was seen as an effective policy for addressing low 
rates of pay and poverty; and 
 The widening income inequality, which occurred in many countries, 
encouraged policy-makers to consider minimum wages as having the 
potential to reduce income inequality. Concerns about high inflation and the 
erosion of the purchasing power of wages, especially of the low-paid and 
vulnerable workers, also played a role. Timely adjustments of minimum 
wages reflecting consumer price increases were considered as helping the 
low-paid and vulnerable workers maintain their living standards (ILO 2009: 3). 
 
This encouraged both the developed and developing countries to introduce a 
minimum wage policy as a tool to reduce income inequality and alleviate poverty. In 
some of the countries, the implementation of a minimum wage policy led to massive 
job losses among the working poor as predicted by the neoclassical economists 
(Schuldt et al. 2012: 265). In Ghana, for instance, the government’s 1991 decision to 
increase minimum wage levels led to massive job losses and bankruptcies, 
especially among small and medium-sized enterprises.  
 
In other countries, however, the introduction or raising of the minimum wage levels 
did not only increase wages of the vulnerable working poor, but it also led to an 
increase in employment in the formal sector (Jones 1997: 10). A good example is 
that of New Jersey’s restaurants where an increase in the minimum wage level led to 
an increase rather than a decrease in employment as predicted by the neoclassical 
economists (Card & Krueger 1994: 792). 
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Countries reviewed in the study, namely the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom, Costa Rica, India, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Botswana provide a global 
perspective from the major regions of the world, namely; North America, South 
America, Europe, Asia and the African continent. The aim of this chapter is to 
determine the extent to which the working poor in countries, which have applied 
minimum wages benefited from the policy. It will also focus on whether minimum 
wages have assisted in reducing income inequality and alleviating poverty in 
countries where they have been implemented. A brief background of countries that 
have implemented minimum wage policies will be discussed in section two of this 
chapter. This information is arranged according to economic sectors, namely 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In section three, the role of a minimum wage 
policy, as a poverty alleviation tool, will be analysed to find out whether minimum 
wages have succeeded in reducing income inequality and poverty in those countries. 
This will be followed by the conclusion.  
 
3.2 The primary sector  
3.2.1 Minimum wages in Kenya’s primary sector 
3.2.1.1 The institutions for wage-floor setting 
In Kenya, the minimum wage policy was part of the national policies, which were 
adopted before independence. Kenya introduced a minimum wage policy for the first 
time in 1946. Initially the policy was applied in Nairobi, then in Mombasa and 
Kimusu. Later it spread to other industrial towns of Kenya (Amsden: 1971). The main 
purpose of such a policy was to reduce poverty and to promote the living conditions 
of the vulnerable workers (Andalon & Pages 2008: 5). 
 
The Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act guided Kenyan 
minimum wage policy. Two wage boards made recommendations on the wages that 
could be published each year on May 1. These boards also made recommendations 
on the employment conditions of workers. The two wage boards were the 
Agricultural Wages Advisory Board (AWAB) and the General Wages Advisory Board 
(GWAB) (Andalon & Pages 2008: 5). The Agricultural Wages Advisory Board 
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(AWAB) set statutory wage floors for agricultural sector workers while the General 
Wages Advisory Board (GWAB) set minimum wages for workers in other industries 
who were not covered by the specific wage boards.  
 
These boards were made up of representatives from the Department of Labour, the 
Central Organisation of Trade Unions and the Federation of Kenyan Employers. An 
independent member who was usually a labour industry expert chaired them. The 
boards had advisory status only because the ministry of labour could modify their 
recommendations prior to consultations (Andalon & Pages 2008: 29). The 
involvement of social partners in wage setting in this instance was indirect because 
the ultimate decision about minimum wage levels lay with the government. The 
government, in this instance, was not bound to follow the recommendations of the 
other social partners (ILO 2009: 9). 
 
Within the agricultural sector or the general order, minimum wages differed by age, 
location and occupation. Minimum wages in Kenya were received by workers who 
were 18 years and older. The policy did not apply to workers who were younger than 
18 years. The purpose here was to discourage the employment of children. 
 
They also distinguished three different urban areas with different minimum wage 
levels. The three geographical areas were Nairobi and Mombasa, other 
municipalities and other towns. Within the same occupation and location minimum 
wages varied in accordance with the workers’ skills levels and city size. Workers with 
better skills, for instance, received higher minimum wages than those with fewer 
skills, as can be seen in Table 3.1 below. 
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Table 3.1: Basic minimum wage levels in the agricultural sector of 
Kenya, 1998-2004, indicated in Kenyan shillings (KES) 
Type of employee 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
UNSKILLED EMPLOYEES 
18 years and above 
1.428 1.537 1.642 1.888 2.096 
STOCK HERDSMAN AND WATCHMAN 
18 years and above 
1.648 1.772 1.896 2.180 2.420 
SEMI-SKILLED EMPLOYEE 
House servant or cook 
1.629 1.751 1.874 2.155 2.392 
Tractor driver 1.809 1.9945 2.081 2.393 2.656 
Lorry driver or car driver 2.249 2.249 2.406 2.767 3.701 
SKILLED EMPLOYEE 
Farm foreman 
2.574 2.767 2.961 3.405 3.780 
Farm clerk 2.574 2.767 2.961 3.405 3.780 
Section foreman 1.667 1.792 1.917 2.205 2.448 
Farm artisan 1.707 1.835 1.963 2.257 2.505 
Combined harvester driver 1.993 2.142 2.292 2.636 2.926 
AVERAGE 1.777 1.910 2.199 2.529 2.870 
Source: Andalon and Pages 2008: 29. 
 
The unskilled workers of 18 years and above, for example, received minimum wages 
of 2 096 Kenyan shillings (KES) in 2004 while farm supervisors and farm artisans, 
who fell under skilled and semi-skilled employees, received 3,780 Kenyan shillings 
(KES). In the year 2000, the stockmen, herdsmen and security guards (unskilled 
workers) received minimum wages of 1,648 Kenyan shillings while the tractor drivers 
(semi-skilled) received minimum wages of 1,809 Kenyan shillings in the same year. 
This confirmed that the skilled and semi-skilled workers received higher minimum 
wages as compared to unskilled workers (Andalon & Pages 2008: 29). The purpose 
for minimum wages for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers was to ensure that 
all workers received a just share of the fruits of progress (ILO 2009: 1). 
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3.2.1.2 Minimum wage policy and compliance in Kenya 
Minimum wages in Kenya suffered from inadequate enforcement. The majority of 
employers did not comply with minimum wage policy. About 24 per cent of the 
salaried workers in the agricultural sector and 17 per cent of the salaried workers in 
the non-agricultural activities in urban areas, for instance, earned monthly wages, 
which were below the stipulated minimum wages. The Kenyan government also paid 
wages that were below the stipulated minimum wages (Andalon & Pages 2008: 32). 
Omolo and Omitti (2004) asserted that the Kenyan government did not adhere to 
minimum wage regulations.  
 
The level of non-compliance was higher among the workers in the highly skilled 
occupations such as tractor drivers, salesmen and caretakers where it reached 68 
per cent in 1999. The levels of non-compliance were also higher among the unskilled 
workers in the agricultural sector. In 1999, the level of non-compliance with regards 
to minimum wages in Kenya’s agricultural sector was 29 per cent among the 
unskilled workers and only 10 per cent among the skilled workers. Among the 
unskilled workers, the level of non-compliance was highest among the young 
workers of 18-25 years of age as compared to the older workers of 26-45 years. For 
the young unskilled workers of 18-25 years, 41 per cent received wages which were 
below minimum wage levels as compared to only 20 per cent of the 26-45 year olds 
(Andalon & Pages 2008: 35).  
 
Among the different types of workers, non-compliance was similar for men and 
women in the agricultural sector, but it was slightly higher for women where it was 29 
per cent relative to the 27 per cent for men. The level of non-compliance was higher 
among the less educated and young workers of 18 to 25 years old (Andalon & Pages 
2008: 32). The following were reasons for non-compliance with minimum wage 
legislation in Kenya: 
 There were many different categories of minimum wages and that made it 
difficult for workers and firms to know which ones applied to them; 
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 Minimum wages were set at a very high level relative to the median wage, 
especially the rates for semi-skilled and more skilled workers; and 
 The classification of occupations used for minimum wages was outdated. 
Many occupations were therefore no longer relevant for the current 
requirements of the labour market (Andalon & Pages 2008: 18). 
 
3.2.1.3 The effect of minimum wages on employment share 
Levin-Waldman (2001) suggested that minimum wages be set at the median of the 
unskilled labour wages. In Kenya, most minimum wages in the urban areas were far 
above the median of the unskilled labour wages. According to the 1998/9 levels, 
there were eighteen minimum wages that were above 70 per cent of the median 
wage for all workers (Andalon & Pages 2008: 11). 
 
Minimum wages in the agricultural sector raised the wages of low educated 
employees and women to levels, which were much higher than the economic value 
of their work or the value of their marginal product. This made labour to be more 
expensive relative to the contribution made to the respective firms. Some employers 
of the vulnerable workers were forced to lay off some of their workers. Therefore, the 
higher levels of minimum wages led to job losses in the agricultural sector of Kenya.  
 
It is estimated that a 10-percentage point increase of minimum wage to a median 
wage led to a decline in the share of formal sector employment by between 1.1 to 
5.5 percentage points. It also led to an increase in the share of self-employment by 
between 2.7 and 5.9 percentage points as people who lost their jobs in the formal 
sector sought employment in the informal sector (Andalon & Pages 2008: 18).  
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This confirmed the standard competitive model with incomplete coverage, which 
maintained that a high-level increase in minimum wages would lead to a decrease in 
formal sector employment and to an increase in informal sector employment (Jones 
1997: 3). This means people who lose employment in the formal sector found refuge 
in the informal sector. The informal sector therefore acted as a buffer between 
employment in the formal sector and unemployment. If there were no corresponding 
increase in demand for informal sector workers, one could conclude that the 
increase in labour supply in the sector led to a decrease in wage levels. This means 
an increase in minimum wages worsened rather than improved the situation of the 
working poor (Jones 1997: 12).  
 
3.2.2 Minimum wages in Malawi’s primary sector 
3.2.2.1 Background of minimum wage policy in Malawi 
In Malawi, the government intervened in the labour market through the pursuit of a 
minimum wage policy long before independence. The official National Wages and 
Salaries Policy came into existence in 1969 and it had the following objectives: 
 To keep the wages of unskilled and semi-skilled workers under control. The 
purpose was to keep the wages lower in order to encourage the 
establishment and expansion of job opportunities in the farming estates. The 
Malawian government wanted to increase the number of people who had paid 
jobs; and 
 The government also wanted to keep inflation in the domestic economy under 
control. That was to be achieved through wage restraints and stabilisation of 
labour costs in order to maintain the country’s competitiveness in international 
markets (Livingstone 1995: 729). 
The National Wages and Salaries Policy of 1969 was reinforced by the Wage and 
Restraint Committee of 1971. According to this policy, any employer wishing to 
raise his employees’ wages by more than 5 per cent had to apply to the Wages 
and Salaries Restraint Committee for approval. This was an indication that 
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Malawi was determined to pursue a low wage policy. The low-wage policy was 
also reflected in a long period of wage stability, which prevailed in Malawi 
throughout the 1970s (Livingstone 1995: 730). 
 
The low-wage policy was, however, disturbed by increasing inflation in the 1980s. 
Consumer inflation, for instance, increased from an average annual rate of about 
7.5 per cent in the 1970s to about 18 per cent in the 1980s. This made the 
workers to demand high minimum wages in line with the rising inflation. The 
demand for high minimum wages in line with increasing cost of living left the 
Malawian authorities with no option other than acceding to workers’ demands. 
The rising cost of living, therefore, made minimum wages to be increased by 
higher percentages in both rural and urban areas of Malawi. This means the 
rising cost of living made Malawi to abandon the low wage policy that they had 
pursued in the 1960s and 1970s. The information in Table 3.2 below illustrates 
this change in policy.  
 
Table 3.2: Trends in minimum wages in Blantyre and other rural 
areas 
Year Blantyre Percentage 
increase (%) 
Rural areas Percentage 
increase (%) 
1965 35 _ 21 _ 
1966 38 9.1 23 9.5 
1973 40 5.3 25 9 
1980 45 12.5 30 20 
1981 70 55.6 50 67 
1982 81 16 58 16 
1987 111 37 77 33 
1989 217 95 174 126 
1992 260 20 209 20.1 
Source: Livingstone 1995: 730. 
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In the 1960s and 1970s, minimum wages increased by smaller percentages in 
both the urban and rural areas of Malawi as it is observed in Table 3.2 above. In 
1966, minimum wage levels in Blantyre increased by 9.1 per cent and in 1973 it 
increased by only 5.3 per cent. In rural areas, minimum wages increased by 9.5 
per cent in 1966 while it increased by only 9 per cent 1973. This confirmed that 
the Malawian authorities were determined to keep labour costs as low as 
possible. 
 
The situation, however, changed in the 1980s in response to the high inflation 
rates, which compelled workers to demand high minimum wages in line with the 
increasing cost of living. This led to a higher increase in minimum wages in 1981 
and 1989 respectively as can be seen in Table 3.2 above. In 1981 and 1989, for 
instance, minimum wage levels in Blantyre increased by 55.6 per cent and 95 per 
cent respectively. In rural areas, the minimum wages increased by 67 per cent in 
1981 and by 126 per cent in 1989. The 1980s’ high minimum wage increases 
confirmed that Malawi had abandoned the low wage policy, which they had 
pursued in the 1960s and 1970s (Livingstone 1995: 734) 
 
3.2.2.2 Minimum wage policy and compliance 
The main limitation of the effectiveness of the minimum wage policy in Malawi 
was that few people were engaged in paid employment. In 1987, for example, 
paid employees in both the formal and informal sectors were 549 000, which was 
only 16 per cent of the total workforce of Malawi at the time. Formal sector wage 
employment during the same period was 406 000, which represented only 12 per 
cent of the total workforce of Malawi. The difference between 549 000 and 406 
000 represented wage employment in small-holder agriculture, in rural non-
farming activities and urban informal sectors, which were not covered by 
minimum wage legislation (Livingstone 1995: 736). 
 
A large number of salaried workers received wages that were below the 
stipulated minimum wages. The workers who received the lowest wage rates 
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were those in the tobacco estates. In 1990, for example, when the rural minimum 
wage was 45 Malawian Kwacha per month, 59 per cent of workers in the tobacco 
estates earned wages that were below 33.3 Malawian Kwacha, while 90 per cent 
received wages that were below 50 Malawian Kwacha. In the sugar estates, the 
proportion of workers receiving less than 33.33 Malawian Kwacha in 1990 was 37 
per cent (Livingstone 1995: 735). 
 
Another challenge in Malawi was that within the tobacco estates a large 
proportion of the workforce employed in the burley tobacco estates consisted of 
tenants who were not even remunerated through wages for their labour. 
Unfortunately, it was in that area where the majority of the people in Malawi were 
employed (Livingstone 1995: 737). To the tenants working in the burley tobacco 
farms minimum wages were actually irrelevant because they did not apply to 
them. 
 
The coverage of minimum wage legislation referred only to that fraction of the 
population for whom the policy was legally guaranteed, namely the formal sector 
(Cunningham 2007: 19). Minimum wage policy was properly implemented in the 
government sector, large estates and by large urban employers, but together 
they only accounted for less than 8 per cent of the total labour force in Malawi. 
Some of the large estates managed to even pay their employees’ wages, which 
were higher than the statutory minimum wages. The higher minimum wages paid 
by the bigger estates were somewhat helpful in that they encouraged 
neighbouring estates to also pay high minimum wages (Livingstone 1995: 737). 
 
3.2.2.3 Effects of the minimum wage policy on employment 
There is evidence, which suggested that the increases in minimum wages, which 
had occurred in May 1989, led to a reduction in the number of people employed 
in the tea estates. The Ministry of Labour also found that the number of working 
days in the tea estates was reduced following the May 1989 minimum wage 
increase. They found that, over the four quarters after March 1989, the period 
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when minimum wage levels increased by 95 per cent in Blantyre and 126 per 
cent in rural areas, the number of days worked on the tea estates had decreased 
by 17 per cent.  
 
In the tobacco estates, the figure was 11 per cent lower than it was in the four 
quarters preceding the raising of the statutory minimum wages. In contrast, the 
number of working days in the sugar estates was 2 per cent higher than it was in 
the four quarters before raising the minimum wage levels (Livingstone 1995: 
738). This was an indication that minimum wage policy had created a distortion in 
terms of promoting equality in income (Cunningham 2007: 20). Instead of 
promoting income equality, it made the situation of the working poor worse since 
most of them lost their jobs following minimum wage increases. This seemed to 
be a confirmation of the argument raised by the opponents of minimum wages 
that the policy led to job losses among the working poor whom it was intended to 
help (Stigler 1946: 358). 
 
3.2.3 Minimum wage legislation in the agricultural sector of Mexico 
3.2.3.1 The institutions for minimum wage setting 
The federal labour law of Mexico defined minimum wages as the least amount 
payable to a worker for services rendered during one day. The law did not state the 
number of hours that the worker should work to earn the daily minimum. However, it 
set the maximum number of eight hours per day for the workers working day shift, a 
maximum of seven hours for the workers working night shift, and seven-and-a-half 
hours for workers working mixed shifts. Hours above the legal maximum per day 
were considered to be overtime and had to be paid accordingly at a higher rate. The 
law also stated that if a worker earned a minimum wage, the employer was also 
expected to pay the employee’s portion of payroll taxes such as social security. This 
meant minimum wage referred to the after payroll tax wage. 
 
The 1962 wage policy established minimum wages for three categories of workers in 
Mexico, namely general, agricultural and professional workers. The professional 
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workers’ minimum wage consisted of 86 different minimums and applied to workers 
in specific occupations. The category for workers in the agricultural sector included 
all workers in the country’s agricultural sector workers while the general minimum 
wages applied to all other workers. Each of these categories differed by their 
regions. This implied that Mexico, just like other developing countries, had a sectoral 
minimum wage system. 
 
In 1962, there were 111 minimum wage regions in Mexico, each with its own 
committee. Each committee consisted of representatives from the trade unions, 
employers and government. The regional committees submitted suggestions for 
minimum wage rate, which could be adopted by the National Minimum Wage 
Commission. This commission had authority over all proposed minimum wage levels 
in that it could adopt or reject the suggested wage rate. 
 
In 1976, the National Minimum Wage Commission started simplifying the minimum 
wage structure in Mexico. It gradually eliminated the distinction between the general 
worker’s minimum wage and the agricultural worker’s minimum wage, and equalised 
the general worker’s minimum wage across regions. The restructuring of minimum 
wages was followed by the policy on reducing minimum wages in relation to the 
average wage ratio between 1970 and 1990. The ratio declined from 0.34 per cent in 
1970 to 0.30 per cent in 1980 and 0.18 per cent in 1990 (Feliciano 1998: 167). 
 
3.2.3.2 The effect of the reduced minimum wage on employment  
Those who are against minimum wage policy are of the view that the policy leads to 
job losses of the very same people whom it is intended to help. The people who end 
up losing their jobs as the minimum wage level increases, are the uneducated and 
the less skilled (Schuldt et al. 2012: 265). The employers tend to prefer the services 
of skilled and experienced workers over those of less skilled workers. The reason is 
that the services of the less skilled and less educated are now more expensive while 
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their marginal products are lower when compared to those of the skilled workers 
(Schuldt et al. 2012: 265). 
 
If minimum wage increases lead to job losses among the less skilled workers, 
minimum wage decreases should lead to an increase in the employment of these 
vulnerable workers. On the other hand, minimum wage decreases should lead to a 
decrease in the employment of the more skilled workers whose services have now 
become more expensive relative to those of the less skilled workers (Brown 1988: 
136).  
 
The outcomes for Mexico seemed to confirm the argument of the neoclassical 
economists that higher minimum wages would lead to job losses among the 
vulnerable and less skilled workers whom it was intended to help. That was because, 
when minimum wage levels were higher, very few less skilled female workers were 
employed, as their services were more expensive compared to the contributions 
made to the employing firms. In contrast with this trend, more skilled male workers 
were employed at the time when minimum wage levels were higher. However, as 
minimum wage levels decreased from the 1970s to the 1990s, the employment of 
the less skilled female workers between the ages of 15 and 64 increased, while the 
employment of skilled male workers decreased (Feliciano 1998: 178). These results 
were the confirmation that employers preferred the services of skilled workers only 
when minimum wages were higher, and those of the less skilled workers when 
minimum wage levels were lower.  
 
3.3 The secondary sector 
3.3.1 Minimum wages in India’s secondary sector 
3.3.1.1 Background of the wage-floor policy in India 
India was one of the first developing countries to introduce minimum wage legislation 
in 1948. The introduction of a minimum wage policy was triggered by the following 
factors: 
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 An increase in the number of factories and wage earners in India in the first 
half of the twentieth century; 
 A growing number of industrial unrests and strikes of workers who were 
dissatisfied with their slave wages; and 
 The adoption by the international labour organisation in 1928 of Convention 
number 26 on minimum wage-fixing in trades where no effective bargaining 
took place or where minimum wages were extremely low (Belser & Rani 
2012:46). 
 
The central government set minimum wages in companies operating under a railway 
administration or major ports or any corporation established by the central 
government. All other rates were set by the states, which were assisted by the 
Tripartite Advisory Boards. The Tripartite Advisory Boards included representatives 
from government, employers and workers. The number of workers covered by 
minimum wages was determined by the number of scheduled employment and was 
decided upon at state level. 
 
The original Minimum Wage Act of 1948 forced states to protect workers from 13 
identified sectors where employees were considered most exploited. These were 
workers who were not covered by collective bargaining. The law also empowered the 
state governments to expand the list where necessary. There were more than 300 
different sectors, which were covered by minimum wages in one or more of the 
Indian states (Belser & Rani 2012: 47). 
 
The central government determined 48 minimum wage rates for different job 
categories. The various state governments set minimum wage rates for 1 123-job 
categories among the sectors scheduled in the Act. This meant that India had 1 171 
different minimum wage rates. That made India to be a country with multiple 
minimum wage rates, which varied across states as well as across jobs within a 
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state. India, therefore, had sectoral and occupational minimum wages as opposed to 
a single national minimum (Belser & Rani 2012: 48). 
 
International experience had proven that relatively simple systems were more 
effective than complex systems. It was found that multiple rates were difficult to 
communicate and enforce, especially when both workers and employers were not 
sure as to which rates were applicable to them (Belser & Rani 2012: 49). 
Cunningham (2007) concluded that it was better to design a simple system, which 
could be understood by all rather than attempting to address the heterogeneous 
needs of the labour force. 
 
Policy-makers in India discussed the possibility of simplifying and extending the 
coverage of minimum wages to the whole labour force. A step was taken in 2003 
when the Central Advisory Board constituted a working group, which led to the 
introduction of a non-binding national minimum wage floor. Initially, the national 
minimum wage rate was set at 66 Indian Rupee (Rs66). In 2011, the non-binding 
national minimum wage was at 115 Indian Rupee (Rs115) per day (Belser & Rani 
2012: 49). 
 
3.3.1.2 Minimum wage legislation and compliance 
In 2004 and 2005, the level of non-compliance with minimum wage legislation was 
the highest in India. About 73 million wageworkers received wages that were below 
the stipulated minimum wages (Belser & Rani: 2012). Female workers and people 
residing in rural areas were most likely to earn wages that were below the stipulated 
minimum, while male workers and people living in urban areas earned more.  
 
The situation became slightly better in 2009-10 as the level of non-compliance 
decreased from 73 million to 61.1 million. More male workers received minimum 
wages in 2009-10 than in 2004-05. More workers were still receiving wages, which 
were below the stipulated minimum wages in India’s agricultural sector (Belser & 
Rani 2012: 51). This can be seen in Table 3.3 below. 
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Table 3.3: Minimum wage legislation and non-compliance in India’s 
secondary sector 
Area Rural (%) Urban (%) 
Gender Male Female Male Female 
Himachal Pradesh 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Chandigarh 20.8  26.0  
Uttaranchal 5.0 1.9 55.9 58.2 
Haryana 11.6 19.3 3.8 88.3 
Delhi 6.0 12.1 0.0 22.3 
Rajasthan 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Urunachal Pradesh 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Manipur 1.3 1.2 1.8 0.6 
Mizoram 1.7 10.9 0.0 3.3 
Megalaya 17.1 29.5 33.3  
Orissa     
Gujurat 14.0 36.9 11.6 43.1 
Maharashtra 39.0 55.5 22.6 22.6 
Andhra Pradesh 41.1 53.7 29.2 58.7 
Karnataka 0.0 0.0 6.8  
Kerala 0.6 5.3 0.0 10.4 
Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands 
1.2 0.0   
Source: Belser and Rani 2012: 52. 
 
From Table 3.3 above it is clear that non-compliance with minimum wage legislation 
was particularly higher in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Uttaranchal. In 
Uttaranchal, the level of non-compliance was higher in urban areas for both male 
and female workers where it was 55.9 and 58.2 per cent respectively. The level of 
non-compliance was much higher for women in both urban and rural areas as 
indicated in Table 3.3 above. In Maharashtra, for example, the level of non-
compliance for female employees in rural areas was 55.5 per cent. In Andhra 
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Pradesh, it was 53.7 per cent in rural areas and 58.7 per cent in urban areas. In 
Haryana, 88.3 per cent of female employees received wages that were below the 
stipulated minimum wage levels.  
 
However, there were some states where the compliance level was higher in both 
rural and urban areas. In Arunachal Pradesh, for instance, only 0.2 per cent of rural 
male workers received wages that were below the stipulated minimum wage levels. 
In the rural area of Karnataka, there was no worker who was paid below the 
stipulated minimum wage rates (Belser & Rani 2012: 52). 
 
3.3.1.3 The role of the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme on minimum wages 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) was introduced to 
promote the employment level among the unemployed rural majority of India. It also 
promoted better pay, as workers employed by NREGS were paid wages that were 
equivalent to the minimum wages or above. It provided a guarantee of 100 days of 
employment per household in the rural areas. All rural people who were willing to 
work registered with the rural council, which gave them the job cards. After receiving 
the job cards, a household could demand work at any time. After the household’s 
expression of its willingness to work, employment had to be provided within 15 days 
of such expression. The majority of the people who were unemployed ended up 
finding employment in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes. 
Between 2009 and 2010, about 52 million households were provided with 
employment. The additional employment created under NREGS had reduced 
underemployment and unemployment, and this created labour shortages in the rural 
and urban areas of India. It also curbed the movement of people from rural to urban 
areas, as there were then plenty of jobs in the countryside (Belser & Rani 2012: 59). 
 
Wages under NREGS were linked to the statutory minimum wages of the agricultural 
sector workers. Later they were linked to India’s non-binding national minimum wage 
rate. This made people to prefer to work for NREGS as opposed to those employers 
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who paid wages that were below the stipulated minimum wage levels. This led to 
labour shortages, especially for the employers who paid wages below the national 
minimum wages (Belser & Rani 2012: 64). 
 
The labour shortages created by the NREGS programme made it possible for the 
low-paid workers to demand higher wages. They demanded wages that were at the 
same level as the national minimum wage or above. The labour shortages brought 
about by the implementation of NREGS forced employers to pay higher wages as 
demanded by the workers. The NREGS programme therefore had reduced the level 
of non-compliance with minimum wages (Belser & Rani 2012: 64). 
 
3.3.2 Minimum wage policy in Ghana’s secondary sector 
3.3.2.1 Background of minimum wages in Ghana 
Just like other African countries, Ghana increased its minimum wages to record 
levels during the first half of the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1975 the value of 
minimum wage levels increased by more than 40 per cent for workers in the private 
sector and by more than 80 per cent for workers in the public sector. The high 
minimum wage levels were in response to higher inflation rates, which made workers 
to demand higher wages in line with the increasing cost of living (Jones 1997: 7). 
This meant the adjustment of minimum wages in Ghana was tied to the inflation rate 
(Cunningham 2007: 20). From 1975 onwards, however, the government’s attitude 
towards minimum wages changed in response to the other budgetary and political 
crises. The government was faced with a growing debt problem and because of that, 
it allowed the real value of minimum wages to be eroded by rising inflation in both 
the private and public sectors. By 1985, the value of minimum wages in Ghana had 
fallen to less than a third of what they were in 1975. 
 
The position of the government regarding minimum wage legislation, however, 
changed in the early 1990s. In August 1991, for example, the Ghanaian government 
announced a new daily minimum wage, which increased the old wage floor in real 
terms by over 25 per cent. The purpose of that legislation was to raise the income 
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and purchasing power of the vulnerable low-income workers. Both the trade union 
movements and Ghana’s Employers Association supported this legislation, which 
came into effect at the period when inflation was falling. This law was expected to be 
more biting, as it came about at the time when the inflation rate was declining (Jones 
1997: 7). 
 
3.3.2.2 Minimum wage policy and compliance in Ghana  
The majority of firms in the manufacturing sector of Ghana complied with minimum 
wage legislation. Most of the workers in the formal sector earned wages that were 
either equal to or above the legal minimum wage levels. The majority of non-
production, union and skilled workers earned wages that were above the stipulated 
minimum wages. Low-skilled workers, however, were most likely to earn incomes 
that were below the legal minimum wages. The majority of workers in the informal 
sector also earned wages that were far below the legal minimum wages. However, 
there were some informal sector firms which paid their workers minimum wages 
(Jones 1997: 8). 
 
3.3.2.3 Minimum wage effect on employment 
There is strong evidence that indicates that minimum wage increases in Ghana had 
a negative effect on employment. Due to the increases in minimum wage levels 
Ghana experienced massive job losses in the 1970s and 1980s. The 1991 minimum 
wage increase, in particular, led to a drop in manufacturing employment by about 5 
to 6 per cent. However, the impact of minimum wage increases was not the same for 
all Ghanaian firms. The results from the cross-sectional analysis indicated that firms 
who complied with the legislation laid off about 2.5 per cent more workers than firms 
who evaded the legislation (Jones 1997: 10). 
 
It is, however, not all firms, which laid workers off due to an increase in minimum 
wage levels. There was some evidence that showed that bigger firms increased 
employment after minimum wage increases. These results supported the 
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monopsony theory, which maintains that the introduction of minimum wage would 
raise the level of employment in the non-competitive sector (Jones 1997: 7). 
 
The increase in Ghana’s minimum wages led to an increase in informal sector 
employment. This was an indication that workers who had lost their jobs in the formal 
sector sought employment in the informal sector (Jones 1997: 10). If it were to be 
assumed that there was no simultaneous increase in the demand for informal sector 
workers, one could conclude that the rise in the level of employment in that sector 
led to a decrease in wage levels. This meant the Ghanaian minimum wage 
legislation had an adverse effect on reducing the wages of the most vulnerable 
workers in the informal sector (Jones 1997: 12). 
 
Another possible effect of minimum wage legislation was a decline in female 
employment. In most developing countries, women are discriminated against in the 
labour market. In cases where the labour costs have increased, employers are most 
likely to lay off female workers ahead of male workers. The increase in minimum 
wages in Ghana, however, had no negative effect on the employment of female 
workers. It was discovered that more women entered the labour market instead after 
the fall of formal sector employment, which was mainly dominated by male workers 
(Jones 1997: 10). 
 
3.3.3 Minimum wage legislation in Botswana’s secondary sector 
3.3.3.1 The background of minimum wage policy in Botswana 
Minimum wage legislation was first introduced in Botswana in 1974. The main aim of 
the introduction of minimum wage legislation, just like in other countries, was to 
protect the vulnerable workers from being exploited by their employers. In Botswana, 
the government determined minimum wage levels. The government believed that the 
employers could take advantage of urban unemployment and push wages to 
unacceptable low levels, thereby making the situation for the vulnerable poor 
workers worse. The legal minimum wages were further seen as most relevant for 
Botswana because trade unions in that country were considered very weak. The 
70 
 
weaker trade unions at the time made minimum wages the most relevant tool to 
protect the low-paid workers from being exploited by their employers (Sesinyi 1998: 
8). 
 
To ensure that both the employed and the unemployed were protected, minimum 
wage levels were set at very low levels. The authorities were afraid that high 
minimum wage levels could lead to the following negative consequences: 
 Job losses amongst the working poor; and 
 The significant slowdown in the creation of employment for any category of 
workers. 
 
The authorities were also afraid that the high minimum wages would make it difficult 
for Botswana’s businesses to compete with imports and sell successfully in foreign 
markets. They were also concerned that higher minimum wages could increase 
production costs, which would eventually make Botswana’s products more 
expensive and uncompetitive in the global market (Sesinyi 1998: 11). 
 
Another measure that was taken to protect the employed and the unemployed 
people of Botswana was the introduction of differentiated minimum wages. The 
authorities were concerned that some businesses could be unable to pay higher 
minimum wages. Botswana therefore looked at the enterprise’s capacity to pay 
(Eyrand & Saget 2005: 38). At first, there were two minimum wages in Botswana, 
which covered five sectors in the economy. These sectors were building, 
construction, exploration, quarrying and manufacturing.  
 
In 1985, there were five separate wage rates for the different categories of unskilled 
workers. Minimum wages for the unskilled workers ranged from 56 Thebe 
(Botswana’s currency) per hour in the construction and other sectors to 37 Thebe 
per hour for night watchmen. The minimum wages, which were differentiated 
according to sector, confirmed that Botswana had sectoral minimum wages (Sesinyi 
1998: 6). From 1985 onwards, the trend was towards a harmonisation of minimum 
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wages. The authorities wanted the people of Botswana to enjoy the benefits of a 
single minimum or only a few minimums. Those in the authorities realised that the 
single minimum wage or a few minimum wages were less confusing to the 
employers. They also realised that a single minimum or a few minimums would be 
most effective in reducing wage inequality and poverty among the working poor 
rather than the confusing multiple minimums (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001: 3). 
 
3.3.3.2 Minimum wage policy and compliance in Botswana 
The Department of Labour and Social Security was responsible for enforcing 
minimum wage policy in Botswana. The Department took into consideration payment 
in-kind when assessing compliance with minimum wage legislation. The workers 
also had the right to demand payment in cash as opposed to payment in-kind. 
 
Inspections to check compliance were supposed to be done twice per year. 
However, inspections in Botswana were not conducted regularly; they were either 
conducted once per year or not conducted at all due to the lack of resources (Sesinyi 
1998: 9). Poor inspections in Botswana were caused by the fact that the country had 
insufficient funds to enforce minimum wages effectively. Benassi (2011: 14) asserted 
that labour inspections were not always carried out in many countries because they 
were costly and that governments did not always invest enough funds in financing 
them. The ILO (2009) concluded that labour inspector offices were often 
understaffed, underequipped and undertrained. These limitations made it difficult for 
inspectors to carry out their inspection work successfully in Botswana. In Botswana, 
the work of the inspectors entailed the following: 
 The distribution of inspection forms to both the management and staff; 
 Discussions between the department’s officials and the workers; 
 Department officials requesting the employers to pay the correct minimum 
and back pay the workers from April in cases where workers were paid below 
minimum wage levels; and 
 To lay charges against employers who refused to comply (Sesinyi 1998: 9). 
72 
 
There was a high level of non-compliance with minimum wage levels in the 
manufacturing sector just like it was the case in other sectors. Lack of compliance 
with the minimum wage was mostly common among the smaller companies that 
were usually based in rural areas. The reason given for non-compliance with 
minimum wage legislation was that it was too high and unaffordable. Some 
employers argued that they did not know about the prevailing minimum wage rates. 
Fifty percent of the industries that were inspected were found to be paying their 
employees wages that were below the stipulated minimum levels (Sesinyi 1998: 9). 
 
3.3.3.3 The effects of minimum wage legislation on employment 
It was discovered that the overall employment level in Botswana had increased after 
the introduction of minimum wage policy. The increase in employment level was 
more evident in sectors where minimum wages increased by smaller percentages. 
However, in sectors where minimum wage levels increased by bigger percentages, it 
was discovered that the vulnerable workers were negatively affected by the 
increases because they lost their jobs (Sesinyi 1998: 12). 
 
Scoville and Nyamadzabo (1988) found that the levels of minimum wages were 
lower in most of the economic sectors in Botswana. This is believed to be the main 
reason why minimum wage policy did not adversely affect output and employment in 
the country. Another reason why the legislation did not have an adverse effect on 
employment was that some firms had high proportions of skilled workers whose 
wages were already higher than the stipulated minimum wages (Sesinyi 1998: 12). 
 
3.4 The tertiary sector 
3.4.1 Minimum wage legislation in the tertiary sector of New Jersey 
3.4.1.1 The setting of the wage floor in New Jersey  
In November 1989, a bill, which raised the federal minimum wage from US$3.35 per 
hour to US$3.80 per hour, was signed into law. The law was to be effective from 1 
April 1990 with a further increase to US$4.25 per hour in April 1991. In 1990, the 
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New Jersey legislature went a step further and enacted parallel increases in the 
state minimum wage for 1990 and 1991. From 1992, New Jersey’s minimum wage 
was to further increase to US$5.05. The scheduled increase gave New Jersey the 
highest minimum wage in the United States (Card & Krueger 1994: 775). 
 
In the two years between the passage of the US$5.05 minimum wage and its 
effective date of 1 April 1992, New Jersey’s economy slipped into a recession. This 
made the authorities reluctant to introduce the 80 cents minimum wage increase at 
that particular time. They were afraid that high minimum wage increase would 
worsen the economic conditions of New Jersey. To minimise the possible negative 
effects of higher minimum wage to the economy, the state legislature voted in March 
1992 to phase in the eighty-cent increase over the period of two years. The purpose 
was to lighten the burden of high minimum wage to employers. The authorities failed 
to secure the necessary votes, which would allow them to introduce the 80 cents 
increase over the period of two years. The governor allowed the US$5.05 to go into 
effect on April 1 1992, as was initially agreed (Card & Krueger 1994: 773).  
 
Pennsylvania, where minimum wage was still at US$4.25, was used as a control 
group in this case. Their choice of the fast food restaurants was motivated by the 
following factors: 
 The fast food stores were the leading employers of low-wage workers in 1987; 
 The fast food restaurants were known for complying with minimum wage 
regulations and they were expected to comply with the legislation even this 
time; 
 The job requirements and products of fast food restaurants were relatively 
identical. That made it easy to obtain reliable measures of employment, 
wages and product prices; 
 It was easy to compile a sample of frame of franchised restaurants; and 
 The fast food restaurants were known to have a high response rate to 
telephone surveys (Card & Krueger 1994: 774). 
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Before the actual date of introducing the higher minimum wage of US$5.05, Card 
and Krueger (1994) conducted a survey in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania to 
determine what the situation had been like before the high minimum wage legislation 
was introduced. In the first survey, they found the following information: 
 
Table 3.4: The situation in Pennsylvania and New Jersey before the 
introduction of higher minimum wage legislation 
 New Jersey Pennsylvania 
Full-time employment (%) 32.8 35.0 
Starting wage (US$) 4.61 4.63 
Wage = US$4.25 (%) 30.5 32.9 
Price of full meal (US$) 3.35 3.04 
Hours open (weekdays) (hrs) 14.4 14.5 
Source: Card and Krueger 1994: 776. 
 
When the minimum wage level for both New Jersey and Pennsylvania’s fast food 
restaurants was US$4.25, the percentage of full-time employment was 32.8 per cent 
and 35.0 per cent respectively. The price of a full meal in Pennsylvania was US$3.04 
and in New Jersey the price of a full meal was slightly higher at US$3.35. In terms of 
working hours, there was not much differences between the two states. In New 
Jersey, they were open for 14.4 hours per day and in Pennsylvania they operated for 
14.5 hours per day (Card & Krueger 1994: 775). 
 
3.4.1.2 The effect of minimum wage legislation on New Jersey’s 
economy 
After the introduction of the higher minimum wage of US$5.05 in New Jersey’s fast 
food restaurants, about 90 per cent of the employers paid their employees the 
stipulated minimum wage. Other employers paid their employees’ wages that were 
above the stipulated minimum. There was not a single restaurant in New Jersey that 
still paid its workers wages below US$5.05. They either paid the stipulated minimum 
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or higher minimum wages. The reason for the high compliance level was that the 
system of inspections used in that state was highly effective. The fast food 
restaurants of Pennsylvania, however, still paid their employees the lower minimum 
wage of US$4.25, as the higher minimum applied only in New Jersey (Card & 
Krueger 1994: 776). 
 
Despite the high minimum wage level in New Jersey’s restaurants, the average 
percentage of full-time employment (FTE) increased from 32.8 per cent to 35.9 per 
cent. This finding supports the monopsonistic theory that minimum wages lead to an 
increase in the employment level. In Pennsylvania, where minimum wage levels 
remained unchanged at US$4.25, the average percentage of full-time employment 
(FTE) decreased from 35.0 per cent to 30.4 per cent as can be seen in Table 3.5 
below: 
 
Table 3.5: The situation in New Jersey after the higher minimum 
wage legislation 
 New Jersey Pennsylvania 
Full-time employment (%) 35.9 30.4 
Starting wage (US$) 5.08 4.62 
Wage = US$4.25 (%) 0.0 25.3 
Wage = US$5.05 (%) 85.2 1.3 
Price of full meal (US$) 3.41 3.03 
Hours open (weekdays) (hours) 14.4 14.7 
Source: Card and Krueger 1994: 776. 
 
The hours of operation in New Jersey’s fast food restaurants remained unchanged 
after raising the minimum wage rate. They still operated for 14.4 hours per day. In 
Pennsylvania, where the minimum wage level was lower at US$4.25, the operation 
hours increased from 14.4 to 14.7 per day. The New Jersey’s meal price increased 
from US$3.35 to US$3.41. This meant employers passed the higher labour cost on 
to the customers. In Pennsylvania, however, the price of a full meal decreased 
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slightly from US$3.04 to US$3.03 during the same period (Card & Krueger 1994: 
776). 
 
3.4.2 National minimum wage policy in the United Kingdom’s 
tertiary sector 
3.4.2.1 National minimum wage policy in small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
The national minimum wage (NMW) came into operation in the United Kingdom in 
April 1999 (Druker et al. 2005: 6). The inaugural national minimum wage (NMW) 
levels was £3.60 for adult workers (i.e. workers aged 22 and above). There was also 
a developmental rate of £3.00 for young workers of ages 18 to 22. The 
developmental rate also applied to adult workers in the first six months of their new 
employment. This was intended to encourage employers to employ the youth and 
inexperienced people. Kristensen and Cunningham (2006: 6) asserted that special 
minimum wages could be set for some categories of workers like apprentices, the 
youth, workers with disabilities et cetera. 
 
National minimum wage (NMW) was expected to benefit about two million poorly 
paid workers in the United Kingdom (UK), the majority of whom were women and 
young workers (Druker et al. 2005: 6). The opponents of the minimum wage policy 
argued that it would have negative consequences for the economy of the United 
Kingdom, especially for the firms that complied with the policy. McNabb and Whitfield 
(2000: 291) pointed out that the national minimum wage (NMW) would negatively 
affect a large number of small businesses since they were the ones that mostly 
employed majority of low-paid workers. The small business owners also complained 
that the increased employment regulations would affect their businesses negatively 
since they could not cope with the higher labour costs. They maintained that the new 
legislation would force them to replace labour with machines, as labour had become 
more expensive as a factor of production (Druker et al. 2005: 6). 
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3.4.2.2 National minimum wage legislation and the hairdressing 
salon industry 
Hairdressing was a labour-intensive sector comprised predominantly of small 
businesses. About 80 percent of the hairdressing salon industry comprised 
businesses with fewer than ten employees. Sixty-five percent of the salons were 
single outlet businesses, usually with the employers working alongside their 
employees. This was an indication of how small those businesses were. 
 
Despite the fact that the majority of businesses were small, the sector made a 
significant contribution to the economy of the United Kingdom. They made a positive 
contribution in that they employed and trained more women and young workers in 
the United Kingdom’s economy. In 1999, for example, about 91 984 people were 
employed in the United Kingdom’s hairdressing salon sector. By June 2002 the 
number of people employed in the sector increased to 103 000. People employed in 
this sector acquired skills that were important to their survival. The skills they had 
acquired in this sector enabled some of the women to open up their own small 
hairdressing salon businesses and become employers themselves (Druker et al. 
2005: 8). 
 
3.4.2.3 Compliance with the policy 
Contrary to the complaints raised by the small business owners that the legislation 
would make the services of the vulnerable workers more expensive and that they 
would be forced to retrench some of these worker, the majority of employers in the 
United Kingdom’s hairdressing salon businesses complied with the legislation. 
Where non-compliance existed, it was partial rather wholesale within the industry. 
 
The high level of compliance with the legislation could be attributed to the fact that 
the United Kingdom’s national minimum wage was less complex and easy to 
understand when compared to other countries’ minimum wage legislation in the 
1990s. One other factor that made the compliance level to be higher in the United 
Kingdom was that the inspectors targeted the sectors that were considered to be at 
78 
 
risk of not complying with the legislation. This made it possible for the United 
Kingdom to use the limited resources available in the most effective way (Benassi 
2011: 15). In this way, the level of compliance increased, as employers were afraid 
to be reported to the Employer Tribunal (Druker et al. 2005: 18). 
 
However, some employers in the industry did not comply with the legislation. There 
were some salons, for instance, where workers worked 40 hours per week and were 
only paid for 37.5 hours. In these salons, the managers, together with their 
colleagues, were paid wages, which were below the adult national minimum wage of 
£4.10 in 2002. These employers preferred to employ young people and trainees 
whose wage rate was lower as compared to the adult national minimum wage 
(Druker et al. 2005: 19). The Low-Pay Commission (2003: 99) confirmed that the 
percentage of hairdressers who earned below the adult minimum wage remained 
higher as compared to other sectors. The main reason for this was that the 
hairdressing sector was a major training sector and it made more use of youth 
development rates and training exemptions than the other low paying sectors. 
 
3.4.2.4 The effect of the national minimum wage policy on 
employment 
Contrary to the concerns of the small business owners, the number of small 
businesses and the employment level in the UK’s hairdressing sector had increased 
after the introduction of the wage policy. In June 1999 (three months after the 
introduction of the NMW), for example, there were 91 984 employees in the United 
Kingdom’s hairdressing salon sector and by June 2002 the number of people in the 
industry had increased to 103 000, which was a 12 per cent increase (Druker et al. 
2005: 9). This was an indication that more jobs were created in the hairdressing 
salon industry in spite of the introduction of national minimum wage legislation. 
Mason et al. (2006: 103) declared that the national minimum wage policy did not 
have any adverse effect on employment in the United Kingdom’s hairdressing salon 
industry. The following were some of the reasons why the national minimum wage 
policy had negligible negative effects on the UK’s hairdressing salon industry: 
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 The level at which the national minimum wage had been set initially was 
cautious. It was intended to avoid drastic consequences; 
 Large numbers of under 18 trainees and 18-22-year-olds lessened the impact 
upon the overall pay bill, as their wage rates were lower; and 
 National minimum wage adopted by the Low-Pay Commission allowed 
incentive pay to count towards minimum wage. National minimum wage 
legislation was introduced at the time when consumers were experiencing a 
growth in disposable income, as the United Kingdom’s economy was doing 
well at the time. There was therefore a buoyant demand as people had more 
money to spend (Druker et al. 2005: 21). 
 
Besides the increase in the level of employment, which came after the introduction of 
national minimum wage, the wage legislation also made a substantial improvement 
to the wages of low-paid workers in the hairdressing salon industry of the United 
Kingdom. The average gross annual, weekly and hourly earnings improved 
substantially after the introduction of the national minimum wage policy. However, 
the average weekly hours remained more or less stable after the introduction of the 
legislation. This is illustrated by the information in Table 3.6 below. 
 
Table 3.6: Average earnings and working hours of adult female 
workers after the introduction of the national minimum wage policy, 
1998-2003 
Earnings 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 
Average Hourly Earnings (Pounds) 4.15 4.64 4.79 5.15 6.02 
Gross Average Weekly Earnings 
(Pounds) 
157.9 177.2 184.4 199.9 227.6 
Gross Average Annual Earnings 
(Pounds) 
7.962 8.368 9.201 9.809 10.812 
Average hours per week 38.1 38.1 38.6 38.8 37.9 
Source: Druker et al. 2005: 9. 
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The United Kingdom’s national minimum wage improved the working conditions of 
full-time adult female workers of the hairdressing salon industry. After the 
introduction of the policy, for example, the average hourly earnings of the adult 
female workers increased from £4.15 in April 1998 to £6.02 in April 2003. These 
amounts excluded overtime pay. The average gross weekly earnings for female 
workers increased from £157.9 in April 1998 to £227.6 in April 2003, while the 
average gross annual earnings increased from £7 962 to £10 812 over the same 
period. Thus the weekly earnings increased by 12.2 per cent between 1998 and 
1999, and by 44.1 per cent from April 1998 to April 2003 (Druker et al. 2005: 18). 
 
The average working hours per week remained more or less stable after the 
introduction of the national minimum wage policy. In 1998 and 1999, for example, 
the average working hours per week were 38.1. These increased slightly to 38.6 per 
cent and 38.8 per cent in 2000 and 2001 respectively, but in 2003 these hours 
decreased to 37.9 (Druker et al. 2005: 18). This confirmed that the national minimum 
wage policy benefited the vulnerable workers as predicted by the proponents of the 
policy. 
 
There were, however, some negative outcomes caused by the national minimum 
wage policy, especially amongst the reactive firms, which did not come up with new 
ways of effectively managing employment. In a survey of 6 000 small firms 
conducted by the Low-Pay Commission (2003) it was found that 11 per cent of those 
firms cited the higher national minimum wage as an obstacle to the success of their 
businesses. Some of those employers responded to the legislation by employing 
smaller number of trainees. Other salon owners simply passed on the increased cost 
of labour to the consumers through raising the prices (Druker et al. 2005: 17). 
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3.4.3 Minimum wage policy in Costa Rica’s tertiary sector 
3.4.3.1 Background of minimum wages in Costa Rica 
Costa Rica, like other countries, introduced minimum wages to improve the welfare 
of the working poor. They wanted to use a minimum wage policy to reduce earnings 
inequality in Costa Rica’s covered and uncovered sectors. Costa Rica had multiple 
minimum wages, which were set for various occupations and industries. In the 1970s 
and early 1980s, for example, they had about 350 minimum wages (Gindling & 
Terrell 2002: 6).  
 
Later the authorities realised that a single minimum wage or a few minimum wages 
would be more effective in reducing wage inequality and poverty than multiple 
minimum wage levels. This made them reduce the number of minimum wages to 
about 80 (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001: 3). In 1997, the policy of setting minimum wages 
by industry was done away with and it was replaced by a simpler system that was 
based on the educational qualifications of the workers (Gindling & Terrell 2002: 6). 
 
The Costa Rican minimum wage was always set by negotiations. It was decided by 
negotiations within the tripartite body, which consisted of the National Council of 
Salaries representing workers, employers and government. Adjustments were made 
on an annual basis until 1980. As the inflation rate increased in the 1980s, the 
frequency changed to two adjustments per year. The first increase was made in 
January while the second was made in either June or August each year. The 
adjustments were largely inflation based (El Hamidi and Terrell 2001: 3). 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Costa Rican National Salary Council took an additional 
step of systematically raising the lowest wage floor by a greater percentage than it 
raised the higher minimum wages. This was done to reduce the level of wage 
inequality between the rich and the low-paid workers in Costa Rica (Gindling & 
Terrell 2002: 6). This was an indication that Costa Rica was more determined to use 
minimum wages as a vehicle to improve the living conditions of the working poor in 
that country.  
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Eyraud and Saget (2005: 87) asserted that minimum wages could serve to reduce 
wage inequality if it were increased faster than wages of the highly paid workers. To 
achieve the country’s goal of reducing inequality between the rich and the poor 
workers, the council did not allow minimum wages to be eroded by inflation, as it was 
the case in most Latin American countries like Ecuador, Mexico and Peru. This 
made minimum wages to be relatively stable in Costa Rica over the period 1976 to 
1992 (Gindling & Terrell 2002: 6). 
 
3.4.3.2 Minimum wage policy and compliance in Costa Rica 
As in other developing countries, compliance with the minimum wage policy was not 
perfect in Costa Rica. On average, 33 per cent of full-time salaried workers earned 
less than the lowest minimum wages between 1976 and 1991. The share differed 
according to industries. The highest non-compliance level in the tertiary sector was 
in personal services and transportation where it was 44 per cent and 15 per cent 
respectively (Gindling & Terrell 2002: 7).  
 
Inspectors employed by the Ministry of Labour carried out the enforcement of the 
policy. They worked on complaints made by workers to the National Directorate of 
Work Inspection. About 11 per cent of the Costa Rican businesses were inspected 
for violating minimum wage legislation. The inspection level was the highest in 
commerce where half of all inspections were made between 2000 and 2001 
(Gindling & Terrell 2002: 7). 
 
3.4.3.3 The effects of minimum wages on wage inequality 
Up to a certain point, an increase in the service sector minimum wage in relation to 
an industry’s average reduces wage inequality in that sector. This is true only when 
minimum wage rate is not set at a very high level. When the minimum wage level is 
set at an extremely high level, it increases instead of decreases the level of 
inequality as can be seen in Table 3.7 below. 
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Table 3.7: The effect of the minimum wage level on wage inequality 
Income Inequality Average Wages Levels 
Average Wages Lowest               Median                  Highest 
   (30.0)                (55.5)                     (89.0) 
Gini coefficient (Gini) -0.0195 -0.0093 0.0041 
Theil index (Theil) -0.0346 -0.0173  0.00552 
Source: El Hamidi and Terrell 2001: 14. 
 
At the average wage level of 30 per cent, a one-percentage point increase in 
minimum wage reduces income inequality by 2 per cent when the Gini coefficient 
(Gini) is used and by 3 per cent when the Theil index (Theil) is used. At an average 
wage level of 55.5 per cent, a one per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces 
wage inequality by 0.9 per cent when the Gini coefficient is used and by 1.7 per cent 
when the Theil index is used, as illustrated in Table 3.7 above.  
 
However, at an average wage level of 89 per cent, a one-percentage point increase 
in minimum wage increases inequality by 0.4 per cent when the Gini coefficient is 
used and by 0.6 per cent when the Theil index is used (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001: 9). 
This is an indication that minimum wages have managed to improve the living 
conditions of the vulnerable workers of Costa Rica when wages were at a lower 
level. 
 
3.4.3.4 The effects of minimum wages on employment 
Contrary to the conventional view that minimum wages lead to job losses, El Hamidi 
and Terrell (2001) discovered that minimum wages increased the employment level 
at a decreasing rate in the Costa Rican service sector. When the average wage level 
was lower, an increase in the minimum wage level led to a higher increase in 
employment. However, at the higher average wage level, the minimum wage 
increase led to a decrease in the employment level (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001: 8). 
This is illustrated by the information in Table 3.8 below. 
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Table 3.8: The impact of minimum wage levels on employment in 
Costa Rica 
Wage Inequality Average Wage Levels 
Average Wages Lowest 
30.0 
Median 
55.5 
Highest 
89.0 
Total employment (%) 1.1 0.3 -0.6 
Covered employment (%) 1.3 0.6 -0.4 
Source: El Hamidi and Terrell 2001: 15. 
 
When the average wage level was 30 per cent, a one percentage point increase in 
the minimum wage raised the total employment level by 1.1 per cent while 
employment at the covered sector increased by 1.3 per cent. At the average wage 
level of 55.5 per cent, a one-percentage minimum wage increase raised the total 
employment level by 0.35 per cent while the employment level in the covered sector 
increased by 0.56 per cent. At the average minimum wage level of 89 per cent, 
however, a one-percentage point increase in the minimum wage decreased the total 
employment by -0.6 per cent while employment in the covered sector decreased by  
-0.4 percent (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001: 15). These findings support the 
monopsonistic model, which holds that the increases in minimum wages may raise 
employment up to the point where marginal cost is equal to demand curve. When 
that point has been reached, a further increase in minimum wages forces the 
employer to be on his demand curve, and this makes him to retrench workers (Jones 
1997: 3). 
 
3.5 The effects of the minimum wage policy on poverty alleviation 
The proposal to introduce minimum wage legislation is popular among politicians 
because it is widely seen as an effective tool to pull the working poor out of poverty 
and promote equal distribution of income (Sabia & Burkhauser 2010: 592). This 
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perception makes minimum wages to be popular in most countries of the world with 
the exception of the Middle East (ILO 2009: 2).  
 
There is, however, no consensus regarding the effectiveness of a minimum wage 
policy as an instrument for poverty alleviation. The empirical evidence produced 
conflicting results. There were countries where the introduction of minimum wages 
produced unintended consequences like the substitution of low-paid workers by 
skilled workers or machines (Zavodney 1998: 20). However, there were also 
countries where the introduction of minimum wages benefited the low-paid workers. 
These were instances where minimum wages led to increased employment and 
strengthened the bargaining power of the working poor (Murphey 1996: 84). 
 
3.5.1 Cases for minimum wages: Empirical evidence 
The supporters of the minimum wage policy argue that it is the most useful tool for 
alleviating poverty among the working poor. They maintain that those who criticise 
the policy base their arguments on unrealistic assumptions of the perfect market 
which include the following:  
 Labour markets are perfectly competitive. No firm is able to influence the 
price in this market; 
 Workers are homogeneous, which means that all workers have the same 
level of skills; 
 Workers are perfectly mobile. They move without any hindrances from one 
place to another; and 
 Workers have access to full information of job opportunities available 
(Devereux 2005: 902).  
 
If any of these assumptions could be relaxed, the positive effects of minimum wages 
would be realised (Boadway & Cuff 2001: 554). In areas where poverty is so 
widespread that the supply of unskilled labour is greater than labour demand, for 
example, a legislated minimum wage could increase aggregate employment 
(Devereux 2005: 902). 
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The higher minimum wage of US$5.05 introduced in New Jersey in 1992, for 
example, did not only increase the wages of the working poor, but it also increased 
the employment level. After New Jersey’s minimum wage was raised from US$4.25 
to US$5.05 per hour full-time employment (FTE) among the working poor increased 
from 32.8 per cent to 35.9 per cent (Card & Krueger 1994: 776). Similar positive 
results were achieved in the United Kingdom’s hairdressing salon businesses after 
the introduction of national minimum wage legislation in 1999.  
 
The introduction of a national minimum wage (NMW) did not only raise the wages of 
the low-paid workers in the hairdressing salon businesses, but it also led to an 
increase in employment in that sector. The number of low-paid workers, most of 
whom being women and the youth employed in the hairdressing salon businesses, 
increased from 91 984 in 1999 to 103 000 in June 2002 (Druker et al. 2005: 8). 
These findings refuted the argument raised by the opponents of a minimum wage 
policy who claimed that the policy would lead to job losses among the least skilled, 
least educated and least experienced workers (Schuldt et al. 2012: 265).  
 
They also argued that the minimum wage policy made it impossible for the people 
with little or no work experience to find their initial employment that would provide 
them with much needed experience and on-the-job training (Brown & Johnson 2006: 
4). This argument also turned out to be untrue in the case of the United Kingdom’s 
hairdressing salon sector because the majority of people employed in this sector 
were women and inexperienced youth who were entering the job market for the first 
time. Some of these workers ended up acquiring much needed skills and 
experience, which made it possible for them to open up small hair salon businesses 
of their own (Druker et al. 2005: 8). 
 
Contrary to the classical economists’ prediction that minimum wages would lead to 
job losses, the minimum wage policy increased employment in Costa Rica, 
especially when these were at a lower or middle level. When the average wage level 
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was 30 per cent, for instance, a further one percentage point increase in minimum 
wage level increased total employment by 1.1 per cent while employment in the 
covered sector increased by 1.3 per cent. At the average wage level of 55.5 per 
cent, a further one percentage point increase in the minimum wage level increased 
the total employment level by 0.4 per cent while employment in the covered sector 
increased by 0.6 per cent (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001: 8). This totally contradicted the 
argument raised by the opponents of the minimum wage policy who maintained that 
minimum wages would lead to job losses.  
 
These findings supported the monopolistic model raised by the supporters of 
minimum wages that the employers paid their workers’ wages, which were, less than 
their marginal value product. They argued that forcing the monopsonist to pay a 
minimum wage increased both wages and employment levels. They maintained that 
this helped to reduce income inequality as more people from the informal sector then 
would be employed in the formal sector where wages were higher compared to 
wages in the informal sector (Devereux 2005: 902).  
 
Despite the higher level of non-compliance and job losses which followed the 
introduction or raising of minimum wages in most of the developing countries, the 
policy had somewhat played a role in reducing the levels of inequality and poverty in 
those countries. The higher minimum wages paid by the firms that complied with the 
legislation acted as reference wages to the employers of the low-paid workers. The 
employers of the vulnerable workers, who were found in areas where the policy was 
implemented, usually raised their employees’ wages in accordance with minimum 
wages paid in their respective areas.  
 
Eyraud and Saget (2005: 62) point out that the increases in minimum wages affected 
wages across the board because they were usually regarded as wage benchmark. 
This meant other employers in the area ended up modelling the wage increases of 
their employees to the minimum wages paid to low-paid workers in their vicinity. This 
was helpful in reducing the income inequality and poverty among the vulnerable 
workers. In Malawi, for example, the higher minimum wages paid by the firms that 
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complied with the legislation pulled up the wages of other estates in their immediate 
vicinity (Livingstone 1995: 737). Minimum wages were also used as reference wage 
in India. The labour shortage created by the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme programme (NREGS) in India made it possible for the working poor to 
demand higher wages, which were at the same level as the national minimum wage. 
The employers of the low-paid workers were forced to respond positively to the 
demands because workers were becoming scarce due to the NREGS programme 
(Belser & Rani 2012: 64). 
 
The opponents of minimum wages argued that it helped the people from the middle- 
and high-income families as well as people with no children as opposed to the 
working poor whom it was intended to help. Herman (1996: 4) concluded that 
increases in the minimum wages did not raise the poor from poverty since earners 
were part-time workers, students and people holding down second jobs or 
supplementing the income of their households’ primary earners.  
 
Contrary to the argument raised by the opponents of minimum wage policy that it 
benefits people from rich families, Belser and Rani (2012) found that about 30 per 
cent of salaried workers and 40 per cent of casual workers in India lived in poor 
families between 2004 and 2005. They also found that among the wage earners 
living in poor families about 50 per cent earned less than minimum wages. This 
meant there was a greater possibility that minimum wages in India played a pivotal 
role in reducing poverty among the working poor. This dispelled the myth held by the 
classical economists that the minimum wage policy benefited people from rich 
families (Belser & Rani 2012: 52). 
 
The opponents of the minimum wage policy argued that the policy did not help the 
working poor as the businesses that employ these workers did not comply with the 
legislation (Rama 2001: 868). They maintained that the firms that employed 
minimum wage workers evaded the legislation if they realised that chances of being 
detected were lower (Jones 1997: 1).  
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This was more common in countries where the labour inspectors were paid little and 
therefore more prone to corruption (Skidmore 1999: 428). Contrary to this assertion 
made by the opponents of minimum wages, the majority of employers in the 
hairdressing salon sector of the United Kingdom complied with the wage legislation 
(Druker et al. 2005: 20). The high level of compliance in the UK was promoted by the 
effective labour inspections, which targeted the employers considered most likely not 
to pay the stipulated minimum wage. Employers who were found to have defaulted 
on minimum wage payment were forced to pay the arrears. The labour inspectors 
could also take the employers, who deliberately failed to pay the arrears, to court 
where they would be criminally prosecuted (Benassi 2011: 15). Criminal prosecution 
was also carried out in cases where the employers had given the authorities false 
records and information. The fear of prosecution encouraged the employers to 
comply with the stipulated minimum wage in the United Kingdom (Low Pay 
Commission 2003: 199).  
 
The United Kingdom’s government also ran campaigns intended to make the low-
paid workers aware of the national minimum wage. The campaign was particularly 
more intense in sectors where the most vulnerable workers were employed like the 
hairdressing salon sector. In carrying out such campaigns, they made use of 
different communication methods, which were accessible to vulnerable workers such 
as posters, leaflets, newspapers and publicity buses. They also made procedures for 
laying complaints more simple and accessible to the most vulnerable workers 
(Benassi 2011: 21). These incentives encouraged the employers to comply with the 
national minimum wage.  
 
The level of compliance with the minimum wage policy was higher in New Jersey. 
After the raising of the New Jersey’s minimum wage there was no restaurant in that 
state which still paid its employees a wage rate of US$4.25. About 85 per cent of the 
restaurants in New Jersey paid their employees the stipulated wage of US$5.05 
while others paid wages that were higher than the stipulated minimum wages (Card 
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& Krueger 1994: 776). This made the argument of the opponents of the policy that 
employers did not comply with minimum wages to be untrue in this case. 
 
3.5.2 Cases against minimum wages: Empirical evidence 
The classical economists argue that minimum wages lead to unemployment in the 
formal sector as it causes retrenchments of the working poor. Addison and 
Blackburn (1999) point out that minimum wage levels reduce the share earnings that 
go to the low-paid workers by displacing them from employment. They argue that the 
workers whose services are worth less than minimum wages are discharged from 
employment by the firms that comply with the legislation. The displaced workers will 
seek employment in the informal sector where they will secure lower returns (Jones 
1997: 7). The laid-off workers will then depress wages in the sectors into which they 
are forced to seek employment, especially the rural and urban informal sectors 
(Stigler 1946: 359).  
 
The introduction of minimum wages led to job losses among vulnerable workers in 
countries like Mexico, Ghana, Kenya, Costa Rica, India and Malawi. A 10-
percentage point increase in Kenya’s minimum wage, for example, reduced the 
share of formal sector employment by 5.6 per cent (Andalon & Pages 2008: 17). In 
Ghana, the introduction of a minimum wage policy in the manufacturing sector led to 
job losses among the low-paid workers employed by smaller firms, which complied 
with the legislation.  
 
The 1991-minimum wage increase, for instance, led to a 5 to 6 per cent drop in the 
manufacturing sector’s employment in Ghana. From the cross-sectional analysis, it 
was found that the Ghanaian firms that complied with the minimum wage regulations 
released 2.5 per cent more workers than firms, which did not comply (Campolieti et 
al. 2012: 289). 
 
The majority of workers who lost their jobs in the formal sector found employment in 
the informal sector. It is believed that the increase in informal sector employment led 
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to a decrease in wages in that sector, as there was then labour surplus (Jones 1997: 
12). This meant the increase in minimum wages in Ghana had an unintended 
consequence of increasing instead of reducing poverty among the working poor 
(Campoliet iet al. 2012: 289).  
 
The higher minimum wages also led to job losses and a reduction in working hours 
in the agricultural sector of Malawi, particularly in the tea estates. The Malawian 
Ministry of Labour found that the number of working days in the tea estate sector 
was reduced, following the raise in minimum wages. After the higher minimum wage 
increase of 95 per cent in Blantyre and 126 per cent in the countryside, for instance, 
the number of working days in the tea estate sector decreased by 17 per cent.  
 
In the tobacco estate sector the number of working days decreased by 11 per cent 
when compared to the four quotas before the higher minimum wages came into 
effect (Livingstone 1995: 738). These employers reduced the working days and 
working hours in order to minimise the high labour cost brought about by higher 
minimum wages. This made minimum wages to be an ineffective poverty alleviation 
tool, as it led to job losses and a reduction in working hours for the vulnerable 
workers. It only protected the few workers who managed to retain their jobs (Eyrand 
& Saget 2005: 96). 
 
The Mexican situation also confirmed the neoclassical economists’ argument that 
minimum wage was an ineffective tool for poverty alleviation among the less skilled 
and low-paid workers. This is because employers preferred employing low-paid 
workers who were less skilled and less experienced only when the wages were 
lower. At the time when minimum wages were higher in Mexico, for example, fewer 
skilled and less experienced women between the ages of 15 and 64 were employed. 
In contrast, more skilled males between the ages of 55 and 64 were employed 
during the period when minimum wages were high, as employers preferred their 
services over those of less productive and less skilled workers whose services were 
then more expensive compared to their marginal product. However, as minimum 
wages decreased from the 1970s to the 1990s, the employment of the less skilled 
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female workers between the ages of 15 and 64 increased while the employment of 
highly skilled male workers between the ages of 55 and 64 decreased (Feliciano 
1998: 178).  
 
This confirmed the notion that employers would only prefer the vulnerable and less 
skilled workers when minimum wages were lower. However, but as soon as 
minimum wages increased, the employers preferred the skilled workers to the less 
skilled employees. The reason was that the services of unskilled workers were more 
expensive relative to their outputs. This meant the less skilled and less experienced 
workers were laid off as their services had become more expensive compared to the 
value of their marginal product (Stigler 1946: 358). 
 
The opponents of a minimum wage policy also argue that the level at which those 
wages are set depends on the expected employment effect they may have on the 
low-paid workers. If politicians believe that the negative employment effect will be 
higher, they may increase minimum wage levels just modestly or not raise them at 
all. The politicians usually raise minimum wages when the negative effects are 
expected to be minimal, especially at the time when the economy is doing well and 
the average wages are higher (Zavodney 1998: 24). 
  
Botswana and Costa Rica’s minimum wages did not lead to job losses because they 
were set well below the competitive levels. In Botswana, the authorities kept 
minimum wages lower in order to protect both the employers and the workers. The 
workers were being protected from possible job losses that could happen if the 
wages were above the competitive level. The authorities also wanted to keep the 
cost of production lower so that Botswana’s products could continue to remain 
competitive in the global market (Sesinyi 1998: 11). 
 
In Costa Rica, employment levels increased only when the average wage levels 
were lower. At the average wage level of 30 per cent, a one per cent minimum wage 
increase raised the total employment level by 1.1 per cent while employment in the 
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covered sector increased by 1.3 per cent. However, as average wage levels 
increased, further increases in minimum wages led to job losses. When the average 
wage level was 89 per cent, for example, a further one per cent increase in minimum 
wages made the total employment level to drop by 0.6 per cent while employment in 
the covered sector decreased by 0.4 per cent (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001: 8). This 
confirmed the assertion made by the opponents of minimum wages that the 
minimum wage level did not alleviate poverty because it was usually set at very low 
levels (Eyrand & Saget 2005: 96). 
 
The sceptics of minimum wages also argue that the minimum wages do not alleviate 
poverty among the working poor because the firms, which employ minimum-wage 
workers, do not comply with the policy. They continue to pay wages that are below 
the stipulated minimum, especially when the possibilities of being detected are lower. 
The problem of non-compliance with minimum wages is common in developing 
countries where there are low levels of enforcement. The low level of enforcement 
occurs because of poor administration and the inability of the authorities to conduct 
inspections on firms that employ minimum-wage workers (Devereux 2005: 902).  
 
In countries like Botswana, Malawi, Kenya, Costa Rica and India, for example, 
enforcement was legislated, but it was not carried out due to lack of resources such 
as vehicles to conduct inspections and telephones to receive complaints from low-
paid workers whose employers did not comply with the legislation. The scarce data 
on enforcement in these countries is a confirmation that fines were rarely enforced 
(ILO 2009: 26).  
 
About 50 per cent of the industries inspected in Botswana, for example, were found 
to be paying their workers below the stipulated minimum wages (Sesinyi 1998: 9). In 
2009 and 2010, about 15.4 per cent of paid workers and 40.9 per cent of casual 
workers in India received wages that were below the stipulated minimum wage of 
eighty Indian Rupees (Rs80) per day (Belser & Rani 2012: 51).  
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In Kenya, the level of non-compliance with minimum wages was high for both skilled 
and unskilled workers. In the highly skilled occupations, non-compliance was 
common among the tractor drivers and salesmen where it was about 68 per cent. In 
the unskilled occupations, non-compliance was about 78 per cent (Andalon & Pages 
2008: 10). 
 
Most of the employers in Ghana complied with the higher minimum wages. Some of 
the employers even paid their employees’ wages that were above the stipulated 
minimums. However, the situation was different with regard to the less skilled 
workers in smaller firms and workers in the informal sector. These workers were paid 
wages that were below the stipulated minimum wages because the employers could 
not afford higher labour costs (Jones 1997: 7). Eyraud and Saget (2005: 108) found 
that the proportion of workers earning less than the stipulated minimum wages was 
usually higher in smaller firms with fewer than six workers than in the larger firms 
due to limited resources. 
 
Following the high increase in consumer inflation in the 1980s, Malawi responded by 
raising minimum wages to improve the wages of the vulnerable workers. A large 
number of deserving salaried workers in Malawi received wages that were below 
minimum wage levels. In 1990, for example, when the rural minimum was 45 
Malawian Kwacha per month, 59 per cent of deserving workers in the tobacco 
estates received wages that were below minimum wage rates (Livingstone 1995: 
737). 
 
The level of non-compliance with minimum wages was also high in Costa Rica. 
Majority of the working poor in that country received wages, which were below the 
lowest stipulated minimum wages. On average 33 per cent of full time salaried 
workers earned wages, which were less than the lowest minimum wages between 
1976 and 1991. The highest non-compliance level in the tertiary sector was in the 
personal services and transportation where it was 44 and 15 per cent respectively 
(Gindling & Terrell 2002: 6). 
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The level of compliance with minimum wages was also low in India. In 2004 and 
2005, for instance, 73 million Indian workers were paid wages that were below the 
stipulated minimum wage rate. The female workers and workers in rural areas were 
the most affected by the high level of non-compliance. About 55.5 per cent of female 
workers in the rural area of Maharashtra and 88.3 per cent of female workers in the 
urban area of Haryana, for example, received wages that were below the stipulated 
minimum wage levels as can be seen in Table 3.3 on page 17 (Belser & Rani 2012: 
52). The poor level of enforcement of the minimum wage policy made it to be an 
ineffective tool for alleviating poverty in India. 
 
The opponents of the legislation also argue that the job losses, which follow the 
increase in minimum wages, cause the output level in the particular sector to decline. 
A decrease in the output level creates a situation where demand is greater than 
supply and this causes prices to rise (Zavodney 1998: 21). The increase in New 
Jersey’s price of a full meal from US$3.35 to US$3.41 following the introduction of 
the US$5.05 minimum wage seems to confirm the prediction made by the opponents 
of the policy. Also, some owners of hairdressing salon businesses in the UK have 
responded to the introduction of the national minimum wage by increasing the prices 
of their services. If the working poor were the primary purchasers of goods produced 
by minimum wage workers, the rise in prices would have a negative effect on the 
very same people whom the policy was intended to help (Freeman 1996: 245).  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
Minimum wage policy produced inconsistent results in different countries. In some 
countries, the policy produced positive results in that it did not only raise the wages 
of the low-paid workers, instead it also led to an increase in employment levels in 
sectors in which it was implemented, as predicted by the supporters of minimum 
wages. These are countries where the introduction or raising of wage floors have led 
to an increase in both working hours and employment levels as predicted by the 
supporters of minimum wages (Edwards & Gilman 1999).  
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In New Jersey’s fast food restaurants and the United Kingdom’s hairdressing salon 
sector, for example, the introduction or raising of minimum wages did not only lead to 
an increase in wage levels of the vulnerable workers, but it also led to an increase in 
employment levels and working hours. In these countries and sectors of the 
economy, minimum wages had therefore improved the living conditions of the 
working poor. 
 
However, there were countries and economic sectors where minimum wages 
produced unintended negative consequences. In these countries and economic 
sectors, the introduction of minimum wages did not only lead to the reduction of the 
working hours and working days, but it also led to massive job losses among the 
working poor as predicted by the opponents of the policy.  
 
In countries like Ghana, India, Malawi and Kenya, for example, the introduction or 
raising of minimum wages led to job losses among the working poor whom it was 
intended to help. These high levels of job losses were even minimised by high levels 
of non-compliance, which was encouraged by poor enforcement due to lack of the 
necessary resources needed to carry out inspections. These findings supported the 
argument raised by the opponents of minimum wages that in developing countries, 
minimum wages were the principal source of labour market segmentation and 
unemployment (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF MINIMUM WAGES IN  
SOUTH AFRICA’S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
  
4.1 Introduction 
 
Just like other countries, South Africa is faced with a huge challenge of poverty. 
Poverty is most prevalent among the unemployed and the low-paid workers. The 
high level of poverty is an indication that the economy is unable to distribute income 
equally among its citizens. The majority of the low-paid workers are black Africans, 
female workers, the youth, the uneducated and those with low levels of education 
(Oosthuizen 2012: 180). 
 
In an attempt to alleviate the high level of poverty the South African government 
introduced a variety of policies that were intended to redistribute income to the 
unemployed and the working poor (Yamada 2012: 42). One of the policies that was 
intended to redistribute income and pull the working poor out of poverty is the 
minimum wage policy for those sectors where workers were grossly exploited by 
their employers (ILO 2013)  
 
One of the sectors in which minimum wages were introduced was the agricultural 
sector. In this sector, minimum wages were introduced in December 2002 and came 
into effect in March 2003 (Naidoo et al. 2007: 30). In 2013, the agricultural sector’s 
minimum wage was raised by a significant 52 per cent in an attempt to alleviate 
poverty among the working poor (Agrisa 2014: 4). 
 
 The standard competitive model predicted that minimum wages would force 
employers to lay off inexperienced and unskilled workers, as their labour had 
become more expensive relative to the contribution made to the firm. These workers 
would then be replaced by skilled workers whose wages had increased by smaller 
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margins (Schuldt et al. 2012: 265). The classical economists also argue that the policy 
does not actually help the working poor because most of the employers do not 
comply with legislation regarding minimum wage. They continue to pay wages that 
are lower than the stipulated wages, since there is a low level of enforcement (Jones 
1997: 1). 
 
The purpose of this study is to look at the level of minimum wages and employment 
trends in South Africa’s agricultural sector, as it is intended to find out if the minimum 
wage policy had led to job losses among the working poor in the agricultural sector 
whom the policy is intended to help, as predicted by the standard competitive model. 
Lastly, the research is also intended to find out if the wage policy has been properly 
implemented and monitored in the sector.  
 
The first part of this chapter deals with the main causes of poverty in South Africa. 
This will be followed by the description of South Africa’s agricultural sector and the 
historical background of the sector where the focus will be on the periods before and 
after 1994. Thereafter a discussion about the size and the characteristics of 
agricultural sector workers is undertaken. The social and economic conditions of the 
working poor in the agricultural sector will be discussed thereafter. This will be 
followed by a discussion about the government’s intervention and the criteria used to 
determine minimum wages in the sector.  
 
The research methodology will be discussed thereafter and this is followed by an 
analysis of the minimum wage theory and its relevance to South Africa’s agricultural 
sector. Then an analysis of how the minimum wage policy is implemented in the 
agricultural sector follows. The last part to be dealt with in this chapter is the 
conclusion. 
 
4.2 Poverty levels in South Africa 
 
Poverty is a situation where individuals, households or entire communities are 
unable to command sufficient resources necessary to satisfy a socially acceptable 
standard of living (Ngwane et al. 2001: 202). High levels of poverty persisted long 
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after the first democratic government came to power in 1994. Poverty among the 
previously disadvantaged groups has remained high even after most of the apartheid 
laws have been replaced by the new policies designed to tackle the imbalances of 
the past (Oosthuizen 2012: 173).  
Although the intensity of poverty in the country was lessened by social wages, the 
majority of South Africans remained trapped in poverty (Meth & Dias 2004: 83). The 
following poverty lines were used to monitor poverty levels in South Africa: 
 
 Food poverty line: This refers to the amount of money that a person will 
need in order to consume the required energy intake (Statistics South Africa 
2009: 5). In 2014, South Africa’s food poverty line was R400 per capita per 
month; 
 Low-bound poverty line: This refers to the poverty line where people do not 
have enough money to purchase both food and non-food items. These 
people are forced to sacrifice food items in order to pay for other things like 
transport and airtime (Meth & Dias 2004: 23). In 2014, the low-bound poverty 
line was R544 per capita per month (Nicolson 2015: 1); and 
 Upper-bound poverty line: This refers to the food poverty line plus the 
average amount derived from the non-food items of households whose total 
spending is equivalent to the food poverty line (Statistics South Africa 2009: 
5). In 2014, the upper-bound poverty line was R753 per capita per month in 
South Africa (Nicolson 2015: 1). 
 
International poverty lines of US$1.90 and US$3.20 were also used to monitor the 
progress of the Millennium Development Goals. The US$1.90 poverty line was 
generally accepted as the international standard of extreme poverty. These amounts 
were expressed in terms of the purchasing power parity (PPP), which expressed 
prices adjusted for cost of living in a benchmark currency. In this case, it was the US 
dollar (World Bank Group 2017: 1). 
 
The proportion of South Africans living below the international poverty line of 
US$1.90 per day increased from 16.6 per cent in 2011 to 18.9 per cent in 2015. At 
the same time the proportion of people living below the poverty line of US$3.20 per 
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day also increased from 35.9 per cent in 2011 to 37.6 in 2015 (World Bank Group 
2017: 1). This was an indication that government’s social wages did not lower 
poverty levels sufficiently. 
  
Poverty levels were also higher in all nine provinces of South Africa. The poverty rate 
for each province, according to the upper-bound poverty line, indicated that the 
poorest of all provinces was the Limpopo Province with the poverty level of 63.8 per 
cent. It was followed by the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal at the poverty levels of 
60.8 per cent and 56.6 per cent respectively. Poverty levels were lower in Gauteng 
and Western Cape where they were 22.9 per cent and 24.7 per cent respectively as 
can be seen in Figure 4.1 (Statistics South Africa 2009: 12). 
 
Figure 4.1: Poverty levels by province in 2009 (Percentage) 
 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa 2014c: 12.  
 
The main causes of the high rate of poverty in the country were the following:  
 Many households had no access to wage income (unemployment); and 
 Wage income was unequally distributed across the households that had 
access to it (Murray et al. 2001: 78). Allanson and Atkins (2005: 1024) 
asserted that the substantial wage disparities between the rich and the 
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poor and the resultant poverty persisted several years after the transition 
to the democratic majority rule government. 
 
4.2.1 Unemployment and poverty 
 
According to the official definition, “unemployment” refers to people who were 
without work in the week preceding the interview, have taken steps to search for 
employment or start a business, and were available to work immediately 
(Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 2012: 23). The high level of 
unemployment continued to be a challenge in the country long after the 1994 
elections, which ushered in a new democratic government. The high rate of 
unemployment can be seen in Figure 4.2 below.  
 
Figure 4.2: The official unemployment rate in South Africa, 2001 
and 2013 (percentage) 
 
 
Source: Department of Planning and Monitoring 2012 and 2014. 
 
For the entire decade the official unemployment rate in South Africa was above 20 
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0
5
10
15
20
25
30
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
YEARS
Unemployment rate
102 
 
per cent respectively. This was due to an economic slowdown that was illustrated by 
the lower real GDP growth of only 3.7 per cent in 2002 and 2.9 percent in 2012 
(Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 2012: 14). The higher 
unemployment rate was the main cause of poverty in the country. 
 
4.2.2 Low-pay and poverty  
 
Most sectors in the South African economy were subject to minimum wages that had 
been agreed upon through collective bargaining (Business Day Live 2015: 3). 
Bargaining councils were used in sectors where collective bargaining was adequate 
between unions and employers. Some sectors were, however, characterised by 
weaker collective bargaining councils. This was mainly due to the difficulties of 
organising workers in occupations where employment was widely dispersed or 
where enterprises were small. The difficulties encountered in organising workers 
made union coverage to be very low in sectors like domestic work, farming, 
construction and wholesale/retail (Oosthuizen 2012: 186). The union representation 
of the various sectors of the South African economy in 2002 can be seen in Table 
4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1: The union coverage in South Africa’s economic sectors 
in 2002 (percentage) 
Economic Sectors % of Union 
Representation
Domestic work 1.17 
Farming sector 7.98 
Wholesale/retail 19.94 
Mining/Quarrying 78.25 
Manufacturing 35.41 
Electricity/Gas/Water 53.19 
Construction 13.28 
Transportation/Storage/Communication 34.91 
Financial intermediaries/ Insurance/Real estate and business 
services 
23.28 
Community/Social and professional services 60.26 
Source: Yamada 2012: 43. 
 
The information in Table 4.1 indicates that the union coverage rate was high in 
sectors like electricity, gas, water, quarrying, and community, social and professional 
services where it was above 50 per cent. In social and professional services and 
electricity, water and gas, for example, union coverage was 60.26 per cent and 
53.19 per cent respectively. 
 
Union coverage was, however, much lower in the domestic work and farming sectors 
where it was less than 10 per cent as can be seen in Table 4.1. For domestic 
workers, union coverage was lowest at 1.17 per cent. This was followed by the 
farming and construction sectors where union coverage was at 7.98 and 13.28 per 
cent respectively (Yamada 2012: 43).  
 
Low levels of union representation in these sectors made it easy for employers to 
exploit the vulnerable workers (Yamada 2012: 43). Murphey (1996: 84) asserted that 
employers in sectors like these were in a much stronger position from which they 
could drive a hard bargain against vulnerable workers. This can be seen in Table 4.2 
below.   
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Table 4.2: Mean hourly wage in South Africa’s economic sectors in 
2002 (Rands) 
 
Source: Yamada 2012: 43. 
 
From Table 4.2 it is clear that workers with poor union representation were poorly 
remunerated compared to those who were well-represented by trade unions. The 
mean hourly wages for domestic workers and farm workers, for instance, were much 
lower at R2, 88 and R3, 27 respectively. This made the poverty level to be much 
higher among the people working as domestic and farm workers (Yamada 2012: 43). 
In households where members worked as farm workers, about 77.0 per cent were 
living below the poverty line of R322 per month in 2001 (2000 prices). In households 
where members worked as domestic workers, about 70.9 percent were living below 
the poverty line of R322 per month in 2001 (2000 prices). In contrast, the mean 
hourly wage for workers who were well-represented by trade unions was higher. The 
mean hourly wage for electricity, gas and water, and community, social and personal 
services, for example, was R19,46 and R21,22 per hour respectively (Yamada 2012: 
43).  
 
The disparities in income continued to widen the inequality gap between the rich and 
the poor in the country. The monthly real income of the poorest 10 per cent of the 
population, for instance, increased from R742 in 1995 to only R1 386 in 2009 
(Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 2010: 24). The lowest paid 
workers often have large families to support, which pushed the whole family into 
Economic Sector Rands 
Domestic work 2,88 
Farmer 3,27 
Wholesale and retail 10,02 
Mining and quarrying 13,31 
Manufacturing 14,67 
Electricity, gas and water 19,46 
Construction 7,67 
Community, social and personal services 21,22 
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poverty despite having a family member who was working. Poverty was therefore not 
found only among the unemployed part of the labour force (Department of Labour 
2008: 2). On the other hand, the monthly real income of the richest 10 per cent of the 
population increased from R13 416 in 1995 to R26 603 in 2009 (Department of 
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 2010: 24).  
 
Recent statistics from Statistics South Africa’s Labour Market Dynamics Report for 
2013 indicated that the majority of South African employees were still receiving an 
extremely low pay. It indicated that half of South African workers still earned less 
than R3 033 per month in 2012 (Statistics South Africa 2014d: 12). This is an 
indication that most South African workers were still earning wages that were way 
below the estimated living level of R4 500 per month (Business Day Live 2014: 3). 
The high levels of poverty and inequality prevailed despite the political 
transformation and the subsequent abolishment and replacement of the apartheid 
legislation with the new policies designed to tackle the imbalances of the past 
(Oosthuizen 2012: 173). This made it necessary for minimum wages to be 
introduced in the sectors where workers were unfairly remunerated by their 
employers. 
 
4.3 Poverty in the agricultural sector 
 
4.3.1 Description of the agricultural sector 
 
South Africa has a dual agricultural economy comprising well-developed commercial 
farming and more subsistence farming that are dominant in deep rural areas. 
Agricultural activities range from intensive crop production and livestock farming. 
Livestock farming is dominated by cattle and sheep farming. Cattle populations are 
mostly concentrated along the coastal areas of the Eastern and Western Cape, 
north-eastern and central areas of the Free State, western parts of Kwazulu-Natal 
and the southern parts of Mpumalanga. In the North-West Province, most cattle are 
found in the south-eastern and north-western areas of the province, and in Limpopo 
the distribution is even. The sheep populations are mostly concentrated in the 
Eastern and Northern Cape. In the Free State, the sheep population is concentrated 
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in the eastern and southern districts. In the Western Cape, the sheep population is 
mostly concentrated in the Karoo area and along the coast (Department of 
Agriculture 2006: 13).   
 
South Africa’s climatic conditions favour the cultivation of highly diverse agricultural 
production ranging from deciduous fruit, citrus fruit, subtropical fruit, grain, cut-
flowers et cetera. The grain industry is one of the largest industries in South Africa’s 
agricultural sector. It constitutes between 25 and 33 per cent of the country’s total 
agricultural production. The largest area of farmland is planted with maize, followed 
by wheat that is followed by sugarcane and sunflowers (Department of Agriculture 
2016).  
 
Maize is produced throughout the country under different environmental conditions. 
About 8.0 million tons of maize is produced in South Africa annually on 
approximately 3.1 hectares of land. Half of the maize produced in the country 
consists of white maize, which is meant for human consumption (Department of 
Agriculture 2003: 1). The remaining half consists of yellow maize, which is used for 
animal feed (Department of Agriculture 2016: 110).  
 
Annual wheat production in the country ranges from 1.5 to 3 million tons per hectare 
at the rate of 2 to 2.5 tons per hectares in dry areas and approximately 5 tons per 
hectare under irrigation. The contributions of the provinces are as follows: 
 The south-western parts of the Western Cape: 650 000 tons; 
 The Free State: 580 000 tons; 
 The Northern Cape: 300 000 tons; 
 The North-West Province : 162 000 tons; 
 Mpumalanga: 92 000 tons; 
 Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal: about 50 000 tons each; and  
 The Eastern Cape and Gauteng: 15 000 tons each (Department of Agriculture 
2010d: 1).  
 
Wheat produced in the country is not enough for the needs of South Africans. This 
situation forced South Africa to import approximately 300 000 tons of wheat per year 
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to supplement what is being produced locally (Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries 2010d: 1). 
 
Sugarcane is produced mostly in three provinces of South Africa, which are the 
Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. It is produced in 14 cane-producing 
areas extending from Northern Pondoland in the Eastern Cape through to the 
coastal belt of the KwaZulu-Natal midlands up to the Mpumalanga Lowveld 
(Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2010b: 1).  
 
Sunflowers are produced mostly in provinces which experience their rainfall in 
summer like the North-West Province, Free State, Limpopo and Mpumalanga. 
Production of sunflower seeds ranges between 500 000 to 700 000 tons per year. 
There are, however, fluctuations in production levels that are mainly caused by 
uncertain price expectations, high production costs and high stock levels 
(Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2010c: 1). 
 
4.3.2 Historical background of South Africa’s agricultural sector  
 
4.3.2.1 The pre-1994 period 
 
For centuries the indigenous groups in South Africa were subjected to restrictions in 
access to land. The restrictions to access to land became the basis for an adverse 
incorporation in a colonial society and continued to shape social relations in the 
country long after the colonial era. The transition of agriculture into a more capital-
intensive mode of production differed from region to region. The Cape was 
transformed much earlier than the eastern and northern regions due to its closeness 
to the coast. The transformation included the expropriation of land from the 
indigenous people by the white settler farmers. In the northern and eastern regions, 
the expropriation of land only happened in the late 19th century due to the fact that 
the areas were far from the coast and that indigenous communities resisted the 
white settlers. Many black smallholders in these regions remained mixed farmers 
who had enough skills and resources to compete with settler famers (Zamchiya et al. 
2013: 6).  
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In the 19th century, there was a growing demand for labour in the country. Large 
numbers of workers were needed to work in the urban economy as well as the 
agricultural and mining sectors. To address the pressing need for labour, 
government controlled and curtailed farming activities by the indigenous 
smallholders or tenants. Government achieved this goal through the promulgation of 
the Native Land Act No. 27 of 1913 and the Land Act of 1936 (Zamchiya et al. 2013: 
6). These Acts provided a foundation for a system that had created a huge reservoir 
of cheap labour (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 36).  
 
The Land Act of 1913 gave settler farmers an opportunity to expropriate their 
tenants’ livestock. This Act made the tenants to be poorer such that they ended up 
looking for employment on the settlers’ farms (Zamchiya et al. 2013: 6). Bell (2013: 
2) confirmed that the Act was not intended to move Africans from the commercial 
farms; instead it was intended to keep them there as cheap workers on settlers’ 
farms rather than as tenants.  
 
There were other pieces of legislation and institutions that provided protective 
frameworks and powerful bargaining mechanisms to farmers only. The Land Bank of 
South Africa, which was established in 1925, for example, provided subsidised 
financial services and credit to white farmers. The Agricultural Credit Board, an 
agency within the Department of Agriculture, provided credit to white farmers who 
did not qualify to borrow money from the Land Bank (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 36).  
 
The Cooperative Society Act of 1925 led to the establishment of a network of primary 
producer co-operatives. Through the system of these co-operatives commercial 
farmers bought inputs collectively and this enabled them to negotiate cheaper prices. 
They also provided other crucial services like transportation of farmers’ produce to 
the market and grain storage facilities. They also monitored the quality of the 
products, regulated planting quotas and got rid of surpluses through processing 
(Visser & Ferrer 2015: 36). 
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Co-operatives also acted as important financial intermediaries. The Land Bank used 
these co-operatives as agents to provide short- and medium-term credit to 
commercial farmers at subsidised interest rates. Government also channelled 
disaster funds to farmers through these co-operatives. The disaster assistance 
usually was in the form of debt consolidation. These co-operatives also acted as a 
link between the state-provided research and extension services (Visser & Ferrer 
2015: 37). 
 
The Marketing Act No. 59 of 1968 led to the appointment of state-controlled 
marketing boards for a variety of agricultural products. The marketing boards fulfilled 
the following functions: 
 They set prices; 
 They monitored quality standards; 
 They monitored the supply and sale of agricultural products; 
 They used their monopoly power to keep prices of produce higher; and 
 The boards also fulfilled a co-ordination function (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 36). 
 
The support that the white commercial farmers received from the state enabled them 
to have more skills and resources than the black farmers. The low interest loans 
made it possible for white farmers to purchase much needed agricultural machinery 
and to make improvements on their farms. This enabled the white farmers to farm 
directly on the land which had previously been allocated to African sharecroppers. 
This made more Africans to migrate from white-owned farms. African farmers who 
owned land inside and outside the reserves did not receive any form of assistance 
from the government and this made it difficult for them to compete with white farmers 
who could use improved farming methods and expand their farms (South African 
History Online 2016: 4). 
 
4.3.2.2 The post-1994 period 
After the democratic elections of 1994, South Africa wanted to be re-accepted into 
the global market. They wanted to promote international trade between South Africa 
and the rest of the world. In order to lower the tariffs with which South Africa’s 
products were confronted in the global market, the government entered into a 
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number of trade agreements with other countries. These agreements were intended 
to increase South Africa’s share of the world market and therefore to promote 
exports of agricultural products. The two agreements with the biggest implications for 
the South African economy were the World Trade Organisation Agreement on 
Agriculture and the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with 
the European Union. 
 
As member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), South Africa was bound by the 
agreements of the organisation. One of those agreements was the Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA), which came into effect in 1995. The World Trade Organisation’s 
Agreement on Agriculture contained regulations, which were intended to create a fair 
and market-oriented agricultural trading system. Member countries were expected to 
cut export subsidies, lower barriers to trade of agricultural products and cut domestic 
support measures to farmers. The South African government pushed through a 
number of reforms in the agricultural sector since 1996 (Centre for Rural Legal 
Studies 2003: 3). Visser and Ferrer (2015: 38) pointed out that South Africa was 
under pressure to reduce the protection tariffs because it wanted to be accepted as 
member of the World Trade Organisation.  
 
In 1997, the South African government abolished the General Export Incentive 
Scheme (GEIS), an export subsidy, which benefited a number of exported products. 
Government scrapped the scheme because of two reasons: 
 Pressure of the World Trade Organisation; and 
 High cost to the government. 
 
The extent to which the previous tariff regime was reduced went beyond what was 
required by the Uruguay Round Agreement of the World Trade Organisation on 
agriculture. Wheat tariffs in the country, for example, stood at zero per cent instead 
of the bound rate of 72 per cent. The zero per cent tariff led to an increase in the 
import of wheat from 20 per cent in 1997 to above 60 per cent in 2007. At the same 
time local production of wheat decreased by 54 per cent. This indicated that 
imported wheat had displaced local production (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 38).  
 
111 
 
Measured by the producer support estimate, the level of support to farmers in the 
country had decreased substantially. Between 2008 and 2010 it stood at 3 per cent, 
which was well below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) average level of 20 per cent. As a result, producers in South Africa were 
unable to compete, even domestically, with subsidised imported commodities (Visser 
& Ferrer 2015: 38). South African farmers were unable to compete in the global and 
domestic markets because, while the South African government was cutting 
agricultural subsidies to its farmers, other countries maintained their support to their 
farmers. The United States of America, Japan, the European Union and other 
industrialised countries, for instance, spent US$360 billion on supporting farmers in 
1999. The high level of subsidies that farmers in industrialised countries had 
received enabled them to produce cheaply and to also dump on poor countries, 
including South Africa (Centre for Rural Legal Studies 2003: 4). 
 
The process of market liberalisation included, among other things, the abolition of 
state-controlled marketing boards and the single-channel marketing system. Farmers 
disagreed about the advantages of the marketing boards. The main complaint given 
was that they pooled produce and did not reward producers for quality, and that it 
had little incentive to save on marketing cost and innovation (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 
38). 
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, resistance to the single-channel marketing system 
increased as the gap between the producer and consumer price of agricultural 
products increased. Resistance to single-channel system led to an official inquiry into 
the marketing of agricultural products. This was followed by the promulgation of the 
Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996 and the setting up of the National 
Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC). The National Agricultural Marketing Council 
was given the task of dismantling of the marketing control boards, and the future 
managing and monitoring of the state intervention in the agricultural sector (Visser & 
Ferrer 2015: 38).  
 
The abolition of the marketing control boards was expected to lead to the following 
advantages: 
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 Increased investment and employment in agricultural marketing activities; 
 More innovation; 
 More efficient use of agricultural resources; 
 Low real food prices; 
 Reduced opportunities for rent seeking by vested interests; 
 Less exposure to the agricultural risk for the government; and  
 Further decrease in real land prices which would facilitate land reform (Visser 
& Ferrer 2015: 38). 
 
Financial services to farmers were also reduced substantially. Subsidies were either 
reduced or removed. Interest rate subsidies and export subsidies were also removed 
in 1997 (Hall 2008: 122). The Agricultural Credit Board closed down on the 
recommendation of the Strauss Commission of 1996. The Commission also made a 
recommendation that the Land Bank should receive grants from the National 
Treasury to enable it to finance small farmers who wanted to enter the sector and did 
not have money to finance their operations. Lending by the Land Bank itself was also 
reduced drastically. This made commercial farmers to increasingly borrow money 
from the commercial banks (at less favourable interest rates) and less from the Land 
Bank. In the 1970s, for instance, the Land Bank held 22 per cent of all agricultural 
debt. This figure dropped substantially to only 17 per cent in 2005. Agricultural debt 
in the commercial banks and co-operatives, on the other hand, increased 
substantially to 55 and 12.5 per cent respectively (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 39). 
 
These policy reforms had a huge effect on the role of the co-operatives in the 
agricultural sector. They no longer had the privilege of being appointed as agents at 
various marketing boards and because of that they lost their regional monopoly 
positions. While they still provided short- and medium-term credit to farmers, they 
then had to perform that role on a commercial basis, as the Land Bank also had to 
compete with the commercial banks for this business (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 39). 
 
By 1996 government’s support to the agricultural sector was so low that it was 
estimated to be only 4 percent. By 2001 the total annual government spending on 
agriculture was only R2.5 billion (Hall 2008: 122). The phasing out of marketing 
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boards and co-operatives that provided essential support services to farmers 
happened at the time when emerging black farmers were trying to establish 
themselves. These fledgling farmers found themselves having to compete with 
established producers in the global market. That was the same market where even 
established commercial farmers were finding it hard to survive without government 
support (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 45). 
 
It was only in 2003 that government launched a comprehensive agricultural support 
programme (CASP), which was intended to facilitate market entry for black farmers. 
This was followed by the promulgation of the new Co-operatives Act of 2005 that 
was aimed at encouraging black people in rural areas to form emerging co-
operatives. Government financing agencies like Khula and Seda were mandated to 
support emerging farmers through capacity-building (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 49).  
 
Despite all these agencies and promises, the emerging small-scale African farmers 
continued to experience a range of problems with regard to marketing their produce. 
These farmers did not have an understanding of the functioning of the international 
market; for instance, they did not have the knowledge of when and where to market 
their products. They also lacked transport, assemblage and storage facilities. They 
also experienced poor infrastructure challenges. This put them entirely at the mercy 
of the agents (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 49). The continuous decrease in government 
support to the agricultural sector made the sector’s contribution to the economy to 
dwindle over time (Hall 2008: 122). 
 
4.4 The size of the agricultural sector 
 
4.4.1 Contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) relative to 
other sectors 
 
In the years following the Second World War, production in the agricultural sector 
increased considerably in the country. That was made possible by increased 
mechanisation in the sector. The area ploughed (dry-land production) increased with 
the introduction of tractors on a large scale (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy 
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2012: 2). In the 1950s, for instance, the agricultural sector’s contribution to the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product was about 15.2 per cent (Department of 
Agriculture 2010a: 4). It decreased drastically to about 3 per cent in the 1990s and to 
about 2 per cent in the 2000s (Department of Agriculture 2010a: 3). In the second 
quarter of 2016, for instance, the contribution of the agricultural sector to the gross 
domestic product was 2.2 per cent (Statistics South Africa 2016e: 8).  
 
The agricultural sector also played a pivotal role in the economies of all nine 
provinces of South Africa. There were, however, notable differences on the 
contribution made by the agricultural sector in the provinces. There were provinces 
where the agricultural sector made a greater contribution to the gross value added 
than others. In 2013, for example, the agricultural sector made greater contributions 
to Kwazulu-Natal and the Western Cape’s economies where it was 22.6 and 26.4 
respectively. In provinces like the Eastern Cape and Gauteng, the agricultural sector 
made the least contribution to the GDP during the same period (Statistics South 
Africa 2014e: 12). This can be seen in Figure 4.3 below. 
 
Figure 4.3: Provincial share of the agricultural sector to the GDP in 
2013 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa 2014e:12.  
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The services and manufacturing sectors overtook agriculture in terms of their 
contribution to the GDP. Although the relative size of the agricultural sector to the 
GDP had been declining over the years, it showed an annual average growth rate of 
1.7 per cent over the past ten years (Department of Agriculture 2010a: 4). 
 
4.4.2 Contribution of the agricultural sector to employment 
nationally 
 
Large numbers of people were employed in the agricultural sector in the 1950s and 
1960s. The agricultural sector employment reached its highest level of just over 1.9 
million workers during the early 1960s and decreased thereafter to just above 0.8 
million in 2009/10. The majority of those workers were employed to harvest crops 
(Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy 2015: 2). 
 
In the 1970s, the South African economy started experiencing labour shortages in 
the mining and agriculture sectors. Labour shortages put upward pressure on labour 
prices in the country. Favourable interest rates prevailing at the time, together with 
subsidised agricultural loans and tax incentives on capital goods, made the cost of 
capital goods to be lower when compared to labour costs. This, together with the 
desire of farmers to have greater control over the harvesting process, led to a rapid 
increase in mechanised combined harvesting and a full transition to bulk grain 
handling (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy 2012: 3). 
 
After 1994 the agricultural sector underwent far-reaching changes, which 
accompanied the political changes in the country. Some of those changes, like trade 
liberalisation and deregulation of agricultural marketing and withdrawal of direct 
subsidies, had far-reaching consequences for the agricultural sector. They led to a 
sharp decrease in areas planted with field crops. The area planted with field crops 
decreased from about 9 million hectares in the late 1980s to the current 5 million 
hectares. 
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This led to a further decline in employment in the farming sector. Employment 
declined from between 1.6 and 1.9 million in the 1950s and 1960s to below a million 
in the early 1990s (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy 2012: 2). Employment 
levels in the agricultural sector continued to decrease in the 21st century. Neves and 
Hakizimana (2015: 7) found that the total loss of employment in South Africa’s 
agricultural sector between 1993 and 2006 was estimated to be as high as 40 per 
cent. Employment in the sector continued to decrease long after 2006. In the second 
quarter of 2016, for instance, employment in the agricultural sector was even lower 
at 825 000 (Statistics South Africa 2016a: 34).  
 
4.4.3 Contribution of the agricultural sector to employment 
provincially 
 
There were large provincial differences in terms of the proportion of people 
employed on commercial farms. Some provinces employed more agricultural sector 
employees than others as can be seen in Figure 4.4 below. 
 
Figure 4.4: Employment of agricultural sector workers by province 
(percentage) 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa 2016a: 34. 
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At an employment level of 22.5 per cent the Western Cape employed the most 
agricultural sector workers in the second quarter of 2016. It was followed by Limpopo 
and KwaZulu-Natal, which employed 14.9 and 14.8 percent workers respectively. 
The province which employed the least number of agricultural sector workers at the 
time was the North-West Province, which employed only 4.5 per cent of the total 
farm workers in the country. The North West province was followed by Northern 
Cape and Gauteng which employed 5.1 and 5.3 percent of agricultural sector 
workers respectively (Statistics South Africa 2016b: 35). 
 
4.4.4 The agricultural sector and exports 
 
Exports of agricultural products in the country grew over the years. The rapid growth 
in exports outstripped the growth of imports. From 1996 onwards, for example, 
export income of agricultural products increased from R12 531 billion to R71 877 
billion in 2013. During the same period imports of agricultural products increased 
from R7 903 billion to R58 775 billion. Imports were therefore always lower than 
exports. This meant the balance of trade in the agricultural sector was always 
positive throughout this period (Williams 2014: 3).  
 
Balance of trade (BOT) is the difference between a country’s imports and exports for 
a given period of time (South African Reserve Bank 2016: 33). It experienced 
consistent growth between 1996 and 2003. It, however, became more unstable after 
2003, hitting a low point of R0.7 billion in 2007 and a peak of R16.1 billion in 2013. 
The value of the exports market increased from R51.9 billion to R74.9 between 2012 
and 2013 (Williams 2014: 3). Between the first quarter of 2014 and the first quarter of 
2015, the total export value of agricultural products increased by about 2 per cent 
(Department of Agriculture 2015b: 36).  
 
The European Union and Africa accounted for well over half of the total export value 
of these products. The EU retained the greatest market share of well over 30 per 
cent throughout the period, followed by Africa, which retained a market share of over 
20 per cent (Williams 2014: 12). Increased trade with the European Union was made 
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possible by the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement, which was 
concluded in 2000, after five years of negotiations had started. The TDCA 
established free trade between the European Union and South Africa (Centre for 
Rural Legal Studies 2003: 4). Other destinations for these exports were China, 
Japan, USA, Mercosur et cetera (Williams 2014: 12). 
 
4.5 Characteristics of workers employed in the agricultural sector 
 
4.5.1 Population group 
 
The majority of people employed in the agricultural sector were Africans followed by 
Coloureds, Whites and Indians respectively. In the third quarter of 2014, for instance, 
64.8 per cent of farm workers were Africans. Coloured people constituted about 19.9 
per cent while whites and Indians made up 14.4 and 0.4 per cent respectively (Visser 
& Ferrer 2015: 10). Most of these African workers were overrepresented in low-
quality employment like fruit picking and weeding (Orkin & Njobe 2000: 1).  
 
4.5.2 Level of education 
 
Most of the people working in the agricultural sector either had no education or had a 
low level of education. About 18.6 per cent of agricultural household heads in 2016, 
for instance, did not go to school at all. Of those who went to school, about 56.3 per 
cent had between grade 1 and 11. This meant about 74.9 per cent of the agricultural 
household heads did not have grade 12. Only 16.0 per cent of the agricultural 
household heads had grade 12 in 2016. About 8.7 per cent of agricultural household 
heads had tertiary qualifications while 0.4 were classified as ‘other’ (Statistics South 
Africa 2016d: 4). This confirms what Liebenberg and Kirsten (2013) found, namely 
that 74 per cent of people employed in the formal agricultural sector in 2013 did not 
have grade 12, only 11 per cent had grade 12 while 4 per cent had tertiary 
qualifications.  
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4.5.3 Level of earnings 
 
The wages that the agricultural sector workers received was partly determined by the 
level of education they had obtained. The uneducated and least educated workers 
were most likely to receive low pay compared to the more educated workers 
(Oosthuizen 2012: 180). This explained why the majority of workers in the 
agricultural sector were paid such low wages. In 2014, for instance, the median 
monthly earnings of agricultural sector workers was R2 153 (Statistics South Africa 
2014d: 17). In 2016, farm sector workers earned slightly higher wages after the 
sectoral minimum wage was set at  
R2 778,83 per month, up from R2 606,78 in 2015 (Department of Labour 2016: 6). 
The higher minimum wage of R2 778, 83 per month was still much lower than the 
estimated living level of R4 500 per month (Business Day Live 2014: 3). 
 
4.5.4 Gender 
 
More men were employed in the agricultural sector compared to women. In the first 
quarter of 2015, for instance, about 603 000 men were employed in the sector 
compared to only 289 000 women (Statistics South Africa 2015a: 15). The trend of 
male dominance in the sector continued even in 2016. In the second quarter of 2016, 
for example, 590 000 men were employed in the sector compared to 235 000 
women (Statistics South Africa 2016b: 2). This was the reason why the agricultural 
sector was regarded as a male employment generator (Statistics South Africa 
2014b: 15). 
 
4.6 The socio-economic conditions of agricultural sector workers 
 
4.6.1 Immobility of farm workers 
 
High levels of unemployment in the country and the isolated nature of rural 
communities caused farm workers to be immobile. Lack of mobility made farm 
workers to entirely depend on their employers for family cohesion, housing, 
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education, basic necessities and social services. Farm workers’ access to housing, 
for example, was linked to their contracts of employment (Weideman 2004: 336). 
The place of work was also the place of residence for many vulnerable farm workers. 
Termination of employment for these workers also meant that the right to housing 
would be terminated. In most cases these workers had no alternative 
accommodation available (Zamchiya et al. 2013: 8).  
 
4.6.2 Violence against farm workers 
 
The high level of vulnerability made farm workers more dependent on and obedient 
to their employers. It made the working poor in the agricultural sector more open to 
abuse by their employers. Their high level of dependency on employers led farmers 
to believe that they had the responsibility to discipline their employees. Farm workers 
regarded it as normal to be punished by their employers (Weideman 2004: 336). 
 
The relationship between farmers and farm workers was largely characterised by 
violence. In June 1999, for example, a farmer covered his neighbour’s employee in 
toxic paint as punishment for taking a short cut across his farm. In another incident a 
farmer drove over and also decapitated (with an axe) two of his farm workers 
because one of them called him ‘Piet’ instead of ‘baas’. In yet another incident a 
farmer shot and killed a six-month old baby strapped on the back of her 11-year-old 
cousin as they walked across the smallholding on which their family lived and 
worked (Weideman 2004: 336). 
 
4.6.3 Geographic location of farms 
 
Farms are by their very nature isolated. Lack of transport made it difficult for farm 
workers to get to town. Farm workers were therefore forced to purchase supplies, 
including basic stuffs from farm stores, which belonged to their employers. Prices of 
basic stuffs were often set at the discretion of the employers (Weideman 2004: 337). 
In most cases, prices of basic goods were inflated and farm workers were not told of 
the prices of those goods. That contributed to a cycle of debt and led to food 
insecurity for children and adults alike (Department of Social Services 2004: 5). 
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4.6.4 Poor working conditions 
 
Farm workers were exposed to dangerous working conditions. They worked with 
harmful chemicals and dangerous machines, usually without protective clothing. 
Most of these workers were also not given any training on how to handle dangerous 
chemicals and machines. These workers also carried out too demanding jobs and 
they also worked very long hours. This made more farm workers to experience 
numerous health problems like muscular problems, psychological, skin and eye 
problems (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 67). 
 
Despite all these dangerous working conditions to which the working poor in the 
farming sector were exposed, they were the most impoverished group in the formal 
sector of the South African economy. The reason for the high level of poverty was 
that they were some of the least paid workers in the South African economy. In 
1986, for instance, the average income for farm workers in the country (including 
payment in-kind) was R104 per month. In 1992, the average wage had increased to 
R225, 25 (Weideman 2004: 335).  
 
The democratic government, which came to power in 1994, did not do much to 
reduce the harsh working conditions and the problem of low pay among the working 
poor in the agricultural sector. On some farms like at the Malamula farm in the 
former Northern Transvaal, present day Limpopo Province, farm workers were given 
daily targets that were difficult to meet. Seasonal workers on the Malamula farm, for 
example, were paid R40,60 for every 60 bags of lemons filled per day, R28,50 for 40 
bags and R11,40 for 20 bags. On this particular farm a monthly income of casual 
workers could be as low as R300 (Zamchiya et al. 2013: 76).  
 
By 1996 three-quarters of farm workers still lived below the poverty line. Farm 
workers continued to receive 21.1 per cent of their wages in-kind, for example, 
housing, food and land (Weideman 2004: 335). Some wine farms of the Western 
Cape still practiced the ‘dop’ system. This was the system where farmers issued part 
payment of wages to their workers in wine. The system contributed to the chronic 
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alcoholism, which is still prevalent in the wine producing areas today (Department of 
Social Services 2004: 5).  
 
Wages for the agricultural sector workers were also the lowest when compared to 
wages of workers in other sectors. In 1997, for instance, the mean farm worker’s 
wages were 13 per cent lower than the wages of domestic workers, 63 per cent 
lower than the wages of construction workers, 72 per cent lower than the wages of 
manufacturing sector workers and 80 per cent lower than the wages of workers in 
the service sector (Bhorat et al. 2012: 5). The wage disparities between the 
agricultural sector and other sectors continued long after 1997 as can be seen in 
Figure 4.5 below. 
 
Figure 4.5: Wage disparities in South Africa’s economic sectors in 
2014 
 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa 2014d: 40.  
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South Africa 2014d: 40). This made the agricultural sector to have the highest 
percentage of people living below the poverty line. In 2014, the agricultural sector 
had 89.60 per cent people living below the working-poor line. That meant only 10.6 
per cent of people employed in the sector lived above the working-poor line (Finn 
2015: 11). 
 
The low wages which farm workers received made it difficult for them to support their 
families. It led to food insecurity among their family members. Children of farm 
workers suffered greatly, as they did not always get the foodstuffs necessary for their 
development. Most farm workers could not afford nutritious food. Their diets tended 
to be poor in terms of vitamin intake. Children of farm workers were therefore more 
likely to be stunted and underweight than any other children (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 
69). A survey conducted on farms of the North-West Province, for example, found 
that 43.6 per cent of all children were either underweight or stunted. About 6.7 per 
cent of children under the age of ten were wasted (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 69). 
 
4.6.5 Poor union representation 
Even though farm workers were unhappy about their working conditions, they were 
not able to challenge their employers. They considered the employers to have 
unilateral powers of hiring and firing workers. The situation of the farm workers was 
made difficult by the fact that the majority were not trade union members (Zamchiya 
et al. 2013: 45). Despite the fact that the Constitution allowed all workers the right to 
freedom of association there were challenges for strong unionisation in the 
agricultural sector. Some of the challenges were: 
 Lack of access to farms by trade union organisers. Organisers did not have 
the necessary means to access or provide effective service to farm workers; 
 Access to farms was restricted by farmers; and 
 Workers who wanted to join trade unions were threatened with dismissal 
(Department of Labour 2015: 17). 
 
Farm workers of the Malamula farm, for instance, did not want to join trade unions 
for fear that they would antagonise the farmer. They believed that the farmer would 
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always have the final say in any dispute. These workers believed that neither the 
police nor the trade unions had any power over the farmer. They believed that 
engaging in strikes would be tantamount to self-dismissal (Zamchiya et al. 2013: 45). 
 
Therefore, there was no central bargaining process in the agricultural sector. 
Whatever bargaining which happened in the sector took place between individual 
farmers and unions, and sometimes between unions and representatives of farmer 
organisations. This made farm workers to be the most exploited workers in the 
formal sector (Department of Agriculture 2015 18). 
 
4.7 Government’s intervention in the agricultural sector 
 
While the state was gradually withdrawing from the agricultural sector by cutting 
support to existing producers, it was at the same time intervening in the sector by 
introducing labour and social security legislation for farm workers. The agricultural 
sector was to a large extent unregulated by labour legislation until the 1990s. The 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1983, for instance, did not cover farm 
workers. The employment rights of farm workers were protected by common law. 
This put farm workers in a more vulnerable position. Civil liberties for farm workers 
did not exist (Grub 2005). 
 
It was only in the 1990s that labour legislation began to be extended to the farming 
sector and farm workers. Some of the legislation that were extended to cover farm 
workers were the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), the Labour Relations 
Act (LRA), the Employment Equity Act (EEA), the Skills Development Act, the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) and the Sectoral Determination Act 
(Grub 2005). 
 
4.7.1 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 
 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act No. 3 of 1983 was extended to cover 
farming sector workers in 1993. The Act regulated things like working hours, leave 
and prohibition of child and forced labour. It also laid out procedures for terminating 
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employment contracts, and prescribed how records should be kept and how wages 
should be paid out. In cases where workers’ rights were violated, they could appeal 
to the Director General of Labour and the Labour Court (Grub 2005: 56). 
 
4.7.2 The Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act did not entirely address the needs of the 
ordinary farm workers. In 1995, the Labour Relations Act (LRA), No. 66 of 1995, was 
extended to also cover the agricultural sector workers through the Agricultural 
Labour Act (Visser & Ferrer 2015: 39). The Act provided: 
 For the introduction of elected work councils to internally participate in labour 
decisions;  
 Workers with the right to strike, provided proper procedures were followed 
(Grub 2005: 55); and 
 Bargaining rights to farm workers; however, such rights were irrelevant to 
agricultural sector workers because only six percent were organised (Visser & 
Ferrer 2015: 39). 
 
4.7.3 Employment Equity Act (EEA) 
The Employment Equity Act No. 55 of 1998 was intended to eliminate unfair 
discrimination and to apply affirmative action measures. The purpose was to 
promote employment in certain positions of people who were previously 
disadvantaged like women. Medical testing, HIV testing and psychological testing, as 
prerequisites for employment, were no longer allowed (Grub 2005: 59).  
 
4.7.4 Skills Development Act 
The Skills Development Act No. 97 of 1998, which came into effect in April 2000, 
established sectoral education and training associations (Setas) for 27 economic 
sectors in the South African economy. The Seta responsible for the farming sector 
was the Primary Agricultural Education and Training Association (PAETA). 
Contributions for the setas were made by employers who employed more than 50 
workers. The contribution they made had to be equal to one per cent of their wage 
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bill. About 80 per cent of this amount could be reclaimed and used for training 
initiatives for employees (Grub 2005: 60). 
 
4.7.5 Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) 
It was introduced as Act No. 62 of 1997. Its main purpose was to provide security to 
people living on farms. It was also intended to prevent the fresh waves of evictions 
from the farms. This Act was also intended to establish smallholder farm and secure 
the rights of the labour tenants. This law had serious negative effects because it 
prompted many farmers to evict more labour tenants from their farms (Grub 2005: 
57). 
 
4.7.6 Sectoral Determination 8 of 2003 legislation 
The labour legislation that had the greatest effect on the farming sector was the 
Sectoral Determination 8 of 2003. This legislation was intended to protect the 
farming sector workers of South Africa who were considered most vulnerable (Visser 
& Ferrer 2015: 40). The absence of collective mechanisms for protecting the 
interests of farm workers on crucial issues forced government to intervene in the 
sector. The low wages and high percentage of people living below the poverty line 
made the Minister of Labour to give directives to the Director-General of the 
Department of Labour to conduct the necessary investigations to determine if it could 
be necessary to introduce minimum standard of employment in the sector, including 
minimum wages. The commissioned investigations found that the agricultural sector 
workers were some of the most exploited workers in the South African economy. It 
was then recommended that minimum wages should be introduced in the sector to 
improve the lives of the working poor (Oosthuizen 2012: 174). The following were 
some of the main benefits that minimum wage policy was intended to achieve in the 
sector:  
 To ensure that all wage earners in the sector receive decent wages; 
 To alleviate poverty; 
 To get rid of exploitation; 
 To preserve the purchasing power of wages; 
 To reduce unfair competition; 
 To ensure that workers doing the same job receive equal pay; 
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 To prevent industrial conflicts between employers and the employees; and 
 To promote economic growth (Department of Labour 2015: 9). 
             
There was, however, no general consensus regarding the role that minimum wages 
would play in poverty alleviation among the working poor in South Africa’s 
agricultural sector. The opponents of minimum wages like the director of the Free 
Market Foundation, Mr Nolutshungu, for instance, argued that the introduction of the 
wage policy would cripple the South African economy and also push the working 
poor in the sector deeper into poverty (Business News 2015: 2). The following were 
some of the unintended negative consequences that were predicted for the South 
Africa’s agricultural sector:  
  
 It would lead to job shedding among the vulnerable unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers in the sector, as employers could be forced to mechanise and also 
give preference to highly skilled workers. It is estimated that the demand for 
unskilled workers could decrease by as much as 28 per cent following the 
introduction of the minimum wage policy; 
 New investors would also increase their reliance on part-time and casual 
work, and reduce the number of working hours to reduce the wage bill; 
 Prospective farmers would also be reluctant to start new farming businesses 
because of poor profit expectations (International Labour Organisation 2015: 
10). 
 The comparative advantage enjoyed by the farmers in neighbouring countries 
would push local farmers to relocate to countries where there was quality 
land and water and low labour costs. This would lead to further job losses in 
the country, especially in sectors which employ mostly the vulnerable workers 
like the agricultural sector; 
 Production by local farmers would therefore decrease and this would lead to 
increased import of agricultural products; 
 Imports of sub-tropical products like sugar and vegetables, for instance, could 
narrow the opportunities of local producers of increasing employment 
capacity in the agricultural sector; 
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 It would lead to a great decrease in agricultural exports due to reduction in 
local production (Cape Times 2013: 1); 
 These outcomes would greatly undermine the National Development Plan’s 
(NDP) goal of creating additional 1 million jobs by 2030 (Business Day Live 
2015: 3); 
 It would also lead to a decrease in government revenue by 0.3 per cent due 
to loss in income tax revenue; and 
 Food prices would increase, and this would hurt the very same vulnerable 
working poor people whom the policy was intended to help                 
(Mercury 2013: 1).  
 
Supporters of a minimum wage policy, however, argued that it would improve the 
working conditions of the vulnerable poor workers in the sector. They maintained that 
the policy would lead to the creation of more job opportunities for the majority of the 
unemployed South Africans. In his address to the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions’ (COSATU) executive, for example, former Brazilian president Lula da Silva 
argued that higher minimum wages would stimulate total demand for goods and 
services produced in the country. The effective demand would play a pivotal role in 
driving economic growth and economic development, particularly in a country like 
South Africa, where total demand was stifled by the high rates of unemployment and 
poverty. He maintained that once more money was put in the hands of the poor, they 
would spend more and that would make the giant wheel of the economy to start 
turning (Business Day Live 2015: 3).  
 
The ILO (2015: 12) adds that when wages are low, workers could demand less of 
the output produced in the country. Workers would end up being retrenched, as the 
employers would not be making more profit. In this case low pay becomes the main 
cause of unemployment. 
 
Supporters of minimum wages also maintained that the policy would lead to a 
reduction in industrial disputes, which are so prevalent in South Africa’s farming 
sector. It would also trigger an improvement in workers’ morale and living standards, 
which would increase their capacity to work. This would lead to a reduction in 
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debilitating diseases and time off due to illnesses. It would also lead to a reduction in 
work place accidents caused by fatigue. Productivity would therefore increase in the 
agricultural sector. In this case low productivity was seen as the direct consequence 
of low pay (International Labour Organisation 2015: 12). 
 
4.8 Criteria for setting minimum wages in South Africa’s 
agricultural sector 
 
When advising the Minister on the publication of Farming Sector Determination 
Number 8 of 2003, the following criteria were put forward: 
 The basic needs of the workers and those of their family members; 
 The average wage levels in the country; 
 The cost of living at that particular time; 
 The prevailing social security benefits; 
 The living standards of other social groups; 
 The economic situation and development at the time;  
 The impact of any proposed condition of employment or minimum wage on 
current employment or creation of new jobs in the sector (International 
Labour Organisation 2015: 17); 
 The possible effect of the proposed conditions of employment on workers’ 
health, safety and welfare;  
 The ability of employers to carry on with their business successfully after 
paying minimum wages; and 
 Any other relevant information made available to the Employment Conditions 
Commission (ECC) (Department of Labour 2015:10). 
 
4.9 The introduction of minimum wages in the agricultural sector 
 
The failure of the labour market to pay living wages forced the South African 
government to introduce sectoral minimum wages in the agricultural sector. The 
wage policy for the farming sector was first published on 2 December 2002, but it 
only came into effect on 1 March 2003. This policy was established in terms of 
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Section 51(1) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act No.75 of 1997 (Bhorat et 
al. 2012: 5). By the time the minimum wage was first introduced in the farming sector 
about 70 per cent of farm workers earned less than the urban minimum wage while 
50 per cent earned less than the rural minimum (Department of Agriculture  2015b: 
9).  
 
Initially, the farming sector minimum wages were set according to the areas where 
the farms were situated. Minimum wages for farms situated in urban municipalities 
were higher than those of rural municipalities. Urban municipalities covered those 
municipalities where the average household income was more than R24 000 per 
annum in the 1996-census. The workers’ minimum wage in these municipalities was 
set at R800 per month. Area B, on the other hand, consisted of municipalities where 
the average household income was between R12 000 and R24 000 per annum in 
the 1996-census. Workers’ minimum wages in these municipalities were set at R650 
per month as can be seen in Table 4.3 below (International Labour Organisation 
1992: 176).  
 
Table 4.3: Minimum wages for agricultural sector workers in urban 
and rural municipalities 
Urban municipalities 
1 March 2003 – 29 February 
2004 
1 March 2004 – 28 February 
2005 
1 March 2005 – 28 February 
2006 
Hourly rate R4,10 Hourly rate R4,47 Hourly rate R4,87 
Monthly rate R800 Monthly rate R871,58 Monthly rate R949,58 
Rural municipalities 
1 March 2003 – 29 February 
2004 
1 March 2004 – 28 February 
2005 
1 March 2005 – 28 February 
2006 
Hourly rate R3,33 Hourly rate R3,66 Hourly rate R4,03 
Monthly rate R650 Monthly rate R713,65 Monthly rate R785,79 
Source: Naidoo et al. 2007: 30. 
 
The agricultural sector minimum wages were regularly updated for inflation (Bhorat 
et al. 2012: 5). This was an attempt to avoid the purchasing power of minimum 
wages from being eroded by inflation (Eyraud & Saget 2005: 30). The minimum 
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wages for different municipalities laid down in 2003 were merged into a single 
minimum wage of R1 090 in 2009 (Business Day Live 2014: 2).  
 
Despite the minimum wages, farm workers still could not afford basic things like 
houses, education and clothing for their children. This made the Western Cape farm 
workers to go on strike in 2012, protesting against the low minimum wage, which 
was about R69 per day (Business day Live 2013: 2). The Bureau for Food and 
Agricultural Policy (2012: 1) asserted that the De Doorns violent protests were about 
the low wages, particularly for seasonal farm workers. They wanted the farming 
sector’s minimum wage to be increased to at least R150 per day, which was a 117 
per cent increase (Business Day Live 2013: 2). The striking workers felt that the 
higher minimum wage of R150 per day could be enough to meet the socio-economic 
needs of the low-paid workers in the sector (Business Day Live 2014: 3).  
  
In response to the demand for higher minimum wages put forward by the striking 
farm workers, the Department of Labour decided to revisit the Sectoral 
Determination for Agriculture, the most recent being the one concluded in March 
2012. The authorities negotiated with the farmers to try and come up with the 
amicable solution that would suit both the farmers and the farm workers. The 
negotiations enabled the Department of Labour to raise the minimum wage from R69 
to R105 per day, promulgated for a three-year period. In years two and three, the 
minimum wages would be increased by the consumer price index (CPI) plus 1.5 per 
cent as can be seen in Table 4.4 below. This was a 52 per cent increase (Business 
Day Live 2015: 2). Higher minimum wages of R105 per day, which was equivalent to 
US$13 in 2013, did not only apply to the De Doorns farm workers who started the 
strike, but it also applied to all farm owners and farm workers in all parts of South 
Africa. This increase added R2 billion to the wage bill of the farmers (Anetos 2014: 
2). 
 
The new minimum wage of R105 a day came into effect on 1 March 2013. All 
employers in the farming sector were expected to pay farm workers at least the 
minimum wage. The employers had to pay a farm worker who worked fewer than 45 
hours per week at least the hourly rate as set out in Table 4.4. 
132 
 
 
Table 4.4: Minimum wages for farming sector employees as of 1 
March 2013 
Minimum wage rate  Minimum wage rate  Minimum wage rate  
1 March 2013 to 28 February 
2014 
1 March 2014 to 28 
February 2015 
1 March 2015 to 28 February 
2016 
Monthly Weekly Daily Monthly Weekly Daily Monthly Weekly Daily 
R2274,82 R525,00 R105,00 Previous year’s minimum  
wage + CPI + 1.5% 
Previous year’s minimum wage 
+ CPI + 1.5% 
Source: Department of Labour 2013: 4. 
 
The farming sector minimum wage applied to all workers in the farming sector, 
including primary and secondary agriculture, mixed farming, horticulture, acqua-
farming and the farming of animal products or field crops, but it excluded forestry 
workers. For the purpose of this determination, a farm worker also included a worker 
employed in a home on a farm and a security guard who had been employed to 
guard the farm or other premises where farming activities were conducted. This 
determination did not cover any person in activities already covered by another 
sectoral determination or by a bargaining council agreement in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995. The provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
applied to all farm workers covered by the determination and their employers in 
respect of any matter that was not regulated in the sectoral determination 
(Department of Labour 2013: 2). 
 
4.10 The minimum wage and levels of actual wages 
 
In South Africa’s agricultural sector, the sectoral minimum wage did much to raise 
the wages of the working poor in the sector. Districts where wages were lower than 
the median wages of similar workers in other districts experienced greater increases 
after the introduction of minimum wages in the sector. Wage levels increased by as 
much as 17 per cent as a result of the minimum wage policy (Bhorat et al. 2014: 9).  
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Between 2001 and 2007, South African farm workers experienced the highest wage 
increase when compared to other sectors of the formal sector where workers 
received low-pay. From 2012 to 2013, South African farm workers experienced yet 
another greater wage increase. They experienced an average increase of 15.9 per 
cent (Statistics South Africa 2014a: 40). In 2013, the minimum wage in the 
agricultural sector was increased by about 52 per cent following the 2012 unrests for 
higher wages (Business Day Live 2013). 
 
Some economists argued that the employment effect of minimum wage largely 
depends on the level at which the wages were set relative to the market wage. They 
argued that moderate minimum wage increases do not affect employment in any 
significant way. The reason being that employers could find some ways of mitigating 
cost increases in ways other than reducing employment (Department of Labour 
2010: 26). Employers could reduce high wage bills caused by moderate minimum 
wage hikes by reducing other labour costs such as fringe benefits and training 
(Zavodney 1998: 25). They argued that large increases in the minimum wage, which 
were above the market wages, would lead to more job losses, especially among the 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers whom the policy was intended to help 
(Department of Labour 2010: 26). 
 
4.11 Research methodology and data  
 
To determine the effect that minimum wage policy had on employment of agricultural 
sector workers in South Africa two groups, namely; the agricultural sector workers 
and construction sector workers were compared. The agricultural sector workers 
were used as the experimental group while construction sector workers were used 
as a control group. Comparison between the two groups was initially made before 
the minimum wage policy was introduced in the agricultural sector in 2003 and 
before it was raised by 52 per cent in 2013. The initial comparison was done to 
establish the state of employment in the two groups before minimum wage policy 
came into effect in the agricultural sector. Employment levels in the two groups were 
again compared after minimum wages were introduced in the agricultural sector only 
in 2003 and after it was raised by 52 per cent in 2013. The post-comparison was 
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intended to establish how minimum wage policy influenced employment patterns in 
the agricultural sector as compared to the construction sector where there was no 
minimum wages.  
 
An analysis, using secondary data, will be undertaken to establish the employment 
implications flowing from minimum wage legislation in South Africa’s agricultural 
sector. Data used in the research was sourced from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
and the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), which were published by Statistics 
South Africa. The Labour Force Survey was a nationally representative household 
survey that was conducted biannually on the basis of rotating panels. It was 
conducted by Statistics South Africa between February/March and September from 
2001 to 2007. From 2008, the survey was conducted on a quarterly basis and it 
became known as the Quarterly Labour Force Survey.  
 
The surveys included about 30 000 households from both rural and urban areas in 
South Africa. The households in the sampled areas were surveyed in all nine 
provinces, thus making the data more representative. These households were visited 
by field workers employed and trained by Statistics South Africa. Information in the 
LFS was self-reported, as questionnaires were conducted through face-to-face 
interviews in each household visited (Statistics South Africa 2005: xxi). Both the 
Labour Force Survey and the Quarterly Labour Force Survey collected data on 
labour activities of individuals aged 15 to 64 years in South Africa (Statistics South 
Africa 2016b: iv). 
 
In 2008, the LFS was replaced by the QLFS, which was conducted four times per 
year. Both the LFS and the QLFS were designed to measure the labour market. 
They provided information on a variety of issues relating to the labour market like the 
level and pattern of unemployment, and the industrial and occupational structure of 
the economy. The design of the questionnaire used was in line with the requirements 
set by international bodies like the International Labour Organisation (Statistics 
South Africa 2005: i). 
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Data from the LFS and the QLFS was used to examine the effect of the minimum 
wage policy on the employment of farm workers, both skilled and unskilled, and male 
and female. Biannual data from the Labour Force Survey was used to assess the 
effect of a lower minimum wage increase of 17 per cent, which came into effect in 
March 2003, on employment.  
 
Data from the two LFSs was added and divided by two to achieve an average value. 
To determine the implications of a higher minimum wage increase on employment, 
the second and fourth quarter data from the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys of 2010 
to 2015 was used to establish the employment patterns before and after the 
implementation of the 52 per cent minimum wage increase. Data from the four 
quarters was added and divided by four to obtain the yearly average figures. To 
establish the effect that the wage policy had on employment, the periods before and 
after the minimum wage increase were introduced or increased were compared. 
 
To ascertain if changes in agricultural sector’s employment were indeed caused by 
minimum wage legislation, a control group was chosen. Matthews and Ross (2010: 
116) described a control group as a group of people who are similar to the 
experimental group in every way except the aspect of change. The control group that 
was chosen for this purpose was the construction workers of the informal sector. 
 
The group was considered relevant for this comparison because it shared similar 
characteristics with those of the agricultural sector workers. The majority of workers 
employed in both groups were Africans. In 2005, for example, 385 000 Africans were 
employed in the control group compared to only 43 000 of other racial groups. At the 
same time 391 000 Africans were employed in the agricultural sector compared to  
110 000 Coloureds and 75 000 Whites (Statistics South Africa 2005: 15).  
 
In both groups, more male workers were employed compared to female workers .In 
2005, about 269 000 male workers were employed in the control group compared to 
24 000 female employees. During the same period about 449 000 male workers 
were employed in the agricultural sector compared to 113 000 female employees 
(Statistics South Africa 2005: 15).  
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Employees in both groups had low levels of education. About 65.5 per cent of 
workers employed in the agricultural sector in 2011, did not have grade 12 (Visser & 
Ferrer 2015: 11). On the other hand, about 95 per cent of workers in the control 
group did not have grade 12 for the same period (Petersen 2011: 10). The only main 
difference between the two groups was that the agricultural sector workers received 
minimum wages while workers in the control group did not.  
 
To establish the implication of the minimum wage increase on mechanisation will be 
used, data used was sourced from Abstract of Agricultural Statistics published by the 
Department of Agriculture. This data showed how the value of capital assets like 
machinery, implements and tractors purchased by commercial farmers had changed 
over time. In this research, data from 2001 to 2014 was used with the aim of 
covering the periods when minimum wages were introduced in the sector in 2003, 
and when it was increased by 52 per cent in 2013.  
 
4.12 The employment implications flowing from minimum wage 
legislation 
 
4.12.1 The effects of lower minimum wage on employment 
 
The lower minimum wage increase of about 17 per cent introduced in the agricultural 
sector came into effect in March 2003 (Bhorat et al. 2012: 9). Some economists like 
Stigler (1946) argued that employers would lay off more workers only if the labour 
cost became much higher than their marginal products. Moderate minimum wage 
increases were therefore not expected to have any significant effect on employment. 
The actual effect of a 17per cent minimum wage increase is seen in Table 4.5 below. 
 
Table 4.5: The employment effect of a low minimum wage in South 
Africa’s agricultural sector (2001-2007) 
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Year Employment 
in 
agriculture 
Change in 
employme
nt 
(agricultur
e) 
Change in 
employme
nt 
(agricultur
e)  
Control 
group 
(constructio
n workers)  
Change in 
employment 
(control 
group) 
Change in 
employment 
(control 
group) 
 (thousand) (thousand) % (thousand) (thousand) % 
2001 735 _ _ 276 _  
2002 846 111 15.01 260 -16 -5.8 
2003 778 -68 -8.0 248 -12 -4.6 
2004 724 -54 -6.9 297 49 19.8 
2005 584 -140 -19.3 334 38 11.1 
2006 601 17 2.9 339 5 1.5 
2007 592 -9 1.3 353 14 4.1 
Source: Own calculations using Statistics South Africa’s data of 2001-2007. 
 
Before the introduction of minimum wage in 2003, employment in the agricultural 
sector was increasing as can be seen in Table 4.5 above. Between 2001 and 2002, 
for instance, employment in the sector increased from 735 000 to 846 000, which 
was an increase of 15.01 per cent. Between 2002 and 2003, a year in which the 
minimum wage came into effect in the sector, employment decreased by 8.0 per 
cent. It decreased from 846 000 in 2002 to 778 000 in 2003, which was a decrease 
of 68 000. From 2003 to 2005 employment in the agricultural sector continued on a 
downward spiral. The situation was made worse by the country’s economy that was 
not performing well at the time. Growth in the agricultural sector, for example, 
dropped by 4.6 per cent in 2003 before it recovered slightly by about 1.04 per cent in 
2004 (Jooste & Spies 2006: 12). The minimum wage, compounded with poor 
economic conditions, therefore affected employment in a very bad way. Employment 
in the sector only started to recover in 2006 as can be seen in Table 4.5. Between 
2003 and 2005, employment levels in the agricultural sector decreased by 25.1 per 
cent as can be seen in Table 4.5 (Statistics South Africa 2005 & 2007). 
 
The control group, which was also negatively affected by poor economic growth at 
the time, experienced a decline in employment between 2002 and 2003. However, 
unlike in the agricultural sector where the decline in employment started in 2003 after 
the minimum wage came into effect, a decline in the control group’s employment 
started in 2001 and recovered in 2004. Between 2003 and 2004, for instance, 
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employment in the control group increased by 19.9 per cent. At the same time 
employment in the agricultural sector continued on the downward spiral. Between 
2003 and 2004, for instance, agricultural sector employment decreased by 6.9 per 
cent as can be seen in Table 4.5. The decrease in agricultural sector employment 
could therefore be attributed to the introduction of a minimum wage in the sector 
because the same trend of continuous decline in employment could not be observed 
in the control group where there was no minimum wage (Statistics South Africa 2005 
& 2007). 
 
4.12.2 The effects of a higher minimum wage on employment 
 
The minimum wage increase of 52 per cent, which came into effect in March 2013, 
was highly criticised by the opponents of minimum wages. They argued that it would 
lead to rationing of jobs in the sector. Pieter Mulder, the leader of the Freedom Front 
Plus, for instance, argued that it would lead to the dismissal of the thousands of 
seasonal and temporary workers (Dodds et al. 2013: 2). Farmers complained that 
the high minimum wage of R105 would be unaffordable for them and that they could 
afford about R94 per day (Business News 2015: 3). Agri Wes-Kaap head, Carl 
Opperman, supported a minimum wage of between R80 and R85 per day, which 
was even less than the one proposed by the farmers. He predicted that a 52 per cent 
minimum wage increase would lead to about 30 per cent job losses in the sector 
(Davis 2013: 2). The information in Figure 4.6 sheds some light on the employment 
effect of a higher minimum wage increase in South Africa’s agricultural sector. 
 
Figure 4.6: The employment effect of a high minimum wage in 
South Africa’s agricultural sector, 2010-2015 
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Source: Statistics South Africa 2010a-2016b. 
 
Before the high minimum wage of R105 came into effect in March 2013, employment 
levels in the agricultural sector were increasing. It increased from 415 000 in the 
second quarter of 2010 to 739 000 in second quarter of 2013, which was an increase 
of 78.1 per cent. Even after the high minimum wage increase of 52 per cent came 
into effect, employment in the sector continued to rise until the second quarter of 
2013 as can be seen in Figure 4.6. It increased from 739 000 in the first quarter of 
2013 to 742 000 in the second quarter of 2013, which was an increase of 0.4 per 
cent. This indicated that the higher minimum wage of 52 per cent was not felt 
immediately after it came into effect (Statistics South Africa 2013a-2016b).  
 
The reason, which made the 52 per cent minimum wage increase of 2013 not have 
an immediate effect on employment in the agricultural sector, was an increase in the 
demand for agricultural sector products at the time. Prices of agricultural products 
increased considerably as a result of a higher demand. Prices of field crops, for 
example, increased by 23 per cent while those of animal products increased by 8.7 
per cent (Department of Government Communication and Information System 2014: 
34). 
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The growth in the demand for agricultural products was fuelled by an increase in 
exports that was made possible by the weaker Rand at the time. The Rand fell by 
almost 10 per cent in the first half of 2013 to reach a four-year low against the US 
dollar (Department of Agriculture 2013: 27). The weaker Rand encouraged countries 
like the Netherlands, United Kingdom, China and Zimbabwe to demand more 
agricultural products from South Africa (Department of Agriculture 2013: 12).  
 
This led to a considerable increase in gross agricultural income. Gross farming 
income from all agricultural products, for instance, increased from R31, 3 billion in 
the first quarter of 2012 to R34,1 billion in the first quarter of 2013, which was an 
increase of 8.9 per cent. The increase was largely supported by a huge increase in 
gross income from field crops, horticulture and animal products which increased by 
38.2, 12.1 and 3.3 per cent respectively (Department of Agriculture 2013: 27). The 
increase in the demand for the agricultural sector’s products could therefore be the 
main reason which made the demand for workers in the sector not to drop 
immediately after the high minimum wage increase.  
 
Employment in the sector started to decline only in the third quarter of 2013 when it 
dropped from 742 000 (second quarter) to 740 000 (third quarter). Employment 
continued on the downward spiral until it reached the lowest level of 670 000 in the 
second quarter of 2014 before it started to recover again in the third quarter of 2014. 
This meant that from April 2013 to April 2014 employment in the agricultural sector 
had decreased by about 72 000 workers, which was a decrease of 9.7 per cent 
(Statistics South Africa 2013a-2016b).  
 
The 9.7 per cent drop in employment could be attributed to the 52 per cent minimum 
wage increase because the same trend could not be observed in the control group 
where there was no minimum wage increase. Employment continued to increase in 
the control group as can be seen in Figure 4.6. Between March 2013 and March 
2014 employment in the control group increased from 354 000 to 370 000, which 
was an increase of 4.5 per cent. This happened at the time when employment was 
decreasing in the agricultural sector. This was a confirmation that employment in the 
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sector dropped due to the 52 per cent minimum wage increase (Statistics South 
Africa 2013a-2016b). 
 
4.12.3 Employment effect of minimum wage policy on males and 
females 
 
The employment effect of the minimum wage policy affected men and women 
differently in the agricultural sector. More women lost their jobs due to the minimum 
wage policy than men. When the minimum wage was raised by 52 per cent, for 
example, an average of 506 000 men were employed in the agricultural sector. After 
the introduction of the higher minimum wage of 52 per cent, which came into effect in 
March 2013, the number of male workers employed in the sector decreased to an 
annual average of about 488 000 in 2014, which was a decrease of about 3.6 per 
cent as can be seen in Table 4.6 (Statistics South Africa 2010a-2016b). 
 
By the time the higher minimum wage was introduced in 2013, an annual average of  
213 000 women were employed in South Africa’s agricultural sector. After the 
introduction of the higher minimum wage of R105 per day, the number of female 
employees employed in the agricultural sector decreased from an average of 228 
000 in 2013 to an average of 213 000 in 2014, which was a decrease of 6.6 percent. 
The percentage decrease of female workers employed in the agricultural sector was 
therefore higher than that of male employees as can be seen in Table 4.6. This 
confirmed the notion that female employees were affected more negatively by the 
minimum wage legislation than their male counterparts (Statistics South Africa 
2010a-2016b). 
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Table 4.6: The effect of minimum wage legislation on employment 
in terms of gender 
Year Male 
 
Change in 
employment 
level  
Change in 
employment 
Female 
 
Change in 
employme
nt 
Change in 
employment 
 (thousa
nd) 
(thousand) % (thousand) (thousand) % 
2010 417 - - 217 - - 
2011 413 -4 -0.10 201 -16 -7.4 
2012 445 32 7.7 216 15 7.5 
2013 506 61 13.7 228 12 5.6 
2014 488 -18 -3.6 213 -15 -6.6 
2015 587 99 20.3 264 51 23.9 
Source: Own calculations using Statistics South Africa’s data of 2010a-2016b. 
 
4.13 Substitution effect of minimum wages in South Africa’s 
agricultural sector 
 
The introduction of and continuous increase in the agricultural sector’s minimum 
wage led to an increase in production costs in the sector. Evidence from the key 
maize producing provinces like the Eastern Free State, North-West Province, 
KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga indicated that the cost of permanent and temporary 
workers in 2012 was as high as 19.8 and 22.27 per cent respectively. The cost of 
permanent workers for 2013 was projected to be 44.97 per cent as a result of the 52 
per cent increase in minimum wage (Saayman & Middelberg 2014: 348). According 
to statistics from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the wage bill 
of agriculture was about R14,5 billion or 13.3 per cent of the total cost in 2013/2014 
(AgriSA 2014: 3). 
 
The dramatic increases in labour cost made it difficult for the producers in the 
agricultural sector to cover their operating expenses as predicted by the standard 
competitive model. High labour costs made South Africa’s agricultural products to be 
less competitive in the global market. Local farmers found it difficult to compete with 
subsidised products in the global market (Saayman & Middelberg 2014: 344).  
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In an attempt to reduce higher productions costs and improve productivity farmers 
were forced to consider other alternatives such as the following: 
 Substituting unskilled workers with more skilled workers; and 
 Mechanisation (Saayman & Middelberg 2014: 344). 
 
4.13.1 The effect of minimum wage legislation on mechanisation in 
the farming sector 
 
The opponents of minimum wages argue that the policy makes labour costs to rise 
and this makes employers to substitute unskilled labour with machines (Dodds et al. 
2013: 1). It is, however, not clear how the introduction of sectoral minimum wages in 
the agricultural sector influenced mechanisation in that sector. To have a clear 
picture of how minimum wage policy influenced mechanisation in the sector, data 
from an Abstract of agricultural statistics was used show the value of capital assets 
purchased by commercial farmers between the year 2000 and 2014. This will be 
illustrated by figure 4.7 below. 
 
Figure 4.7: Capital assets in the agricultural sector, 2000-2014 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture 2015a: 78. 
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The value of mechanical implements purchased by commercial farmers has been 
increasing even before the minimum wage was introduced in the sector 2003 as it 
could be observed in Figure 4.7. From the year 2000 to 2003 the value of capital 
assets purchased by the commercial farmers in the country increased from 
R15 461million to R20 748 million which was an increase of 34.2 per cent. From 
2003 to 2005 the value of capital assets purchased by commercial farmers continued 
to rise from R20 748 million to R24 729 as it could be observed in the Figure 4.7 
(Department of Agriculture 2015a: 78). 
 
The value of capital assets purchased by the commercial farmers has been 
increasing even before minimum wage was raised by 52 per cent in 2013. The value 
of machines, implements and tractors purchased by commercial farmers increased 
from R39 148 million in 2010 to R51 626 million in 2013 which was aan increase of 
about 32 per cent. By 2014 the value of capital assets increased to R56 726, which 
was an increase of 9.9 per cent (Department of Agriculture 2015a: 78). 
 
4.13.2 The effect of minimum wage legislation on employment of 
skilled workers in the farming sector 
 
The standard competitive model predicted that high minimum wages, which made 
unskilled and inexperienced workers more expensive, would make employers to 
prefer skilled workers who are more productive than the unskilled, inexperienced and 
expensive workers (Schuldt et al. 2012: 265). With the introduction of the minimum 
wage in agricultural sector in 2003 expectations were that employment of skilled 
farm workers would increase as predicted by the standard competitive model. 
However, with the introduction of the minimum wage in the sector, employment of 
skilled farm workers dropped from an annual average of 208 00 in 2002 to an annual 
average of 77 000 in 2003, which was a decrease of 63 per cent. The number of 
skilled workers employed in the sector continued to drop until 2005 when it reached 
the lowest annual average of 70 000. It only started to recover in 2006 when it 
reached an annual average of 93 000 (Statistics South Africa 2009: 15). The 
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decrease in the employment of skilled farm workers after the introduction of the 
minimum wage in the sector was contrary to the prediction of the standard 
competitive model. 
 
With the introduction of a higher minimum wage of 52 per cent, which came into 
effect in March 2013, employment of skilled workers in the agricultural sector, 
however, increased as predicted by the standard competitive model. Before the 
introduction of the high minimum wage increase of 52 percent in 2013, employment 
of skilled workers in the sector was decreasing. In 2012, for instance, the 
employment level of skilled workers in the sector was an annual average of 64 000, 
down from the annual average of 88 000 in 2010. However, with the introduction of a 
daily minimum of R105 in March 2013, employment of skilled farm workers in the 
country increased from an annual average of 64 000 in 2012 to an annual average of 
69 000 in 2013, which was an increase of 7.8 per cent. Employment of skilled 
workers in the sector continued to rise and by 2015 the annual average was 96 000 
as can be seen in Figure 4.8 (Statistics South Africa 2010a-16b). 
 
Figure 4.8: Employment of skilled workers in the agricultural 
sector, 2010-2015 
  
Source: Statistics South Africa 2010a-2015b. 
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4.14 The implementation of minimum wage policy in the agricultural 
sector 
 
4.14.1 The role of labour inspectors 
 
For minimum wages to be complied with, the authorities had to ensure that the wage 
policy was enforced properly. Compliance with minimum wage legislation happened 
when workers who previously received sub-minimum wages then received stipulated 
minimum wages (Yamada 2012: 41). Labour inspections were the main instrument 
for ensuring that there was proper monitoring, which would encourage compliance. 
The inspections were carried out by law in most countries, which had adopted a 
minimum wage policy as instrument to protect the vulnerable workers (Benassi 2011: 
14). To ensure that the minimum policy was enforced properly in South Africa the 
authorities employed labour inspectors. The labour inspectors could promote, 
monitor and enforce compliance with a minimum wage law by doing the following:  
 Advise workers and employers of their rights and obligations in terms of an 
employment law; 
 Carry out regular inspections; 
 Investigate complaints made to a labour inspector by a minimum-wage 
worker; 
 Try to make employers comply with the wage law by issuing compliance 
orders; and 
 Carry out any other prescribed function (Department of Labour 1997:27). 
 
In order to monitor and effectively enforce compliance with the minimum wage law, 
the inspectors could:  
 Enter any work place without any warrant or notice; 
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 Remove records from the employer’s premises and copy them; 
 Require a person to disclose information on any matter relating to a minimum 
wage law; 
 Require a person to produce or deliver records or documents relating to the 
minimum wage to a place of the inspector’s choice;  
 Inspect or question any person about any work performed;  
 Any person questioned by the officer should answer all relevant questions to 
the best of his or her ability; and 
 Employers and employees should provide facilities necessary for the 
inspectors to carry out their work effectively (Department of Labour 1997: 28). 
  
In South Africa’s agricultural sector, most farmers did not comply with the minimum 
wages because of the following reasons: level of inspection, inappropriate fines, and 
unwillingness and inability to enforce the law by the authorities. 
 
4.14.2 Level of inspection 
 
In South Africa, the Department of Labour is responsible for enforcing minimum 
wage legislation. It employs labour inspectors to enforce and monitor compliance 
with the wage law in all sectors concerned, including the agricultural sector (Bhorat 
et al. 2012: 280). Labour inspections are usually costly and this makes governments, 
especially of developing countries, not to invest enough funds to finance the 
inspections. In these countries, labour inspector offices are usually understaffed, 
under-equipped and under-trained. This makes them to be ineffective when carrying 
out their inspection duties (Benassi 2011: 14).  
 
Just like other developing countries South Africa did not have sufficient funds to 
employ enough labour inspectors. In 2004, for example, South Africa had only 706 
labour inspectors employed in labour centres across the country. According to the 
Department of Labour, the inspectors carried out 184 070 inspections between April 
and December 2004. Extrapolating from these data it could be assumed that 245 
000 inspections were conducted per year. According the Department of Labour’s 
estimates, over one million employers were covered by the various sectoral 
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determinations in the country at that time. It could therefore be concluded that a 
large number of employers were never inspected, as only 245 000 inspections were 
carried out (Naidoo et al. 2007: 32).  
 
The agricultural sector in particular scored very low in terms of the number of 
inspections conducted by the labour inspectors (Naidoo et al. 2007: 32). This 
explained why the compliance level was so low in the sector. There were many farm 
workers who still received wages that were far below the stipulated minimum wages 
after its introduction in 2003 (Bhorat et al. 2012: 280). Stanwix (2013: 4) asserted 
that, while wages for farm workers had increased substantially after the introduction 
of the wage legislation, a significant proportion of farm workers received higher but 
sub-minimum wages. In September 2003, for instance, 53.8 per cent of farm workers 
earned less than the stipulated wage rates (Yamada 2012: 41). 
 
The non-compliance trend continued to rise in the sector long after the wage 
legislation was first introduced in 2003. By 2005, for example, compliance with the 
minimum wage level had dropped to only 19 per cent in the farming sector (Yamada 
2012: 41). Average wage-level of minimum wage workers increased by 29.2 per cent 
instead of 52 per cent (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy 2015: 41). By 2013 
and 2014 the mean monthly earnings of agricultural sector workers were R1 733 and 
R2 153 respectively (Statistics South Africa 2014a: 40). All these wages were lower 
than the R2 274.82 minimum wage prevailing in the sector in 2013 (Department of 
Labour 2013: 4). This is a confirmation that, while non-compliance tended to be 
minimal in developed countries, it is still a serious problem in developing countries 
like South Africa where resources are insufficient (Naidoo et al. 2007: 31). 
 
4.14.3 Inappropriate fines 
 
In enforcing minimum wage regulations, wage inspectors conducted workplace 
inspections. Inspectors served employers who violated stipulated employment 
conditions listed in the Sectoral Determination with penalties for non-compliance. 
Information on the penalties for non-compliance with the wage law showed that, 
while repeated offenses and greater levels of underpayment led to large penalties, 
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the overall fines were small when compared to the extent to which employers had 
underpaid their workers. A farmer who violated the wage law for the first time, for 
example, was fined only R300 per worker while a farmer with four previous violations 
of the same provision within three years was fined only R1 500 as can be seen in 
Table 4.7. The small fines encouraged the farmers to violate the wage legislation 
(Cassim et al. 2015: 73). 
 
Table 4.7: Fines for violating minimum wage laws 
Number of violations Imposed fine 
No previous violations R300 per worker 
No previous violation in respect to the same provision of the Act R600 per worker 
A previous violation of the same year or two violations in respect to the 
same provision during the past 3 years 
R900 per worker 
3 previous violations of the same provision within 3 years R1200/worker 
4 previous violations of the same provision within 3 years R1500/worker 
Source: Cassims et al. 2015: 73. 
 
4.14.4. Unwillingness and inability to enforce minimum wage laws 
 
At the time when minimum wage legislation was introduced in 2003, the compliance 
level was higher on large farms than on small farms. The reason for higher 
compliance on bigger farms was that the farmers thought they would be targeted by 
the labour inspectors (Bhorat et al. 2012: 280). However, soon after the wage 
legislation had been introduced, they realised that the government was either 
unwilling or unable to enforce minimum wage laws. The authorities were reluctant to 
enforce the wage laws for fear that it could lead to more job losses among the poor 
and less skilled workers whom the legislation was intended to help (Yamada 2012: 
47).  
 
This explained why the compliance level was extremely low in areas where the poor 
and less skilled workers were most likely to be employed. These were the areas 
where government inspections were likely to have the highest pay-off. The 
government’s inability and unwillingness to enforce the legislation encouraged the 
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employers on bigger farms to disregard the wage laws just like the employers on 
smaller farms. By 2005 the difference in compliance levels between the bigger and 
small farmers had disappeared (Yamada 2012: 47). 
 
4.15 Conclusion 
 
South Africa’s farming sector workers were some of the least paid workers in the 
country. Employers were able to exploit these workers because they were not 
protected by any labour legislation like workers in other sectors of the economy who 
were protected. The majority of farm workers did not even belong to any trade union. 
These workers were therefore only protected by the common law. That made it easy 
for employers to exploit these workers without any consequences (Grub 2005). 
 
The low pay that these workers received made them to continue to live in poverty 
just like people who were unemployed. They could not even support their families 
with the meagre pay that they had received. Most children of farm workers were 
therefore stunted and underweight due to lack of nutritious food (Visser & Ferrer 
2015). 
 
It was only in the 1990s and early 2000s that labour laws like the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act, the Labour Relations Act, the Employment Equity Act, the Skills 
Development Act and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act were extended to also 
cover workers in the agricultural sector (Grub 2005: 60). By extending these laws to 
the agricultural sector government was trying to improve the working conditions of 
the working poor in the sector. However, these laws did not do much to improve the 
working conditions of the working poor in the sector. The majority of workers in the 
agricultural sector continued to live below the poverty line (Department of Labour 
2010: 35). 
 
To help alleviate poverty among the working poor of the agricultural sector, 
government introduced sectoral determination legislation, which led to the 
introduction of sectoral minimum wage in the sector. The sectoral minimum wage 
was introduced in 2002 and it came into effect in March 2003. The 2003 minimum 
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wage increased agricultural sector wages by about 17 per cent but it was not high 
enough to improve the living conditions of the working poor of South Africa’s 
agricultural sector (Bhorat et al. 2014: 9). Minimum wages were inadequate to afford 
farm workers and their children a decent standard of living, as they could not afford 
basics such as housing, clothing and education (Brown-Luthango 2006). This made 
farming sector workers to go on strike for higher wages, which led to a further 
increase in the minimum wage by 52 per cent in March 2013 (Times Live 2016: 1).  
 
Minimum wages were also not properly complied with because inspection offices 
which were supposed to enforce the legislation were understaffed, undertrained and 
under-equipped. Fines imposed on offenders were too small when compared to the 
offences committed. This situation encouraged employers in the sector to disobey 
the minimum wage laws and it rendered the wage policy ineffective as a poverty 
alleviation strategy (Yamada 2012: 47). 
 
The minimum wages of 2003 and 2013 increased labour costs such that farmers 
decided to substitute most of their workers with skilled workers and machines 
(Saayman & Middelberg 2014: 344). As more skilled workers and machines were 
employed in the sector, the majority of unskilled workers were laid off as predicted by 
the standard competitive model. The majority of those who retained their jobs 
continued to be remunerated unfairly, as most employers did not comply with the 
wage policy. About 262 000 and 72 000 unskilled workers lost their jobs in the sector 
in 2003 and 2013 respectively (Statistics South Africa 2010a-2014b). The majority of 
those who lost their jobs were female employees when compared to their male 
counterparts. About 6 per cent of female employees lost their jobs after the 2013-
minimum wage increase compared to 4 per cent of male employees (Statistics South 
Africa 2013a-2016b). 
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                             CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
Countries across the globe, both developed and developing, used minimum wages 
as a tool for alleviating poverty among the working poor (National Treasury 2016: 8). 
A minimum wage set at an appropriate level was seen as an effective tool, which 
could play an important role in addressing extremely low pay, and the broader 
challenges of poverty and inequality (National Treasury 2016: 60).  
 
There is, however, a raging debate about the relevance of minimum wage as a tool 
for alleviating poverty among the working poor. The supporters of the policy believe 
that minimum wages will not only lead to an increase in employment of vulnerable 
workers, but that it will also stimulate aggregate demand and provide on-the-job 
training to the working poor. It will eventually make their skills more desirable and 
expensive (Hashimoto 1981).  
 
The opponents of minimum wages, on the other hand, believe that it does not 
alleviate poverty because most employers of vulnerable workers do not comply with 
the minimum wage policy. The opponents also believe that it will lead to job losses 
among the low-paid workers that it is intended to help. They argue that the policy 
benefits people from rich families instead of the working poor (Even & MacPherson 
1996). 
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South Africa also used sectoral minimum wages in sectors where vulnerable workers 
were employed, like the agricultural sector, in an attempt to pull them out of poverty. 
It is, however, not clear as to whether minimum wages succeeded in reducing 
poverty among the working poor in the agricultural sector or not.  
 
This chapter starts with a summary of the findings on employment and the 
enforcement of the policy globally. This is followed by findings on employment and 
enforcement in South Africa’s agricultural sector, the contributions of this study, 
suggestions for further research, recommendations and a conclusion.  
 
5.2 Summary of findings globally 
5.2.1 Findings on employment in developing countries 
5.2.1.1 Negative employment effect in developing countries 
In most of the developing countries, minimum wage policies led to job losses among 
the working poor whom it was intended to help, as predicted by the standard 
competitive model. In Malawi, for instance, more workers in the tea estates lost their 
jobs in 1989 after minimum wages were raised by 95 per cent and 126 per cent 
respectively. The number of work days in both the tea and tobacco estates also 
decreased following the 1989 increases in the minimum wages in the country. In the 
tea estates, the number of work days decreased by 17 per cent, while in the tobacco 
estates they decreased by 11 per cent (Livingstone 1995: 738). The limited number 
of work days had negative implications on wages of the working poor (Cunningham 
2007). 
 
Minimum wages which were introduced in the formal sector of Kenya in 1999 also 
led to job losses among the working poor whom the policy was intended to help. It 
was estimated that a 10 percentage point increase in minimum wages to a median 
wage made formal sector employment to decrease by between 1.1 per cent and 5.9 
per cent (Andalon & Pages 2008: 18).  
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In Ghana, manufacturing sectors’ employment dropped by between 5 per cent and 6 
per cent respectively after minimum wage was raised by 25 per cent in 1991. Firms 
which fully complied with the minimum wage policy retrenched about 2.5 per cent 
more workers than firms which did not comply (Jones 1997: 10).  
 
In Botswana, where minimum wages were first introduced in 1974, more workers lost 
their jobs due to the minimum wage policy. Job losses were most evident where 
minimum wages were increased by higher percentages (Sesinyi 1998).  
 
In Costa Rica, the increases in minimum wages which occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s led to job losses among the low-paid workers. It was estimated that a one 
percentage point increase in minimum wages led to a 0.4 per cent and 0.6 per cent 
drop in the covered sector and total employment respectively when the average 
wage level was 89 per cent (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001: 5). 
 
In Mexico, more skilled workers were employed in the 1970s when minimum wages 
were higher. However, unskilled female workers replaced most of the skilled male 
workers as minimum wages decreased in the 1990s. This confirmed the notion that 
higher minimum wages would lead to job losses of the very same people whom the 
policy was intended to help (Feliciano 1998: 178). 
 
5.2.1.2 Increased employment in the informal sector 
Some of the workers who lost their jobs in the formal sector found employment in the 
informal sector. This trend was observed in countries like Ghana and Kenya. The 
1999 increase in Kenya’s minimum wage increased informal sector employment by 
between 2.7 and 5.9 per cent (Andalon & Pages 2008). Most of the people who lost 
their jobs in Ghana’s the formal sector joined the informal sector of that country 
(Jones 1997).  
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5.2.1.3 Positive employment effect 
There was, however, instances where increases in the minimum wages led to 
increases in employment and work days as predicted by monopsonistic model. The 
126 per cent and 95 per cent increases in Malawi’s minimum wages led to a  
2 per cent increase in work days in the sugar estates of that country (Livingstone 
1995: 738). Unlike the smaller firms which retrenched workers, bigger firms in Ghana 
increased their employment levels after the 1991 minimum wage increase (Jones 
1997). 
 
Increases in employment were also observed in situations where minimum wages 
were raised by smaller percentages or where minimum wages were reduced. This 
was observed in Botswana in 1985, Costa Rica in the 1980s and 1990s, and in 
Mexico from the 1970s to the 1990s. In Botswana, an increase in employment was 
observed in sectors where minimum wages were raised by 37 Thebe per hour as 
opposed to sectors where minimum wages were raised by 56 Thebe per hour 
(Sesinyi 1998). Increases in employment were also observed in Costa Rica in the 
1980s and 1990s when minimum wages were increased by smaller percentages. At 
the average wage level of 30 per cent, for instance, a one per cent increase in 
minimum wage made the employment level of the covered sector to increase by 1.3 
per cent. When the average wage level was 55.5 per cent, a one percentage 
increase in minimum wage made employment levels of the covered sector workers 
to increase by 0.6 per cent (El Hamidi & Terrell 2001). More unskilled and 
inexperienced workers were employed in Mexico when minimum wages were 
consistently lowered from the 1970s to the 1990s (Feliciano 1998). 
  
5.2.2 Summary of findings on employment in developed countries 
5.2.2.1 Positive employment effect 
In developed countries, minimum wage policies had positive employment effects in 
that they led to an increase in employment levels in sectors where they were 
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introduced. In New Jersey’s fast food restaurants, full-time employment increased by 
3.2 per cent after minimum wage was raised by 3.1 per cent in 1992 (Card & 
Krueger 1994: 776).  
 
The increase in employment was also observed in the United Kingdom’s 
hairdressing salon industry after the national minimum wage was raised to £3.60 in 
April 1999. The positive employment effect observed in the United Kingdom was 
made possible by the fact that the national minimum wage was set at a cautious 
level. It was also introduced at the time when the country was experiencing high 
economic growth, and there was therefore a buoyant demand for goods and services 
in the country (Druker et al. 2005: 9). The increase in employment observed in both 
the United Kingdom and New Jersey confirmed the argument put forward by the 
monopsonistic model that minimum wages would lead to an increase in wages and 
employment of the low-paid workers (Jones 1997). 
 
5.2.2.2 Negative employment effect 
Although minimum wages led to increases in employment in both New Jersey and 
the United Kingdom, there were some negative effects that were caused by the 
wage policy in those countries. In both New Jersey and the United Kingdom, 
minimum wages made employers to pass on increased labour costs to the 
consumers by increasing the prices of their products. In New Jersey’s restaurants, 
for example, meal prices increased by 1.8 per cent after the introduction of a higher 
minimum wage of US$5.05 per hour (Card & Krueger 1994). In the United Kingdom 
some small business owners responded to the national minimum wage by employing 
smaller number of trainees (Druker et al. 2005). 
 
5.3 Findings on enforcement and compliance globally 
5.3.1 Findings in developing countries 
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In most of the developing countries, research showed that minimum wages were not 
enforced properly. Labour inspection offices, who were supposed to enforce the 
minimum wage laws, were understaffed and inspectors were not properly trained. 
This made it difficult for the inspectors to enforce the wage laws effectively. Low 
levels of inspection encouraged employers of minimum-wage workers not to obey 
the minimum wage laws as predicted by the opponents of minimum wage policy. 
Therefore, the majority of the working poor were paid wages, which were below the 
stipulated minimum wages (Benassi 2011).  
 
When the Malawian minimum wage was 45 kwacha, for example, 59 per cent of the 
tobacco estate workers and 37 per cent of sugar estate workers were paid below the 
stipulated minimum wages (Livingstone 1995: 737). In Kenya, about 29 per cent of 
agricultural sector workers and 17 per cent of non-agricultural sector workers were 
paid below the minimum wages in 1999 (Andalon & Pages 2008: 35).  
 
About 73 million working poor of India were paid below the minimum wage between 
2004 and 2005. Between 2009 and 2010 the number of people who were paid below 
the minimum wage decreased slightly to 61.1 million (Belser & Rani 2012). The 
majority of less skilled workers in Ghana were given wages, which were below the 
stipulated minimum wages in 1991 (Jones 1997: 10). In Botswana, the high level of 
non-compliance with the wage policy was common in small companies that were 
usually based in rural areas. Most of the workers employed in the small companies 
were therefore paid wages that were below the stipulated minimum wages (Sesinyi 
1998: 9). In Costa Rica, it was estimated that an average of 33 per cent of full-time 
salaried workers earned below the minimum wage between 1976 and 1991 (Gindling 
& Terrell 2002: 7).  
 
5.3.2 Findings in developed countries 
Unlike employers in developing countries, businesses in developed countries 
complied with the minimum wage policies. In New Jersey’s fast food restaurants, for 
instance, 90 per cent of employers paid the minimum wage of $US5.05 in 1991 while 
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the other 10 per cent paid more than the minimum wage. There was therefore no 
New Jersey’s employer who paid wages that were below the stipulated minimum 
wage of US$5.05 per day. The high level of compliance with the wage policy was 
made possible by the system of inspection, which was highly effective (Card & 
Krueger 1994: 776). The majority of workers employed in hairdressing salon 
businesses in the United Kingdom were as well paid the national minimum wage, as 
employers were afraid to be reported to the Employer Tribunal (Druker et al. 2005: 
18). 
 
5.4 Summary of findings in South Africa’s agricultural sector 
5.4.1 Findings on wages 
Minimum wages raised the wages of South Africa’s working poor. In 2003, minimum 
wage legislation raised the wages of the working poor by about 17 per cent (Bhorat 
et al. 2014). The high minimum wage increase of 2013 raised the wages of the low-
paid workers in the farming sector by R105 per day, which was an increase of 52 per 
cent (Business Day Live 2013). Areas where wages were much lower experienced 
high increases as compared to areas where wages were higher (Bhorat et al. 2014). 
 
5.4.2 Findings on employment 
The 17 per cent minimum wage increase of 2003 and 52 per cent minimum wage 
increase of 2013, led to job losses among the working poor of South Africa’s 
agricultural sector. Approximately 262 000 farm workers lost their jobs after minimum 
wages were raised by 17 per cent in 2003, while another 72 000 lost their jobs 
following the 52 per cent increase of 2013 (Statistics South Africa 2013a-2016b). 
 
The fact that most vulnerable workers in the agricultural sector lost their jobs in 2003 
when the minimum wage was raised by 17 per cent than in 2013 when it was raised 
by 52 per cent supported the argument that any big policy intervention should ideally 
take place when the economy was growing (National Treasury 2016: 8). At the time 
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when the wage policy was first introduced in the agricultural sector in 2003, the 
South African economy was not doing well. This was made evident by a decrease in 
real Gross Domestic Product, which dropped from 3.7 per cent in 2002 to 3 per cent 
in 2003 (IndexMundi 2017). The introduction of a minimum wage under those 
economic conditions made more vulnerable workers in the sector to lose their jobs. 
About 31 per cent of South Africa’s farm workers lost their jobs between 2002 and 
2005 as a result of the introduction of minimum wages (Jooste & Spies 2006: 12).  
 
Between 2011 and 2013, which was the period when the minimum wage was raised 
by 52 per cent, the agricultural sector was doing well economically. There was a high 
demand for agricultural products, which led to a considerable increase in prices of 
agricultural products. Gross farming income increased by R2.8 billion at the time 
(Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2013: 17).  
 
High demand for agricultural products, at the time, made employment in the sector 
not to drop immediately after the 52 per cent minimum wage has been introduced in 
March 2013. Employment only started decreasing in the third quarter of 2013 
(Statistics South Africa 2014). From the second quarter of 2013 to the second 
quarter of 2014, 9.7 per cent of farming sector workers lost their jobs. The 9.7 per 
cent drop in employment was, however, insignificant considering the fact that 
minimum wages had increased by 52 per cent at the time. 
 
Female employees were more negatively affected by the job losses than their male 
counterparts. The number of male workers employed in the agricultural sector 
dropped from 506 000 in 2013 to 488 000 in 2014, which was a decrease of 3.6 per 
cent. The number of female workers employed in the sector dropped from an 
average of 228 000 in 2013 to an average of 213 000 in 2014, which was a decrease 
of 6.6 per cent (Statistics South Africa 2010a-2016b). This meant that the 2013 
minimum wage increase pushed more women into unemployment.   
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5.4.3 Findings on mechanisation and skilled workers 
As the services of unskilled and inexperienced workers in the farming sector became 
more expensive, employers turned to skilled workers in an attempt to lower 
production costs and improve productivity (Saayman & Middelberg 2014). The 
increase in the number of skilled workers became evident after minimum wages 
increased by 52 per cent in 2013. The number of skilled workers employed in the 
farming sector increased from 69 000 in 2013 to 96 000 in 2015, which was an 
increase of 39.1 per cent (Statistics South Africa 2010a-2015b). This confirmed the 
argument put forward by the opponents of minimum wages that the minimum wage 
policy would make employers prefer skilled workers who were more productive over 
unskilled workers (Schuldt et al. 2012: 265).  
It is, however, unclear whether the introduction of minimum wage policy in the 
agricultural sector had any influence with regard to mechanisation. The value of 
machinery, implements and tractors purchased by commercial farmers had been 
increasing even before the introduction or raising of minimum wages in the sector. 
From the year 2000 to 2003 the value of capital assets purchased by commercial 
farmers increased by 34.2 per cent and from 2010 to 2013 it increased by 32 per 
cent (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2015). This makes it difficult 
to conclude that increased mechanisation in the sector occurred as a result of 
minimum wage policy.  
 
5.4.4 Findings on enforcement and compliance 
There was high levels of non-compliance with the minimum wage policy, as most of 
the working poor in the agricultural sector still earned wages that were below the 
stipulated minimum wages. By 2005, non-compliance with the policy was at its 
highest level at 81 per cent. In 2013, when minimum wages in the sector increased 
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by 52 per cent, the average wages of entry level workers increased by only 29.2 per 
cent and 32.7 per cent respectively (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy 2015: 
41). This meant there were workers who still earned below the stipulated minimum 
wage of 52 per cent. 
 
The high level of non-compliance with the minimum wage policy was the result of a 
shortage of inspectors. The few inspectors employed by the Department of Labour 
were also poorly trained and under-resourced. This encouraged employers to 
disobey the legislation as the risk of being caught was low. In the Western Cape, for 
example, the chance of being visited by a labour inspector was only 11 per cent in 
2007. Fines imposed on farmers, who did not comply with the policy, were also very 
low. A farmer violating the law for the first time was only fined 25 per cent of the 
amount of the underpayment. These factors encouraged most farmers not to comply 
with the minimum wage policy (Stanwix 2013: 4). 
 
5.5 Summary of contributions 
The findings support the argument for the standard competitive model that the 
minimum wage policy is not an ideal tool for alleviating poverty among the working 
poor because it leads to job losses among the very same people whom it is intended 
to help. Although minimum wages increased the wages of the working poor they also 
led to job losses in some of the developing countries studied and in South Africa’s 
farming sector. More female employees lost their due to minimum wages their male 
counterparts.  Those who retained their jobs did not benefit that much either due to 
the fact that there was poor enforcement of the policy, encouraging employers not to 
comply with the policy. In most cases employers continued to pay wages which were 
below the stipulated minimum levels, since the consequences for non-compliance 
were not dire. Minimum wages were also set at levels that were even lower than the 
poverty line. This made the working poor, who retained their jobs, unable to satisfy 
even their basic needs. 
 
5.6 Suggestions for further research 
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The topic of minimum wages in South Africa’s agricultural sector has been poorly 
researched. It is now a known fact that minimum wages increase the labour costs, 
which causes employers to lay off some of their workers. It is, however, not known 
as to what happens to workers who have lost their jobs due to minimum wages. 
Jones (1997) pointed out that the workers who lose their jobs in the formal sector 
end-up finding employment in the informal sector. It would, therefore, be helpful to 
investigate what happened to workers who lost their jobs in South Africa’s 
agricultural sector and other sectors where minimum wages were introduced. 
 
Workers benefit from minimum wage policy because it increases their purchasing 
power. It is, however, not known how employers benefit from high wages that they 
now pay to their employees. The Efficiency Wage Model argued that higher wages 
encourage workers to work harder such that they become more productive (Brown & 
Johnson 2006). Research should therefore be conducted to find out if higher wages 
brought about by minimum wage policy made farm workers more productive 
following the introduction of minimum wages. 
  
The macroeconomic model argues that the introduction of minimum wages would 
stimulate aggregate demand because workers would be having more money to 
spend (Levin-Waldman 2001). It is, however, not certain how minimum wages would 
influence aggregate demand in the South African context. Research to determine 
how farming sector’s minimum wages influenced aggregate demand in the South 
African economy would therefore be helpful. 
 
5.7 Policy implications  
Despite the fact that minimum wages led to job losses in South Africa’s agricultural 
sector, the policy was a useful tool in promoting social justice in that it improved the 
living conditions of the working poor, especially of those workers who managed to 
retain their jobs. Minimum wages played a crucial role because it raised the wages of 
the working poor in South Africa’s agricultural sector. Wage levels increased by as 
much as 17 per cent in 2003 and 52 per cent in 2013. 
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For the minimum wage policy to be even more effective, the following 
recommendations are made: 
 Given the vulnerability of the agricultural sector workers to disemployment 
effects and the evidence from previous experiences where job losses 
occurred, any adjustment of minimum wages should be based on past 
experiences or case studies. If available evidence suggests that an 
adjustment of minimum wage levels will lead to job losses, then such 
adjustments should not be made. Minimum wages should only be increased if 
evidence show that such an adjustment will not lead to job losses (National 
Treasury 2016: 10); 
 During recession periods minimum wages should either be frozen or 
increased cautiously. Past evidence should as a guide as to whether 
minimum wages should be frozen or increased cautiously. High minimum 
wage increases should be avoided during recession periods because such 
adjustments could lead to more job losses as it happened in 2003 (National 
Treasury 2016); 
 The adjustment period should also enable both farmers and farm workers to 
adjust to minimum wage increases in a manner that does not cause 
disruptions in the sector. For smooth adjustments to be possible minimum 
wage increases should be announced a year before the adjustments come 
into effect (National Treasury 2016);  
  Whenever minimum wages in the agricultural sector are increased, small 
farmers should be given more time to adjust to new wage levels. Sudden 
changes on the side of these farmers could lead to job losses as employers 
could not be ready for such changes (National Treasury 2016); 
 Any commercial farmer who could effectively motivate why s/he is unable to 
pay the new minimum wage level should be granted temporal exemption. 
Such exemptions should be granted only to farmers who are in significant 
economic distress. The process of exemptions should be based on 
appropriate and verifiable documentary evidence (National Treasury 2016: 
10); 
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 The authorities should consider appropriate punitive sanctions against 
commercial farmers who fail to comply with the minimum wage policy. 
Farmers who repeatedly fail to comply with minimum wage policy should be 
heavily fined. Only consistent losses will serve as effective deterrent to non-
complying employers. The cost of non-compliance should be structured in 
such a way that it outweighs the benefits. The punitive sanctions for non-
compliance should also be made known to the public (Benassi 2011); 
 Labour inspectors should promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the 
minimum wage policy by advising both employers and employees about their 
rights and obligations. They should also conduct inspections and investigate 
complaints made by farm workers on a regular basis (National Treasury 
2016); 
 Compliance with the policy will also be promoted if simplified, accessible and 
anonymous reporting is a requirement. Anonymous reporting could be 
achieved by setting-up call centres that handles employees’ queries and 
complaints regarding non-compliance. Posters on minimum wages should 
also be displayed in places of work. Information on minimum wage policy  
should also be widely advertised on radios to make farm workers fully aware 
of their existence. There should also be seminars where both farm workers 
and employers could be educated about the minimum wages (National 
Treasury 2016); 
 To overcome the challenge of lack of resources, which is common in South 
Africa, a prioritisation strategy should be adopted. Farms considered to be at 
risk of non-compliance should be targeted by inspectors. In this way the 
limited resources would be used most effectively (Benassi 2011); and 
 Sectoral minimum wage system, which is currently in place in South Africa, 
should be replaced by single wage levels which apply in all sectors of the 
economy where minimum wage workers are employed. A single minimum 
wage level (National Minimum Wage) makes marketing and enforcement of 
the policy more practicable and simple and this would promote compliance 
(National Treasury 2016: 78). 
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5.8 Conclusion 
Globally minimum wages had mixed outcomes. There were countries where 
minimum wage policies did not only increase the wages of low-paid worker; but they 
also increased employment in sectors where minimum wages were introduced. The 
increase in minimum wages and employment was observed in New Jersey’s fast 
food restaurants and the United Kingdom’s hair salon sector after minimum wage 
was raised by high percentage in the former and national minimum wage was 
introduced in the later. The increase in employment occurred despite the fact that the 
policy was properly enforced by the authorities. Increases in employment, after 
minimum wages were introduced or increased, were also observed in Botswana and 
Costa Rica in sectors where minimum wages were cautiously raised. The increases 
in Malawi’s minimum wages led to an increase in work days in the country’s sugar 
estates (Livingstone 1995). 
 
Minimum wages, however, also led to job losses in some of the economic sectors of 
Ghana, Kenya, Botswana and Costa Rica where wages were raised by high levels. 
The number of work days was decreased in Malawi’s tea and tobacco estates after 
minimum wages were raised by 95 per cent and 126 per cent respectively 
(Livingstone 1995). The job losses occurred despite the fact that most employers in 
these countries did not comply with the policy as enforcement was weak (Benassi 
2011).  
 
Minimum wages did not do much to improve the living conditions among South 
Africa’s agricultural sector workers either because it led to job losses among the very 
same workers that it was meant to help. As the services of unskilled and 
inexperienced workers became more expensive as a result of minimum wages, 
employers in the sector began to give preference to skilled workers. Majority of the 
workers who lost their jobs were female employees as compared to their male 
counter parts (Statistics South Africa 201a-2016a). The high level of job losses in the 
sector happened despite the fact that most of the employers did not comply with the 
policy (Bhorat et al. 2012).  
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Although sectoral minimum wages led to job losses among South Africa’s 
agricultural sector workers, it increased the wages of the working poor who retained 
their jobs in that sector. The 2003 and 2013 sectoral minimum wages raised the 
wages of the agricultural sector workers by 17 and 52 per cent respectively. The 
benefits derived from minimum wages made the authorities to consider this policy as 
an important tool for addressing income inequality among vulnerable workers. 
  
The role that minimum wage policy played in addressing income inequality in the 
country encouraged government to replace sectoral minimum wages with the 
national minimum wage, which is less complex and easy to understand. The national 
minimum wage was agreed upon by members of the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (Nedlac), which is made up of organised labour, 
organised business, communities and government (National Treasury 2016: 8). 
These parties agreed on a national minimum wage of R3 500 per month, which 
would come into effect from May 2018. The stipulated minimum wage is expected to 
uplift more than 6.6 million workers who are currently earning below R3 500 per 
month (Herald Live 2017: 1).  
 
From the period in which the national minimum wage is to become effective up to 30 
June 2019, applicable transitional arrangements will be in place and compliance will 
be aided through technical assistance and persuasion. Universal coverage of the 
national minimum wage will only take effect on July 2019. From July 2019 the 
enforcement for non-compliance will include payment of a fine (National Treasury 
2016: 62). 
 
A phase-in period was recommended for workers in vulnerable sectors like 
agriculture, domestic work and other sectors where the higher minimum wage of  
R3 500 could lead to job losses. The national minimum wage of R3 500 in the 
agricultural and domestic work sectors will therefore not be phased in immediately. 
For farm workers and forestry workers, 90 per cent of the national minimum wage 
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will come into effect in May 2018. For domestic workers, only 75 per cent of the 
national minimum wage will be implemented when the policy comes into effect. Any 
adjustment to the level tiers of 90 per cent and 75 per cent will be made on the basis 
of evidence of the impact of the national minimum wage in the sector concerned. 
The parties agreed that any transitional arrangement should be in place until 2020 at 
the latest (National Treasury 2016: 62).  
 
Businesses that are unable to pay the stipulated national minimum wage will be 
allowed to apply for exemption lasting one year. For these businesses to qualify for 
the exemption, they should effectively substantiate why they are unable to pay the 
national minimum wage (Herald Live 2017: 2). The exemption process will only be 
based on appropriate and verifiable documentary evidence (National Treasury 2016: 
63). Own-account workers and paid or unpaid workers in the informal sector are 
permanently excluded from the national minimum wage (National Treasury 2016: 
11).  
 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act, which currently governs the working 
conditions and regulation of wages together with the sectoral determinations, will 
continue to regulate all other employment conditions and mechanisms of 
enforcement. A new Wage Commission will be established to deal with setting 
wages and conditions of employment in all sectors and to review the national 
minimum wage (National Treasury 2016). 
 
Social partners agreed that the implementation of a national minimum wage would 
provide a positive intervention in addressing the high level of poverty in South Africa. 
Unlike the sectoral minimum wages, which varied according to sectors, the national 
minimum wage would be simpler and easier to communicate and implement, and 
those aspects would encourage compliance (National Treasury 2016: 9).  
 
The national minimum wage will also stabilise the labour market and reduce the 
number of strikes, stimulate growth as workers will spend more and address income 
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inequality, which has always been high. Generally, it will improve the lives of the 6.6 
million vulnerable workers who currently earn less than R3 500 per month (Herald 
Live 2017: 1). 
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